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15 of 178 Organizations Exposed in the Optimizely Cyber Attack, Explained

15 of 178 Organizations Exposed in the Optimizely Cyber Attack, Explained

Qz • November 17, 2026

Fifteen of the 178 organizations exposed through Optimizely's flawed testing tool, and what each listing does and does not show.

Most people who hear that a big company's website was hacked picture a break-in, with someone getting past the company's own defenses and into its systems. In this case the attacker went around those defenses through a supplier, Optimizely, whose website-testing software ran on the companies' pages. BNO News reports that at least 178 organizations were affected. That count is a minimum. Researchers at Report URI arrived at it by examining 1,611 Optimizely scripts, according to SecurityWeek , and organizations whose scripts went unexamined could raise it. These organizations a vendor, not a common lapse in their own security.

The tainted files were eventually cleaned, Infosecurity Magazine reports , but the attacker had built the code to take a great deal while it ran. BNO News reports that the malware could capture card details, cookies and screenshots, and that the number of visitors whose data was stolen is unclear. A brand caught up in this attack served the bad code to its visitors, but that fact alone does not show that any of those visitors were hurt.

Newsweek set out to catalog the organizations whose websites were exposed to the script-injection hack, a group that takes in names as different as IKEA, the BBC, Hang Seng Investment and the tour brand Costsaver. Crypto payments traced to the attack's wallets on November 16 total approximately $7,040. That sum is small, and it says little the card details and other personal data the code could have taken. The firm behind the count of affected organizations also has a business interest in the problem, because Report URI sells software that spots harmful scripts, according to The Web . Decrypt reports that the count comes from Report URI's examination of the scripts it could find, not from confirmed breaches. Each name therefore raises a question instead of settling one: Did the organization respond, and what is known the people who visited its pages that day?

Credit: Tyler Lahti /Wikimedia Commons ( CC BY-SA 4.0 )

A credit bureau's name on a hack list alarms readers, who picture records their own finances in someone else's hands. Equifax is named among the organizations whose websites were exposed in the attack. The company says it dropped Optimizely after investigating the problem without delay, according to Newsweek. That response treats the trouble as a supplier's failure, and Equifax's remedy was to remove the tool. Equifax Canada and Equifax UK appear among the affected names as well, so the exposure reached beyond the company's main pages to its regional sites. Equifax's place on the list records a tie to a supplier that the company has since cut. It does not record a failure inside Equifax.

Equifax's reassurance covers less than it first appears to. "We have not identified evidence of any compromise to our systems or impact to our data," the company said. The planted code ran in visitors' browsers, so a clean result for Equifax's servers does not show what happened on the screens of the people who loaded its pages. A visit to an exposed site does not by itself mean that a visitor's information was stolen. Equifax's own finding does not rule that out either, because the company checked its systems and not its visitors' devices. Equifax cut off the vendor quickly, but neither its statement nor its listing tells a customer whether anything was taken from them that day.

Credit: Donald Trung Quoc Don (Chữ Hán: 徵國單) / Wikimedia Commons ( CC BY-SA 4.0 )

For a bank, appearing among hacked websites raises the question its customers care most: whether their money and accounts were within an attacker's reach. ABN AMRO is listed as a separate entry among 32 banking and finance organizations exposed to the tainted script, according to Newsweek. The attack reached deep into the industry that handles people's money, so ABN AMRO's exposure is part of a pattern across finance rather than a single lapse at one bank. That pattern gives the bank's customers more reason for concern, but it does not settle what happened on any ABN AMRO site.

What a customer wants to know is whether anyone lost money through the bank's pages, and so far no loss has been tied to ABN AMRO. Investigators have traced cryptocurrency payments to the attack, but nothing on record connects any of those payments to the bank or shows that its customers paid the attacker anything. It is also unknown which of the bank's pages carried Optimizely's testing tool. The attacker reached ABN AMRO through that vendor rather than by breaking into the bank, and nothing public shows how the bank used the software. Nobody can yet say whether the tampered code appeared on the pages where customers sign in and move money or only on lighter pages around them.

ABN AMRO is a bank whose name appears among the exposed organizations, with no known harm and no known details. Its customers have reason to watch for more information, but they have no reason yet to assume the worst.

An investment firm's name on a hack roster is the one most likely to send readers to check their own accounts, because people trust such firms with their money. Hang Seng Investment is here as a money business that ran the compromised script on its website, not because of anything known its own systems. It is one of 32 banking and finance organizations whose sites were exposed in the attack, according to Newsweek. Finance firms formed a sizable group among the exposed sites, and nothing more is known Hang Seng Investment beyond its name. No detail has come out which of its pages loaded the code, how long they did so or who visited them that day. For a customer, that settles only whether the firm's site was exposed. It leaves open everything a customer would want to know, such as whether anything was taken from someone who logged in or browsed there.

Other reporting on the hack adds nothing Hang Seng Investment. Decrypt reports that HSBC was among the affected sites, along with the crypto and trading firms Ledger, IG and OANDA. Those names show that the attack reached several companies that handle people's money, but Hang Seng Investment is not among those examples. Its absence neither confirms nor contradicts its exposure. It means only that the firm's customers have no further detail to go on.

For Hang Seng Investment's customers, the honest reading is the narrowest one: the firm's site loaded the tampered code, and what that meant for anyone who visited it remains unknown.

Pankaj Patel / Unsplash

GitLab is where developers store and build their code, so readers might expect it to guard its own web pages more closely than most companies do. Yet GitLab appears among 23 technology and software organizations whose sites were exposed, according to Newsweek. Infosecurity Magazine lists GitLab as affected alongside Salesforce $CRM , IKEA and Optimizely, the vendor behind the compromised tool. Those names tie GitLab to the attack through a supplier it shared with a furniture retailer and other software firms, not through any known weakness in code GitLab wrote itself.

GitLab's listing describes nothing the company's own systems, and no detail shows what reached the people who used its site. The attack as a whole went past the browser. Its operator also deployed two kits aimed at Apple $AAPL 's iOS devices, named Coruna and DarkSword, according to Infosecurity Magazine . No report connects those kits to GitLab's pages. Still, an attack that could aim at a phone poses a broader threat than a stolen password or a skimmed card. For a GitLab user, the useful question is what their own phone or computer loaded that day, not whether GitLab was breached.

No statement from GitLab how it responded has been reported. Readers can't tell when GitLab removed the script from its pages or whether the company is rethinking the outside code it allows on its site. That gap matters because each customer still decides which outside code its pages load. "Supply chain breaches may be an inherent weakness of the web in its current form, but this doesn't excuse organizations from failing to reduce their own attack surface," William Wright, CEO of Closed Door Security, told Infosecurity Magazine. A company that sells tools for building software is well placed to meet that standard.

For now, GitLab's name sits on the list without an answer, and for a software company that unanswered question is the most telling part of its entry.

Every other organization on this list was exposed through another company's product, but Optimizely was exposed through a weakness in its own. Newsweek reports that attackers got in through a flaw in Optimizely's testing software and used it to inject harmful code. The incident started at the supplier, not at any of the sites that later served the code. The flaw was in Optimizely's Experimentation platform, the product companies load onto their pages to test them. Attackers used that product to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects, according to BleepingComputer . Customers trusted the platform to run inside their websites, so the attackers needed only one way into Optimizely to reach all of those pages at the same moment.

The best measure of how many scripts carried the code comes from outside the company, with researchers counting 188 tainted scripts, according to Newsweek. Optimizely's own account of the attack carries no number. "They used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects," the company told BleepingComputer. to that outside count, "some" is the only measure the company at the center of the attack has offered, and its customers must rely on someone else's tally. Optimizely did not escape the attack either. The company has admitted in a status update that an outsider broke in through a weakness in its software. Its own website loaded the malicious script as well, according to urlscan.io scans reported by BleepingComputer . Owning the product gave Optimizely no protection, and its own site served visitors the same code that its customers' pages did.

Newsweek reports that Optimizely says it has closed the hole and cleared the planted code out of the affected projects. At least one large customer cut off the scripts anyway. Salesforce $CRM moved to disable Optimizely scripts on both its preview and production sites, according to BleepingComputer . The vendor's fix was not enough for Salesforce to keep running those scripts.

For the other organizations on this list, the open question is no longer whether Optimizely has fixed its flaw. It is whether they will keep running another company's code inside their own pages.

Accruent's website is among those the script-injection hack may have affected, and nothing suggests anyone broke into the company's own systems. Accruent works in technology and software, but that expertise would not have protected it from this kind of attack. Any exposure would have come through an outside tool that Accruent ran on its pages, not through code the company wrote itself. Accruent is one of 23 technology and software organizations whose sites the attack may have reached, according to Newsweek. With that many software firms in the same group, the thread that joins them is the vendor they shared, not any one company's security habits. Read that way, Accruent's entry says more how much software firms rely on outside website tools than how well Accruent guards its own systems.

Accruent's name appears with no further detail. No separate statement its exposure or its response is on record. Nobody outside the company can say whether its pages carried the code, for how long, which pages were involved, or what Accruent did once the problem came to light. Those gaps leave the most important question unanswered. Nothing on record shows whether anyone who visited Accruent's site that day lost data or money. A possible exposure does not by itself mean that anything was taken from those visitors. Until the company says more, Accruent's place among the affected sites marks a risk rather than a known harm.

For Accruent's customers, the entry is a question to put to the company, not a verdict already reached.

Adam Kolmacka / Unsplash

IKEA is a furniture store, so the concern over its place in this attack centers on the shoppers who use its website. Newsweek reports that IKEA is named among the affected organizations and that the company is investigating whether its customers were affected. The company did not dismiss its place among the exposed sites. Instead, it treated the matter as an open question that it still needed to check. That leaves IKEA customers with one known fact, that the company's site was among those exposed, and one unanswered question: whether anything reached them.

The supplier's repair does not answer that question for IKEA. Optimizely has patched the flaw and taken the planted code out of affected customer projects, according to a company status update reported by BNO News. IKEA, for its part, said it was working "to understand any potential impact on our digital services and customers." The two statements cover different things. The vendor's fix concerns its own tool, while IKEA's review concerns its own site and the people who used it. IKEA has not reported finding any harm to its customers. An IKEA customer who used the company's website should watch for word from the company rather than assume the worst.

A large retailer can be named among a supplier's affected customers and still not know whether the problem reached a single shopper.

Austin Burke / Unsplash

Levi's New Zealand is named among the retail and fashion organizations whose websites were exposed in the attack, according to Newsweek, and the company's other regional storefronts are named with it. Levi's sites for Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Korea appear as well. The company's shops across much of Asia and the Pacific are therefore among the sites that may have loaded the attacker's code. A New Zealand shopper who reads the entry as a local glitch is reading it too narrowly. Being named does not mean that anything was taken from a given site. Anyone who browsed or bought from one of those Levi's shops during the attack is still left with the same unanswered question whether anything was taken from them.

Levi's has made no statement on record its exposure. The company has not said how far the problem ran across its regional sites, whether it ran the vendor's script at all or what its shoppers should do now. Nothing beyond the New Zealand store's name is on record either. There is no detail on whether any of its pages carried the code, for how long, or whether checkout pages were among them. That gap leaves the shopper with almost nothing to act on. The store's name appears among the possibly affected sites, but nothing on record says what that meant for the people who used it.

Only Levi's can tell its customers in New Zealand and across the region what happened to them.

The attacker's code turned up on sites where people watch television and films, as well as on the pages of banks, software makers and newsrooms. NOW Italia, an Italian streaming service, is one of the streaming and entertainment sites exposed to the tampered Optimizely script, according to Newsweek. For someone who opened the site to browse shows or manage a subscription that day, that listing marks a site where the risk existed, not proof that anything reached or left their own screen. NOW Italia was not the only streaming brand exposed, and NOW TV and the German service WOW from Sky Deutschland were caught in the same attack. An Italian viewer should therefore see NOW Italia's entry as one of several streaming sites exposed in more than one country, rather than as a problem specific to this one service. What these brands have in common on the record is the vendor's tool, not anything known their own systems, and that tool is the plainest explanation for why an Italian streamer and a German one appear among the exposed sites together.

For NOW Italia, the fact that its site was exposed is all that is on record. The company has made no public statement, and no one has reported how long the script stayed on its pages, which pages carried it, or whether NOW Italia removed the tool or changed how it loads outside code. Viewers are left with one question that no one has answered yet: whether anything was taken from the people who visited the site during the attack. Their card details, logins and devices may have come through untouched, or they may not have, and nothing yet shows which. Until NOW Italia or investigators say more, the site's exposure is the only fact on record, and any harm to its viewers is unknown.

Pacharamon Dorego / Unsplash

Newsrooms form their own group among the organizations exposed in the attack, and CNN is one of 10 news and media names in it, according to Newsweek. One compromised testing tool reached that many news brands at once because so many of them had placed it on their pages. CNN belongs to that group for one reason only. An infected Optimizely script was loaded on CNN's site, SecurityWeek reports , and Report URI named CNN among the affected organizations. Beyond that exposure, nothing CNN is on the record. CNN has not been reported to have made any statement, and no harm or response specific to CNN has been described. Its place among the exposed sites raises questions what happened on CNN's pages and answers none of them.

A CNN reader's phone may have been part of the risk as well as their browser. The attack's tools included exploit kits aimed at Apple $AAPL 's iOS devices, known as Coruna and DarkSword, according to SecurityWeek . Security researchers have not shown that this part of the attack worked. "The current evidence does not establish a zero-day, successful device exploitation, or collection of specific device data by unseen downstream stages," Hudson Rock, a security firm, said. A CNN reader has to keep both facts in mind: an attacker may have tried to reach their phone, and nobody has shown that the attempt succeeded.

CNN is a news organization whose work includes holding others to account, yet it has given no account of its own exposure. Until it does, its listing remains an open question for its readers, not a finding them.

K. Mitch Hodge / Unsplash

The BBC's exposure comes with a clock time as well as a name, and that time marks the first injection of Nov. 16. The BBC is among the organizations possibly affected, according to Newsweek, and the day's first injection appeared in the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC, according to Security Affairs . That hour falls before dawn in Britain, so the code reached the BBC's pages before the day's first wave of readers arrived.

The early start matters because the cleanup came late. Work to remove the code from affected sites began only around 20:40 UTC, according to Security Affairs , so the attack ran from before dawn into the evening. Nobody has said when the code left the BBC's pages in particular. People return to a news site again and again through a day, and even part of that window gives the BBC's entry more weight than a name alone.

The BBC was not the attacker's first target. The same actor had been going after Turkish sites since Sept. 17, according to Security Affairs . By the time the code reached one of the world's best-known broadcasters, the attacker was not new to this work.

Nothing the BBC's exposure points to a flaw in its own systems. The BBC's name marks a site where the compromised Optimizely script appeared, not confirmation that BBC systems were breached or data stolen. The code came in because the BBC's pages trusted it. "The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy," researchers at Report URI said, as reported by Security Affairs. For the BBC, the question is less how well its defenses held and more which outside code its pages should be allowed to load.

Rubaitul Azad / Unsplash

Fox News is named among the organizations whose websites were affected by the attack, according to Newsweek. Hackread reports that the evidence doesn't show Fox's internal network was breached or that all of its visitors were compromised. Fox Sports is listed as a separate entry, so the vendor's code may have appeared on more than one Fox site. A reader who moved between Fox's news and sports pages could have met that code on either one. For a company that runs both news and sports sites, the useful question is how widely its web properties depended on the vendor. The two separate entries suggest that the dependence may have gone beyond a single page.

Fox could have responded in public, but no response has been reported. Salesforce $CRM , which was also caught up in the Optimizely fallout, said it was investigating and was disabling the scripts as a precaution, according to Hackread . The only reassurance on record for Fox readers comes from Optimizely, which says it fixed the flaw and removed the injected code. That assurance covers the vendor's own files and says nothing what Fox checked on its own pages. Fox readers are left to take a supplier's word a site the supplier does not run.

Whether any one reader lost anything depends less on the Fox brand than on how Fox built its pages and what that reader did on them. A standard browser safeguard protected some data on sites that use it, because cookies marked HttpOnly were beyond the reach of the injected script, according to Hackread . Fox has not described its setup, and a reader cannot tell whether that protection covered their own session data.

Until Fox says more, a reader's best guide to their own risk is what they did on the site on Nov. 16, not the brand's name among the exposed sites.

NPR's website was exposed to the compromised testing script, and nothing known NPR's own systems explains that exposure beyond the vendor tool it ran on its pages. The public broadcaster is one of 10 news and media organizations whose sites were exposed, according to Newsweek. What connects NPR to the other news names in that group is the outside tool they used to test their web pages. Nothing on record points to a lapse in any newsroom's own security. NPR's name shows that the broadcaster relied on a supplier whose software was turned against its customers. It does not show that NPR made a mistake in how it built or protected its own site.

The record on NPR stops at that exposure. No statement from NPR has been reported, and no effect on the people who visited its pages has been described. The missing account does not show that NPR's readers were harmed, and it does not show that they were safe. It also leaves basic questions unanswered, such as how long the tampered code stayed on NPR's pages and which of those pages carried it. Until NPR or investigators say more, its readers have nothing beyond the listing to help them judge their own risk.

A reader who visited NPR's site that day knows only that a vendor's tampered code reached it, and NPR has not said what that meant for them.

BBC Earth's website was exposed in its own right, apart from the BBC's. A reader who sees two BBC names might assume the same exposure was counted twice, but Newsweek reports that BBC Earth is listed as a separate entry from the BBC. The tampered tool was tracked site by site rather than company by company, so one familiar brand can appear under more than one name. For a visitor, the difference matters, because BBC Earth's entry concerns its own website and not the BBC's main pages.

Nothing beyond the bare fact of exposure is on record for BBC Earth. The only date attached to it belongs to the attack as a whole, and no detail its own site that day is known. Nobody has said which script appeared on its pages, how long the code stayed there, or whether any visitor lost anything. Some other organizations caught up in the attack have described their response, but nothing on record describes how BBC Earth responded. Someone who browsed BBC Earth on the day of the attack can learn only that the site was among those exposed. Whether anything was taken from that person remains unknown, and no information so far answers the question in either direction.

With no other detail attached, BBC Earth's entry means one thing: a supplier's tampered tool was loaded on its site, and every question its visitors remains open.

People planning trips online were within the attack's reach, and Costsaver's website is one place where that happened. Newsweek reports that the travel brand was one of nine airline and travel names whose sites carried the tainted Optimizely code. Nothing else the company is on record. Nobody has said whether Costsaver responded, how long the code stayed on its pages, or whether any visitor was affected. The entry establishes that Costsaver's site served the bad code on November 16. It doesn't establish that Costsaver's own systems were breached or that anyone who browsed its trips lost anything.

Costsaver is listed alongside Trafalgar, Contiki, Insight Vacations and The Travel Corporation, so travel brands form a visible group among the exposed sites. A traveler who sees those names together might assume the companies one parent, one web setup and one response to the incident, and that news one would cover all of them. Nothing on record supports that. Whether these brands are related companies has not been stated. A Costsaver customer has no basis for assuming the company shares the other brands' systems or their handling of the attack.

For anyone who looked at Costsaver's site that day, what the exposure meant is still entirely open. The site carried the script, and so far no one has said whether its visitors were harmed or safe.