Tested version : JeecgBoot v3.9.5, default configuration (context-path /jeecg-boot ).
Status : Unfixed in 3.9.5 and on main (HEAD 2026-09-22). validateGatewayBasePath (3.9.5) only validates the URL syntax of the X_GATEWAY_BASE_PATH header and re-serializes it; it does not restrict the host. The Host branch used by {{domainURL}} is not validated at all.
Reachable on a default installation because the vulnerable flow is seeded by the official SQL seed data (full dump jeecg-boot/db/jeecgboot-mysql-5.7.sql or Flyway V3.8.0_2__airag_init_db.sql ), not created by the administrator.
3.8.0last through 3.9.5 , and the current main branch ( main still declares jeecg-aiflow-boot4:3.9.5 ).
Verification details:
Each engine jar listed above was downloaded from Maven Central and disassembled; all of them contain {{domainURL}} → CommonUtils.getBaseUrl(HttpServletRequest) .
v3.8.0 is excluded because jeecg-aiflow-jdk8:1.0.0 has no @IgnoreAuth on /run , and v3.8.0's Shiro chain ends with /** = jwt .
The seed flow 1900029596154232833 exists in jeecgboot-mysql-5.7.sql (line 183, v3.9.5) and in flyway/sql/mysql/V3.8.0_2__airag_init_db.sql for every release from v3.8.0 to v3.9.5.
In 3.8.0last through 3.9.3, getBaseUrl returns the X_GATEWAY_BASE_PATH request header directly ( return xGatewayBasePath; , no validation). 3.9.5 runs it through validateGatewayBasePath , which only checks the scheme, rejects userInfo and re-serializes the URI; it does not restrict the host, so X_GATEWAY_BASE_PATH: is still accepted. The Host branch is unvalidated in all versions.
Code locations (v3.9.5, all classes below are from jeecg-aiflow-boot4:3.9.5 unless noted):
The controller method is unauthenticated:
JwtFilter whitelists it before any token check:
The service loads the flow from the database by ID and executes it with the current thread's real request bound into the flow context:
The HTTP node component reads the request back from the flow context and resolves the placeholder:
CommonUtils.getBaseUrl concatenates request.getServerName() and request.getServerPort() — that is, the Host header — with no validation:
The X_GATEWAY_BASE_PATH branch was sanitized for issue 9695 ( validateGatewayBasePath ), but that check only validates URL syntax and does not restrict the host; the Host branch used by this code path is not validated at all.
The seeded flow contains two HTTP nodes:
The response body is written back into the flow context ( setContextData(nodeId, "body", respBody) ) and returned through the SSE stream. If the caller supplies X-Access-Token , the engine also forwards it (and X-Tenant-Id ) to the attacker-chosen destination:
Observed on JeecgBoot v3.9.5:
The target issued POST /jeecg-boot/test/jeecgDemo/add to the listener ( User-Agent: Java/25.0.3 ), independently confirmed with tcpdump .
DNS resolution of the attacker domain was observed at the network layer.
The SSE stream contained I/O error on POST request for " .
When the listener answered {"result":{"records":[{"id":"SSRF_RESP_ECHO_9F3A"}]}} , that body was reflected in the SSE stream, proving full-response SSRF.
A Host header pointing at the server's own listening port made the server call itself and return the internal response.
Unauthenticated attacker-controlled HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts and ports, including loopback, RFC1918 networks and 169.254.169.254 , with the response reflected to the caller. If the caller sends an X-Access-Token , it is forwarded to the attacker-chosen destination, enabling token exfiltration.
The only limitation in a default installation is the request path, which is fixed by the seeded flow ( /jeecg-boot/test/jeecgDemo/add and /list ). Host, port and scheme are fully attacker-controlled.
Resolve {{domainURL}} from server-side configuration instead of the request Host header.
Enforce a scheme/host/port allow-list and block loopback, link-local and private ranges before RestTemplate.exchange .
Remove @IgnoreAuth from /airag/flow/run , or require a valid token plus an explicit permission for flow execution.
Workaround: disable or delete the seeded sample flow 1900029596154232833 .
VulDB entry:
Vendor repository:
Maven artifact:
Seed data: jeecg-boot/db/jeecgboot-mysql-5.7.sql line 183 (v3.9.5)
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