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Bitcoin's Quantum Fix Hits a Harder Problem: Moving 7 Million Coins

Bitcoin's Quantum Fix Hits a Harder Problem: Moving 7 Million Coins

Finance.Biggo • November 22, 2026

Bitcoin's effort to guard itself against future quantum computers is running into a constraint that better cryptography cannot fix: the industry still has to persuade millions of coin holders, exchanges and bridge operators to actually move their funds.

Roughly 7.12 million BTC, or 35.4% of the issued supply, sat behind public keys already visible on the blockchain as of a Nov. 10 analysis by Glassnode, the on-chain data firm. That is up from an October count of more than 6 million BTC, or 31.2% of circulating coins.

Visible public keys are not the same as compromised private keys. No publicly demonstrated quantum machine can currently break the elliptic-curve signatures that authorize Bitcoin transactions. The concern is theoretical but consequential: a sufficiently powerful future computer could, in principle, derive private keys from exposed public keys and take control of the associated coins.

Glassnode traced 25.8% of the supply exposure to address reuse, a category that includes 11.6% held on exchanges. The remaining exposed coins sit in older address formats and transaction structures that reveal public keys by design.

"The clock that matters is migration," said Leo Fan, chief executive of blockchain infrastructure company Cysic, arguing that practical changes across wallets, exchanges and other providers could take longer than writing new security standards.

Developers split on dormant wallets

Bitcoin developers agree the exposure needs attention. They do not agree on whether holders should be forced to act.

In April, Jameson Lopp and five co-authors introduced Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 361, which would phase out the ECDSA and Schnorr signatures used today. Under the draft, payments would initially be limited to addresses using the vulnerable signatures, followed by additional requirements for spending coins that had not migrated, on a timeline stretching several years after a post-quantum transaction system is activated.

Lopp has argued that restricting access to dormant holdings may be preferable to letting a future attacker seize them. Blockstream chief executive Adam Back has backed voluntary upgrades and opposed a predetermined deadline that could lock legitimate owners out of their own funds.

Neither position is policy. A separate draft, BIP 360, proposes a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output type that removes Taproot's key-path spending option. The design could narrow attacks that rely on long-exposed public keys, but it does not by itself add quantum-resistant signatures or close every avenue of attack.

Fan framed the dormant-coin question as a governance matter rather than an engineering one. "Coins that never move are a social problem, not a technical one," he said, adding that if the old spending path stays open indefinitely, attackers will use it.

The data do not show how many of the exposed coins are permanently lost or how many owners could complete a migration if one were required.

Custody and bridges lag behind

Institutional holders face a separate obstacle. Exchanges and asset managers typically split transaction approvals across several people or machines, relying on multisignature or multi-party computation setups so that no single participant controls the funds.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology finalized post-quantum signature standards in 2024, but multi-party versions remain under development. In January, the agency issued a separate call for proposals on threshold cryptography, in which several parties jointly perform cryptographic operations while control of the private key stays distributed.

Some testing is under way. In May, BitGo and Silence Laboratories completed a simulated post-quantum transaction using the ML-DSA signature standard inside a multi-party computation system, showing how quantum-resistant signing could coexist with institutional custody procedures such as distributed key management and approval workflows. No production rollout has been announced.

Coinbase has urged a gradual approach, flagging signature sizes, transaction fees, network capacity and wallet compatibility as factors that must be settled before new standards go live.

Cross-chain bridges carry an extra layer of difficulty because their security spans more than one network. Rootstock's PowPeg locks bitcoin on the original chain and issues corresponding RBTC assets on the Rootstock sidechain. Its published roadmap puts protocol-level post-quantum signatures and hybrid accounts in 2027, with an assisted account migration program in 2028, alongside work on signing infrastructure and hardware security modules. Rootstock cannot unilaterally change Bitcoin's base protocol.

Elsewhere, adoption is moving faster at the account level. NEAR added ML-DSA transaction signing through a July mainnet upgrade, and Algorand launched native Falcon-1024 accounts in August, though broader institutional multisignature support and additional wallet integrations are still in progress.

Note: Figures come from Glassnode's public-key analyses. Exposed public keys do not mean private keys have been compromised.

Note: Timelines are as published by the projects involved and remain subject to change.

What it means for the market

The exposure figures are a measure of migration work rather than an immediate threat, and that distinction matters for how investors read them. Coins in old address formats are safe today; the risk crystallizes only if quantum hardware advances far enough to break current signatures, and no such machine has been demonstrated publicly.

The nearer-term pressure falls on infrastructure. Custodians that cannot yet offer quantum-resistant multi-party signing, and bridges whose security depends on networks they do not control, would need to rebuild approval and key-management systems before holders could move funds even if they wanted to. Coinbase's list of unresolved issues -- signature sizes that swell transactions, fee effects and wallet compatibility -- suggests the transition will be paced by engineering and economics as much as by cryptography.

The dormant-coin debate is the wildcard. A mandatory migration would force long-idle holdings to move or be restricted, a change with no precedent in Bitcoin's history. A voluntary approach preserves property norms but leaves exposed coins in place indefinitely. With neither BIP 361 nor BIP 360 adopted, the network has acknowledged the problem without settling how to solve it.

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The full story

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Bitcoin Quantum Exposure: ~6-7M BTC Behind Visible Public Keys, Migration Plan Unresolved Glassnode's November 10 analysis, as reported by Finance.Biggo, found roughly 7.12 million BTC (35.4% of supply) behind public keys already visible on the blockchain, up from over 6 million BTC in October. Glassnode's May 2026 estimate was approximately 6.04 million BTC, and broader research cited by Tradingview and Crypto Briefing puts the figure at 6 to 7 million BTC. Finance.Biggo attributes 25.8% of the exposure to address reuse, including 11.6% held on exchanges, with the rest in older address formats that reveal public keys by design. Crypto Briefing reports about 1.7 million BTC sit in legacy P2PK addresses. No publicly demonstrated quantum computer can currently break Bitcoin's elliptic-curve signatures, so the risk is theoretical. Proposed BIP-361 (introduced in April by Jameson Lopp and five co-authors) would phase out ECDSA and Schnorr signatures and could restrict spending of unmigrated coins; Adam Back has opposed a predetermined deadline. BIP-360 proposes a Pay-to-Merkle-Root output type but does not by itself add quantum-resistant signatures. Both BIPs remain in draft with no activation timeline as of November 2026. Crypto Briefing reports StarkWare carried out what it described as the first quantum-safe Bitcoin transaction on mainnet in August 2026. The articles do not establish how many exposed coins are permanently lost or how many owners could complete a required migration. 2 sources 25