China & Taiwan Update, November 13, 2026

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is very likely continuing to conduct a major unannounced exercise that simulates isolating Taiwan from outside intervention during a contingency. ISW-CDOT assessed on November 6 that the PRC was conducting a major military exercise around Taiwan.[1] Taiwanese Minister of National Defense Wellington Koo confirmed on November 10 that the PRC was conducting “area denial” drills in the Western Pacific with its naval forces, including the Liaoning carrier strike group (CSG).[2] Taiwanese National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Joseph Wu reported on November 12 that the number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels operating around Taiwan had decreased since November 3, but that large naval formations from the PLA’s Eastern, Northern, and Southern Theater Commands remained east of Taiwan.[3] Wu’s report indicates that the military exercises are ongoing, as PLA and CCG vessels continue to conduct a close encirclement of Taiwan while operating significant surface forces between Taiwan and Guam.[4] The PLA’s movements follow the same pattern that ISW-CDOT reported on November 6.[5]

The scale and duration of these movements indicate that the PRC is simulating an extended isolation of Taiwan. A naval isolation of Taiwan would be greater in scope than a blockade and would focus on intercepting adversary naval forces rather than halting commercial traffic. The Liaoning CSG has been at sea for a month at the time of writing, while the other surface forces operating alongside the Liaoning CSG in the Western Pacific have been at sea for at least two weeks.[6] The Japanese Ministry of Defense released information on PLA vessel movements indicating that PLA forces likely practiced escorting large sustainment vessels through the Miyako Strait toward the Western Pacific on November 2 and 12.[7] These movements could indicate that the PLA is drilling the ability to keep surface forces from multiple theater commands in the fight beyond the first island chain for extended periods of time. This capability could prove critical in a Taiwan contingency, allowing the PLA to conduct a sustained isolation campaign that prevents US and allied forces from reaching Taiwan.

The PRC likely seeks to normalize its military presence around Taiwan and impose a new regional status quo that degrades Taiwanese sovereignty. PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times released an editorial on November 11 criticizing reports that the PLA was conducting a major, unannounced military exercise, including ISW-CDOT’s November 6 assessment.[8] Global Times stated that the PLA military activity and CCG patrols around Taiwan were “legitimate arrangements within China’s sovereignty.”[9] Global Times further characterized PLA military activity in the region as “routine,” claiming that the PLA is transforming its presence around Taiwan from “periodic” to “around-the-clock” operations.[10] Global Times notably did not deny the presence of major PLA forces around Taiwan and instead framed ongoing PLA activity as legitimate demonstrations of PRC sovereignty, despite the clear implications for a Taiwan contingency.

The PRC is likely conducting an information campaign with the goal of establishing a more regularized military presence around Taiwan as a new regional status quo. This could explain the PRC’s decision not to name the ongoing exercise or announce the majority of its activity beforehand. The PRC Ministry of Defense described the Liaoning CSG’s movements as a “routine exercise” on October 14 but did not on any of the other large task forces operating east of Taiwan.[11] Global Times’ insistence that PLA activity around Taiwan reflects “regular” patterns of behavior is a constituent part of this cognitive warfare campaign.[12] The PRC may aim to gradually increase the frequency of similar major military maneuvers to further the perception that the PLA could easily isolate Taiwan and that the waters east of Taiwan are under the PRC’s sovereign jurisdiction.

PRC Exercises Around Taiwan: As ISW-CDOT assessed on November 6, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is very likely continuing a major, unannounced military exercise simulating an extended isolation of Taiwan. The duration of the exercise and apparent efforts to sustain naval operations beyond the first island chain between Taiwan and Guam suggest that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is practicing its ability to prevent US and allied forces from reaching Taiwan during a prolonged contingency.

PRC Cognitive Warfare: The PRC is likely attempting to establish a new baseline for military activity around Taiwan by portraying unusually large deployments as routine. Normalizing such operations could enable the PRC to increase its military presence around Taiwan while reinforcing perceptions that it can isolate the island at will.

Cross-Strait Relations

The US Department of State reported that PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi and United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed a possible unprecedented trilateral leader-level meeting between the United States, the PRC, and Russia on November 11.[13] The PRC could seek to use this forum to ensure it plays a key role in global governance norms and attempt to ensure US cooperation on key policy areas. United States President Donald Trump reportedly pushed for talks on denuclearization as part of the trilateral summit.[14] The PRC reportedly rebuffed the idea of discussing denuclearization in a trilateral meeting.[15] The meeting reportedly may shift focus to “areas of potential consensus,” including a potential agreement to limit the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in nuclear command and control.[16] The Russian Foreign Ministry has stated that a trilateral meeting with Trump and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping “is being worked out.”[17] A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press release regarding the call did not mention the potential trilateral summit, however.[18]

Trump has repeatedly sought joint talks on denuclearization with the PRC and Russia since at least February 2025.[19] The PRC is reportedly heavily resistant to talks concerning denuclearization, indicating that less sensitive issues, such as limiting the use of AI with nuclear weapons, may be the focus of a trilateral summit.[20] The PRC MFA press release regarding the call did not list any specific issues Wang and Rubio discussed beyond PRC-US relations. The PRC may agree to participate in a trilateral summit as a way to further its goal of playing a decisive role in the establishment of global AI governance norms.[21] A trilateral US-PRC-Russia summit would be unprecedented in the modern era.[22]

A US federal court indicted a PRC national on November 5 for making false statements to US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents after he attempted to break into and photograph FedEx facilities at the Chicago O’Hare and Toronto Pearson airports. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) filed a criminal complaint against Weiheng Zeng that stated that Zeng admitted to photographing the interiors of FedEx logistics facilities at Toronto Pearson International Airport in October 2025 and Chicago O’Hare International Airport in April in exchange for payment.[23] Zeng falsely told US CBP agents that he was taking pictures of rare aircraft at O’Hare as a hobby.[24] Zeng later admitted to FBI agents that an unnamed PRC government , likely an agent of a PRC state security service, recruited him through an online aviation enthusiast forum to photograph the interiors of FedEx logistics facilities in Canada and the United States.[25] Zeng stated that the PRC government provided him with SIM cards for receiving orders by text message and instructed Zeng on methods to avoid detection by authorities, including telling Zeng to claim that he was an aviation photography hobbyist if questioned by US or Canadian authorities.[26]

Zeng stated that his PRC government handler sought information on transportation and logistics in the United States, including air freight logistics, bus routes, and train routes and schedules.[27] PRC intelligence agencies may be targeting international airport logistics facilities and other logistical nodes in the US and NATO member states to better track the movement of sensitive high-tech or defense-related shipments, national security and defense personnel, and other targets of strategic interest to the PRC. A PRC intelligence agency recruited Yaqi X., an employee working for a logistics firm at Leipzig/Halle Airport, to spy on military equipment shipments and the movements of personnel linked to the major German defense manufacturing firm Rheinmetall from 2023 to 2024.[28]

FedEx currently holds a contract with the US government permitting it to transport Department of Defense shipments, classified materials, and other national security-related shipments.[29] FedEx also operates services specializing in shipping International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and other export-controlled goods internationally.[30] The PRC likely aims to acquire military and dual-use technologies from the United States and NATO member countries through espionage to support PLA modernization efforts.[31] The PRC likely also seeks to spy on the movement of US and NATO military equipment and defense-industrial personnel to better inform its assessments of the United States and NATO’s military readiness and planning.[32]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] dot cn/page/202611/1374122.shtml [9] dot cn/page/202611/1374122.shtml [10] dot cn/page/202611/1374122.shtml [11] dot cn/gfbw/qwfb/16492998.html [12] dot cn/page/202611/1374122.shtml [13] dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374120/rubio-wang-hold-phone-call-trump-xi-meeting- -week; [14] dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374120/rubio-wang-hold-phone-call-trump-xi-meeting- -week [15] dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374120/rubio-wang-hold-phone-call-trump-xi-meeting- -week [16] dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374120/rubio-wang-hold-phone-call-trump-xi-meeting- -week [17] dot ru/20261112/tszinpin-2131086003.html [18] dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202611/t20261111_12057696.shtml [19] [20] dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3374120/rubio-wang-hold-phone-call-trump-xi-meeting- -week; dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3371544/will-xi-trump-putin-meet-apec-first-they-must-agree-agenda [21] dot gov.cn/wjbzhd/202611/t20261111_12057696.shtml [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32]