These 10 major crypto hacks in history, from Mt. Gox and The DAO to Bybit's roughly $1.5 billion theft, show how exchanges, bridges and smart contracts became targets
Most of the money lost in crypto's major thefts did not disappear because someone broke the underlying cryptography. It vanished through the systems built around it: exchanges holding customer coins, smart contracts with flawed code and bridges that move tokens between blockchains. Each of those layers concentrated value in one place, and each became a target.
This list covers 10 major crypto hacks in history, arranged in the order they happened. It is a selection, not a complete ranking. The incidents run from the collapse of the Tokyo-based exchange Mt. Gox in 2014 to the theft at Bybit in February 2025. Together, they trace how the targets changed as the industry grew.
Early cases centered on exchanges and on code. Mt. Gox reported 850,000 bitcoin missing when it filed for bankruptcy. The DAO, a venture fund built on Ethereum, lost 3.6 million ether through a flaw in its code. The community responded with a hard fork, and the original chain carried on as Ethereum Classic.
Later cases moved to cross-chain bridges. These hold large pools of tokens so users can shift assets from one network to another. Poly Network, Wormhole, Ronin Network and the BSC Token Hub bridge on BNB Chain all fall into this group. The BNB Chain incident was a bridge exploit. It was not a breach of the Binance exchange.
The attackers changed too. The FBI attributed the Ronin Network theft to North Korea-linked groups known as Lazarus Group and APT38. It later attributed the Bybit theft to North Korea as well, naming a group called TraderTraitor. Bybit, at $1.5 billion at the time of the theft, is the largest dollar-value theft in this list.
What happened after each theft varied. The Poly Network attacker returned nearly all of the funds taken. A substantial part of the KuCoin losses was later recovered. Jump Crypto, a backer of Wormhole, replaced that bridge's missing funds. In the Bitfinex case, the U.S. Department of Justice announced in February 2022 that it had seized 94,000 bitcoin tied to the 2016 theft.
Crypto prices move sharply. A theft's dollar value therefore depends on when it is measured. Each dollar figure in this list is the rounded value at the time of the theft. Mt. Gox appears in bitcoin only, because the cause and timing of its losses remained contested.
Mt. Gox bitcoin losses and the 2014 collapse of a Tokyo exchange
Mt. Gox, a Tokyo-based bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in February 2014 after reporting that 850,000 bitcoin were missing.
The missing coins fell into two groups. 750,000 bitcoin belonged to customers who had left funds on the platform. The remaining 100,000 or so belonged to the company itself.
That split shows where the damage landed. Most of the loss fell on account holders rather than on the business. Customers who left coins with the exchange did not control the private keys to those coins. When the bitcoin disappeared, those customers became creditors in a bankruptcy case. They were no longer owners of coins they could move or sell.
The picture changed after the filing. 200,000 bitcoin were later found. That reduced the net shortfall to roughly 650,000 coins. The recovery did not answer the central questions. It remained unclear how much was taken by outside attackers and how much was lost through internal failures. The period over which the coins drained away was also never pinned down.
Mt. Gox did not start as a bitcoin business. Its name came from "Magic: The Gathering Online eXchange," a site first meant for trading cards from the fantasy card game. Jed McCaleb turned the domain into a bitcoin exchange in 2010. He sold it to Mark Karpelès the following year. Karpelès ran Mt. Gox as its chief executive until the collapse.
Japanese police arrested Karpelès in August 2015. In March 2019, the Tokyo District Court convicted him of manipulating electronic data to falsify the exchange's records. He received a suspended sentence. The court acquitted him of embezzlement charges.
In 2018, a Tokyo court moved the case out of bankruptcy and into civil rehabilitation. That process allowed creditors to be repaid in part with recovered bitcoin. Repayments to creditors began in 2024.
Mt. Gox kept customer bitcoin under a single operator's control. When that operator failed, the coins of every customer on the platform were exposed at once.
The DAO hack of 2016 and the Ethereum Classic split
In June 2016, an attacker exploited a flaw in the code of The DAO, a venture fund built on Ethereum, and drained 3.6 million ether. That haul was worth roughly $60 million at the time of the theft.
The DAO took its name from the term decentralized autonomous organization. It had no managers or board in the usual sense. Investors bought tokens with ether, and those tokens gave them votes on which projects the fund would back. Smart contracts — programs that run on the Ethereum blockchain — held the money and enforced the fund's rules.
That design placed the entire fund inside a single body of code. The weakness the attacker used was a reentrancy bug. The contract sent ether out before it updated its own record of the balance. That gap let the attacker request withdrawals again and again before the books caught up.
The drained ether did not leave right away. It moved into a so-called child DAO, a split-off copy of the original contract. The rules of that structure imposed a holding period of 28 days before the funds could be withdrawn. The delay gave the Ethereum community time to debate a response.
The response was a hard fork of Ethereum, carried out in July 2016. A hard fork is a change to a blockchain's rules that older software does not accept. This one rewrote the network's state so that the affected ether went to a recovery contract. DAO token holders could then exchange their tokens for ether.
Not everyone accepted the change. Some participants argued that a blockchain's record should never be altered, even to reverse a theft. They kept running the original, unaltered chain. That chain continued as Ethereum Classic, which trades as a separate cryptocurrency from ether.
The episode showed that one coding error in a smart contract could expose an entire pool of funds to an attacker. It also showed that a blockchain's users could reverse a theft through a software upgrade. Doing so split the network in two.
Bitfinex hack: 119,756 bitcoin stolen in 2016
In August 2016, thieves took 119,756 bitcoin from Bitfinex, a cryptocurrency exchange based in Hong Kong. The haul was worth roughly $72 million at the time of the theft.
Bitfinex let customers buy, sell and hold digital assets. That meant the exchange kept large amounts of bitcoin in its custody. The bitcoin protocol caps total supply at 21 million coins. The stolen coins equaled 0.6% of all the bitcoin that can ever exist.
Bitfinex halted trading after the breach. It then spread the losses across its customers, cutting account balances by 36%. It issued tokens called BFX to cover the difference and redeemed them by April 2017.
Every bitcoin transfer is written to the public bitcoin blockchain. Anyone can follow coins on that ledger from one address to the . That record does not disappear after a theft. The coins taken from Bitfinex could still be traced long after they left the exchange.
The case stayed open for years. In February 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice announced it had seized 94,000 bitcoin tied to the Bitfinex theft. That was most of the bitcoin taken in 2016. The department valued the seized coins at $3.6 billion.
The two dollar figures in this case measure different moments. The $72 million figure reflects bitcoin's price in August 2016. The $3.6 billion figure is the department's valuation in February 2022, five and a half years later. The seizure covered fewer coins than were stolen. Even so, the seized portion was valued at roughly 50 times what the full haul had been worth at the time of the theft.
The Justice Department arrested Ilya Lichtenstein and Heather Morgan, a married couple, in New York in connection with the case. The arrests and the seizure came in the same February 2022 announcement. Both later pleaded guilty. In November 2024, Lichtenstein was sentenced to five years in prison and Morgan to 18 months.
Coincheck hack: 523 million NEM tokens taken in 2018
In January 2018, hackers took 523 million NEM tokens from Coincheck, a cryptocurrency exchange based in Tokyo. The stolen tokens were worth roughly $530 million at the time of the theft. That made it one of the largest crypto thefts of its period.
NEM is a blockchain network, and its native token trades under the ticker XEM. Coincheck held its customers' NEM on the exchange itself, the way most centralized trading platforms hold deposits. Customers did not control the private keys to those tokens. The exchange did.
The weak point was where Coincheck kept the tokens. The exchange stored its NEM in a hot wallet, which is a wallet connected to the internet so it can process withdrawals quickly. Coincheck had also not set up multisignature protection on that wallet. Multisignature, or multisig, requires more than one key to approve a transfer. Without it, control of a single key was enough to move the funds.
Cold storage works differently. Keys kept offline cannot be reached through a network intrusion. Exchanges commonly keep most reserves in cold storage and only a working balance in hot wallets. Coincheck's setup left a large NEM balance exposed in one online location.
Once the tokens left the exchange, they sat on a public ledger. Every transfer on the NEM blockchain was visible to anyone who looked. That transparency let observers follow the stolen tokens as they moved between addresses. Tracking the funds did not return them to Coincheck.
The theft drew a regulatory response in Japan. The country had begun registering cryptocurrency exchanges in 2017. Coincheck was still operating while its registration application was pending. After the hack, the Financial Services Agency inspected the exchange and ordered it to improve its business operations.
Coincheck pledged to compensate affected customers in Japanese yen. In April 2018, the online brokerage Monex Group agreed to acquire the exchange.
KuCoin exchange hack of 2020: $281 million in tokens
In September 2020, attackers took $281 million in assorted tokens from KuCoin, a cryptocurrency exchange based in the Seychelles. That figure is the tokens' value at the time of the theft. A substantial part of the stolen funds was later recovered.
The haul was not a single coin. It was a mix of assets held by the exchange. Each asset moved on its own blockchain or under its own token contract. The theft therefore spread across several separate ledgers at once.
KuCoin said the breach involved its hot wallets. A hot wallet is an exchange account kept connected to the internet so that customer withdrawals can be processed quickly. Its private keys sit on networked systems. Anyone who obtains those keys can move the funds the wallet holds.
Cold wallets keep their keys offline. They are slower to use but much harder to reach remotely. Exchanges generally hold most customer assets in cold storage. They keep a smaller working balance in hot wallets to cover day-to-day withdrawals.
Public blockchains keep a permanent record of every transfer, and a theft does not erase it. Stolen tokens can be traced from one address to the . That trail gives exchanges, token projects and investigators a way to follow funds as they move.
Some tokens also carry controls that bitcoin and ether lack. A project that issues a token through a smart contract can, in some designs, freeze balances held at a given address. Tether, the company behind the USDT stablecoin, has this ability for USDT. Some projects can also replace a compromised token with a new version and leave the stolen one worthless.
The response to the KuCoin breach drew on these tools. Several token projects froze or replaced the affected tokens after the theft. Other exchanges were asked to watch for and block deposits from addresses linked to the attackers.
Poly Network exploit: $611 million taken and returned in 2021
In August 2021, an attacker exploited Poly Network, a cross-chain protocol, and took crypto assets worth $611 million at the time across several blockchains. The attacker then returned nearly all of the funds.
Poly Network was built to move value between separate blockchains. Each chain keeps its own ledger and cannot read another chain's records on its own. A cross-chain protocol bridges that gap. It locks assets on one network and releases or issues matching assets on another. Smart contracts check each request before a transfer goes through.
The weak point sat in those contracts. Poly Network relied on a set of designated signers, known as keepers, to approve transfers between chains. The attacker found a way to make the protocol's own contracts replace the keeper key with one the attacker controlled. With that change in place, the attacker could authorize withdrawals that the system treated as legitimate.
One set of contracts governed assets on every connected chain. Once those contracts were compromised, the losses spread across several networks at once rather than staying on a single ledger.
The affected chains included Ethereum, Polygon and BNB Smart Chain, which was known at the time as Binance Smart Chain. Each of those networks runs its own tokens, validators and software.
Public blockchains record every transfer, and anyone can inspect that record. The movement of the taken assets was visible from the start. Observers could follow the addresses holding them as the funds moved.
Some of the assets were frozen before they could move. Part of the haul was held in USDT, a stablecoin issued by Tether. Tether froze $33 million of those tokens shortly after the attack.
Over the following days and weeks, the attacker sent the assets back in stages. Nearly all of the roughly $611 million returned to the protocol's control. Poly Network publicly offered the attacker a $500,000 bounty during that period.
The bulk of the recovery came through the attacker's own transfers back to the protocol.
Wormhole bridge hack: 120,000 wrapped ether stolen from the Solana link
In February 2022, an attacker exploited Wormhole, a bridge between the Solana and Ethereum blockchains, and took 120,000 wrapped ether. The tokens were worth roughly $325 million at the time of the theft. Jump Crypto, a backer of the project, later replaced the missing funds.
Wormhole moves value between two networks that cannot read each other's records. Solana and Ethereum keep separate ledgers and run on different software. A user who wants to hold ether on Solana cannot send it there directly. The bridge locks the original asset on one chain and issues a matching token on the other.
That matching token is wrapped ether. Each unit on Solana is meant to stand for one ether held by the bridge on Ethereum. The arrangement works only while the two sides stay in balance. A token issued without real ether behind it is a claim with nothing to back it.
The Wormhole attacker broke that balance. A flaw in the bridge's code on the Solana side let the attacker get past the check that confirms a transfer is genuine. The attacker then obtained wrapped ether on Solana without depositing matching ether on Ethereum. To the rest of the system, those tokens looked the same as legitimate ones.
The theft left a hole in the bridge's reserves. Holders of wrapped ether on Solana faced the risk that their tokens were no longer fully backed. Applications on Solana that accepted wrapped ether as collateral carried the same exposure.
Jump Crypto closed that gap by putting ether back into the bridge. That restored the backing for the wrapped tokens on Solana. The money came from the firm, not from the attacker. No court process, law enforcement seizure or negotiation was needed to restore it.
The weak point in a system like Wormhole is the code that confirms events on another chain. A bridge accepts a message from one network as proof that something happened there. If that check fails, an attacker can create tokens that the bridge treats as real. Every holder of those tokens then shares the shortfall.
Ronin Network hack: Axie Infinity's $625 million bridge theft
The Ronin Network, the blockchain bridge behind the game Axie Infinity, lost 173,600 ether and 25.5 million USDC in a theft disclosed on March 29, 2022. The stolen assets were worth roughly $625 million at the time.
Ronin is a sidechain linked to Ethereum. The Vietnam-based studio Sky Mavis built it to run Axie Infinity. In the game, players collect, breed and battle digital creatures called Axies, and each one exists as a token. Handling that volume of activity on Ethereum's main network would have meant slower transactions and higher fees. Ronin gave the game its own chain, and its bridge let players move assets between the two networks.
Axie Infinity's player base grew quickly during 2021. Much of that growth came from the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some players there earned income from the game's tokens.
The bridge relied on a small group of validators to approve withdrawals. Ronin ran nine validator nodes, and a withdrawal needed signatures from five of them. Sky Mavis later said the attackers had gained control of five private keys. Four belonged to validators run by Sky Mavis, and one belonged to a validator run by Axie DAO. Five keys were enough to approve withdrawals without anyone else signing off. The attackers used them to push through two transactions that drained the bridge.
The withdrawals took place on March 23, 2022. They went unnoticed for six days. The theft came to light only after a user reported being unable to withdraw funds from the bridge.
On April 14, 2022, the FBI attributed the theft to Lazarus Group and APT38, groups linked to North Korea. The same day, the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control added the Ethereum address that received the stolen funds to its sanctions list. The listing barred U.S. persons from dealing with that address.
The attackers moved part of the haul through Tornado Cash, a service that mixes cryptocurrency to obscure where it came from. In August 2022, the Treasury Department sanctioned Tornado Cash. It said the service had been used to launder more than $455 million stolen by Lazarus Group.
Sky Mavis raised $150 million in a funding round led by Binance in April 2022. The company said it would use that money, along with its own funds, to reimburse users who lost assets. The Ronin bridge reopened in late June 2022.
BSC Token Hub exploit: the 2022 BNB Chain bridge hack
In October 2022, an attacker exploited the BSC Token Hub, a cross-chain bridge in the BNB Chain ecosystem, and produced 2 million BNB. Those tokens were worth roughly $570 million at the time of the attack.
This was an attack on blockchain infrastructure, not on the Binance exchange. The trading platform and the accounts its customers hold there were not the target. Among the incidents in this list, it is the only one tied to Binance.
The link runs through the network itself. Binance created BNB Chain, which launched as Binance Smart Chain and later took its current name. The "BSC" in the bridge's title comes from that original name. BNB is the network's native token, and users spend it to pay transaction fees.
In 2022, BNB Chain operated as two connected networks: BNB Beacon Chain and BNB Smart Chain. BSC Token Hub carried assets between them. Each transfer arrived with a cryptographic proof meant to show that the matching event had really happened on the other chain. The bridge released tokens only when that proof checked out.
The attacker found a flaw in the proof verification. Forged proofs passed as genuine, and the bridge issued new BNB with nothing behind it on the other side. The minting came in two transactions of 1 million BNB each. The exploit created tokens out of nothing rather than emptying a store of existing deposits.
That changes what the dollar figure measures. The roughly $570 million is the size of an unauthorized issuance, not a sum of coins taken from user wallets.
The attacker then put much of the new BNB to work on Venus Protocol, a lending platform on BNB Chain. There, the attacker posted the tokens as collateral and borrowed stablecoins against them.
Validators halted BNB Chain soon after the exploit came to light. The halt was meant to limit how much of the minted BNB the attacker could move to other networks. The network resumed after validators installed an upgrade that closed the flaw.
Bybit hack of 2025: $1.5 billion in ether stolen
On Feb. 21, 2025, attackers stole $1.5 billion in ether and related tokens from Bybit, a cryptocurrency exchange. Valued at the time of the theft, it is the largest dollar-value loss in this selection of major crypto hacks.
Bybit is a centralized exchange. It holds customer deposits in wallets that the company controls. Large exchanges typically keep most of those funds in cold wallets, which are kept offline and away from everyday trading systems.
The Bybit attack hit one of the exchange's Ethereum cold wallets. It happened during what the company described as a routine transfer of funds from that cold wallet to a warm wallet used for daily operations.
The breach did not come from a flaw in the Ethereum blockchain itself. The cold wallet used a multisignature setup through Safe{Wallet}, a service that requires several approvals before funds can move. The signers approved a transaction that appeared legitimate on screen. The instructions underneath it handed control of the wallet to the attackers, who then drained it.
Ben Zhou, Bybit's co-founder and chief executive, disclosed the theft publicly the same day. He said the exchange remained solvent and that customer withdrawals would continue to be processed.
The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea in late February 2025. The bureau named the group responsible as TraderTraitor, the label it uses for a cluster of North Korean state-backed cyber actors. The FBI said the attackers were converting stolen ether into bitcoin and other assets. It said the funds were being spread across thousands of addresses on multiple blockchains.
The bureau asked exchanges, bridges, node operators and other crypto services to block transactions tied to addresses linked to the attackers. Once stolen tokens are swapped and split across many wallets and networks, freezing them depends on cooperation from the platforms the money passes through.
The theft did not depend on breaking the cold wallet's offline storage. It succeeded at the approval step, when signers authorized a transfer based on what a software interface showed them.
The full story
This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.
