Back Redpacketsecurity CVE Alert: CVE-2026-105210 – zitadel
ZITADEL 3.x before 3.4.15 and 4.x before 4.17.1 contains a missing authentication flaw in the hosted Login V1 UI, whose second-factor enrollment and initialization handlers act on an identify-only session before any primary factor is verified. Attackers knowing only a victim’s login name can enroll attacker-controlled TOTP, OTP-SMS, OTP-Email, or U2F factors, overwrite the verified phone number, and enumerate users through discrepant errors.
**Risk verdict:** High risk: remediate promptly, but the supplied data does not establish whether exploitation is active or being used in the wild.
**Why this matters:** An attacker may bind their own second factor to a victim’s account, enabling persistent account takeover without first proving control of it. This can expose sensitive account data and let attackers act with the victim’s existing access; error differences may also help identify valid users. KEV, SSVC, PoC and EPSS status are not provided, so exploitation likelihood cannot be confirmed.
**Most likely attack path:** A remote attacker needs only a target’s login name; no prior access, user action or complex setup is indicated. The flaw affects account integrity within the identity service, with no direct scope change, but compromised accounts may provide access to connected applications according to their entitlements.
**Who is most exposed:** Organisations running affected builds with the hosted Login V1 flow enabled are most exposed, particularly where the identity service is internet-accessible.
Review MFA enrolment and factor-change events for unexpected additions or phone-number changes.
Correlate enrolment requests with sessions lacking a completed primary authentication.
Look for repeated login-name probes and discrepant responses that could indicate account enumeration.
Investigate new factors followed by sign-ins from unfamiliar devices or locations.
Mitigation and prioritisation
Upgrade promptly to the vendor-fixed release for the deployed branch.
Until patched, restrict public access to the login service where operationally feasible.
Review recent factor changes; verify suspicious changes with affected users and revoke untrusted factors.
Check KEV, SSVC and EPSS status before final scheduling; escalate immediately if exploitation evidence emerges.
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The full story
This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.
