IBM MQ 9.2.0.0 through 9.2.0.44 LTS, 9.3.0.0 through 9.3.0.42 LTS, 9.4.0.0 through 9.4.0.26 LTS, 9.4.0.0 through 9.4.5.1 CD, and 10.0.0.0 through 10.0.0.5 LTS and CD could allow an authenticated user with command queue access to execute arbitrary code by injecting malicious arguments into Ant script commands.
**Risk verdict:** High-impact code execution is possible, but exploitation requires an authenticated account with command-queue access; no KEV, SSVC, PoC or EPSS indicators were supplied, so active exploitation and urgency cannot be confirmed.
**Why this matters:** Successful exploitation could give an attacker the ability to run code with the broker host’s service-account permissions, threatening message confidentiality, integrity and availability. A compromised integration server may also provide a foothold for disrupting business workflows or accessing connected systems.
**Most likely attack path:** An attacker reaches the service over the network, obtains an account with relatively limited privileges and can access the relevant command queue; no victim interaction is required. The high attack complexity is a meaningful barrier, but code runs within the same security scope as the vulnerable service. Further movement depends on the host’s permissions and network access.
**Who is most exposed:** Organisations running internet- or partner-accessible message-broker and managed file-transfer infrastructure are most exposed, particularly where command-queue access is broadly granted or credentials are shared.
Review command-queue access and authentication logs for unusual principals, times or source addresses.
Alert on unexpected Ant script invocation, arguments or child processes from broker services.
Correlate broker activity with new files, outbound connections and changes to service processes.
Investigate failed access attempts followed by successful queue operations.
Mitigation and prioritisation
Identify affected installations and apply the vendor’s fixed maintenance update for each supported stream.
Restrict command-queue permissions to named, essential administrators and service accounts; rotate exposed credentials.
Limit network reachability to trusted management hosts and monitor any temporary access exceptions.
Test updates against critical integrations, then deploy promptly through change control; do not treat access restrictions as a substitute for patching.
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The full story
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