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CVE Alert: CVE-2026-123570 – hickory-dns – hickory

CVE Alert: CVE-2026-123570 – hickory-dns – hickory

Redpacketsecurity •admin • November 8, 2026

The DNS wire-format message parser in hickory-proto (Hickory DNS) 0.18 before 0.26.2 preallocates record vectors sized by the untrusted ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, and ARCOUNT header fields before reading record data. Remote attackers can send a UDP datagram, or a spoofed response to a client/resolver, with these counts set to 65535, forcing 18MB of allocation per message.

**Risk verdict:** High-priority availability risk from unauthenticated network input; active-exploitation urgency is uncertain because KEV, SSVC, EPSS and PoC indicators were not supplied.

**Why this matters:** Repeated crafted DNS messages can drive disproportionate memory use, potentially exhausting resources and interrupting name resolution or dependent services. Likely attacker goals include disrupting a resolver or DNS-enabled application, rather than accessing or changing data.

**Most likely attack path:** An attacker can send malformed DNS traffic directly, without credentials or user interaction; the low-complexity network path makes exposed services the main concern. A spoofed response may also reach a client or resolver, but the supplied metrics indicate no impact beyond the vulnerable component, so broader lateral movement is not expected.

**Who is most exposed:** Operators embedding the affected parsing library in public-facing DNS servers, recursive resolvers, or applications that process DNS responses are most exposed. Internal services may also be reachable from untrusted networks.

Alert on abrupt memory growth or restarts in DNS-serving processes.

Inspect DNS traffic for header record counts inconsistent with the records actually present.

Correlate bursts of malformed UDP DNS messages with resolver timeouts and service health alerts.

Review dependency and build inventories for use of the affected parser.

Mitigation and prioritisation

Confirm KEV, SSVC, EPSS and PoC status from current threat-intelligence sources; their absence here is not evidence of no exploitation.

Upgrade to the vendor-fixed release; prioritise internet-reachable deployments.

Until patched, restrict DNS access to required sources and apply cautious rate limits or filtering for malformed messages.

Test resolver health and memory use after changes; coordinate maintenance where DNS outages would affect critical services.

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