Back Redpacketsecurity CVE Alert: CVE-2026-124001 – nasa-jpl – ION
NASA JPL ION-DTN 2.2.1b through 4.2.0 contains an integer overflow vulnerability in the Datagram Retransmission (DGR) convergence layer that allows attackers to corrupt heap memory by sending a maliciously crafted 64-bit svcDataLength value that wraps a 32-bit allocation size calculation. Attackers can exploit the dgr_receive API’s unchecked memcpy operation using synthetic datagrams or DGR traffic over internal IPC or custom transports to trigger an out-of-bounds write, leading to denial of service or potential remote code execution.
**Risk verdict:** Treat as high priority for exposed deployments: exploitation requires a more demanding network attack, but could cause severe disruption or compromise of the affected process.
**Why this matters:** Heap corruption may crash a service or, if reliably exploited, enable code execution with the process’s permissions. That could disrupt communications or expose and alter data accessible to the service. KEV, SSVC, EPSS and PoC status are not provided, so current exploitation activity and urgency cannot be confirmed.
**Most likely attack path:** An unauthenticated attacker must reach the DGR network-facing path and deliver crafted traffic; no user action or elevated privileges are needed, but the attack is assessed as difficult to execute. The stated scope is unchanged, so direct impact is expected within the vulnerable component’s security boundary; broader movement would depend on its host access and connected services.
**Who is most exposed:** Prioritise operators running ION-DTN nodes that accept DGR traffic from untrusted or broadly reachable networks, especially mission, research or other critical communications environments.
Review DGR ingress and service logs for malformed, unusually large or repeated datagrams.
Monitor crashes, restarts and memory-corruption alerts in ION-DTN processes.
Check network telemetry for unexpected DGR sources or traffic spikes.
Mitigation and prioritisation
Upgrade promptly to the vendor-fixed release; validate compatibility in staging before production rollout.
Restrict DGR ingress to trusted peers and isolate the service from general networks.
Where patching is delayed, disable DGR if operationally safe; monitor closely and document the exception.
Confirm exposure and seek current exploitation intelligence before setting final incident priority.
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