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Director of Public Prosecutions v Zhimin Qian & Anor ,

caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk • October 19, 2026

In this case, the claimant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, has secured the recovery of proceeds of crime to the value of several billion pounds sterling representing the fruits of fraudulent activity perpetrated by and on behalf of the defendants. By far the most valuable of the assets involved are in the form of Bitcoin. These assets are now the subject of claims brought under s.281 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 by those alleging to have been victims of the frauds. Each asserts that he or she has a proprietary interest in the Bitcoin.

The issue to be determined at this stage is limited to the resolution of the question of whether the law of England, China or a combination of the two will later fall to be applied to resolve the substantive legal issues to which the victims’ claims give rise. I have used the term “English law” as a convenient shorthand for the law of England and Wales. No disrespect is thereby intended to the Welsh nation.

No evidence has yet been adduced either as to the content of Chinese law or as to the precise evidential basis upon which each claim may eventually be founded.

To fill the evidential lacuna, a statement of assumed facts has been agreed upon which the court has been invited to base its determination of the applicable law. It is convenient for me now to set out the substance of these agreed facts by way of background.

These are the assumed facts from which only the preamble and footnotes have been removed:

“ The First Defendant

“ The First Defendant

1. The First Defendant (Ms Qian) is a Chinese national born in 1978. She resided in China until around 26 July 2017, when she crossed into Myanmar to evade arrest. She arrived in London in September 2017 and, since then, she has habitually resided in England.

The First Defendant (Ms Qian) is a Chinese national born in 1978. She resided in China until around 26 July 2017, when she crossed into Myanmar to evade arrest. She arrived in London in September 2017 and, since then, she has habitually resided in England.

2. On or around 31 March 2014, Ms Qian established a Chinese Company named Tianjin Lantian Gerui Electronic Technology Co Limited (the Company). At all times, the Company has been registered in Tianjin City, China. 3. Ms Qian was at all material times the controlling mind or actual controller of the Company. Ms Qian also operated and/or controlled a number of other purported entities and also acted in a personal capacity for the purposes of the fraudulent schemes. Those purported entities were either fictional or under the control of Ms Qian. 4. From July 2014 to August 2017, Ms Qian’s associate, Mr Jiangtao Ren (Mr Ren) was the registered “legal representative” of the Company and the sole shareholder and only director of the Company. Mr Ren is a Chinese national and has been resident in China at all material times.

On or around 31 March 2014, Ms Qian established a Chinese Company named Tianjin Lantian Gerui Electronic Technology Co Limited (the Company). At all times, the Company has been registered in Tianjin City, China.

Ms Qian was at all material times the controlling mind or actual controller of the Company. Ms Qian also operated and/or controlled a number of other purported entities and also acted in a personal capacity for the purposes of the fraudulent schemes. Those purported entities were either fictional or under the control of Ms Qian.

From July 2014 to August 2017, Ms Qian’s associate, Mr Jiangtao Ren (Mr Ren) was the registered “legal representative” of the Company and the sole shareholder and only director of the Company. Mr Ren is a Chinese national and has been resident in China at all material times.

The Investment Schemes

The Investment Schemes

5. Between 2014 and July 2017, Ms Qian designed and orchestrated around ten purported investment schemes; most of these schemes were implemented in the Company’s name and others in the names of another purported entity, Britain Nice Life Insurance Company (BNLI). These schemes were Ponzi schemes (collectively, the Fraud). They were designed and carried out in China. 6. The Company was never licensed to provide financial products to investors. In her Basis of Plea dated 29 September 2025, Ms Qian has admitted that such a licence was required by Chinese state law; and any investment activities were therefore unregulated and unlawful. 7. Ms Qian recruited many individuals, including Mr Ren, to assist her in carrying out the Fraud (the Assistants). These individuals were all Chinese nationals who, at all material times, resided in China. 8. These Assistants included many individuals who the fraudulent schemes to members of the public across China (the Promoters). The Promoters purported to represent the Company, BNLI and/or Ms Qian personally when promoting the fraudulent schemes. The fraudulent schemes were at promotional meetings, in publicity materials and in media publicity within China. 9. Promotional material provided to certain s.281 Applicants referred to purported activity in various jurisdictions including China, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Norway, Malaysia, Taiwan and Cayman Islands. In 2015 an Assistant led a team of more than 20 salespersons in a 5-day visit to London and Oxford.

Between 2014 and July 2017, Ms Qian designed and orchestrated around ten purported investment schemes; most of these schemes were implemented in the Company’s name and others in the names of another purported entity, Britain Nice Life Insurance Company (BNLI). These schemes were Ponzi schemes (collectively, the Fraud). They were designed and carried out in China.

The Company was never licensed to provide financial products to investors. In her Basis of Plea dated 29 September 2025, Ms Qian has admitted that such a licence was required by Chinese state law; and any investment activities were therefore unregulated and unlawful.

Ms Qian recruited many individuals, including Mr Ren, to assist her in carrying out the Fraud (the Assistants). These individuals were all Chinese nationals who, at all material times, resided in China.

These Assistants included many individuals who the fraudulent schemes to members of the public across China (the Promoters). The Promoters purported to represent the Company, BNLI and/or Ms Qian personally when promoting the fraudulent schemes. The fraudulent schemes were at promotional meetings, in publicity materials and in media publicity within China.

Promotional material provided to certain s.281 Applicants referred to purported activity in various jurisdictions including China, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Japan, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Norway, Malaysia, Taiwan and Cayman Islands. In 2015 an Assistant led a team of more than 20 salespersons in a 5-day visit to London and Oxford.

The Victims and their Investments

The Victims and their Investments

10. According to an audit carried out by the Zhongyi CPAS Tianjin Office (on the instruction of the Hedong Sub-Bureau), at least 128,409 investment contracts were entered into in connection with the Fraud. [Whether that is the number of Victims or the number of ‘investment contracts’ is not yet known]. The known investors (Victims) were all Chinese nationals, were all resident in China at the time they invested, and the majority of Victims are believed to remain resident in China. 11. Relying upon fraudulent misrepresentations, some Victims signed written documents at the time they invested in the fraudulent schemes (Contracts); others made payments as part of the fraudulent schemes without signing any written documentation. [The DPP notes that it will be for each s.281 applicant to prove whether they relied upon such representations.] Where Contracts were signed: a. The counter-party to the Contracts was generally the Company. Sometimes it was BNLI, which is understood to be a fictitious company. Ms Qian and/or her Assistants and/or Promoters made false claims in promotional materials that BNLI was registered variously in the “City of London, UK” and the Cayman Islands. b. Each of the Contracts promised returns to be paid to the Victims in Chinese currency or, in the case of some Contracts, cryptocurrency or digital assets (including purported contracts of insurance of digital assets). c. Each of the Contracts was said to relate to a purported investment scheme, being one of the fraudulent schemes designed by Ms Qian. These fraudulent schemes included (i) investment in digital currency schemes and (ii) investment in ‘elderly care’ and related insurance services, and (iii) investment in items such as air purification devices and sterilisers. d. Certain of the Contracts contained clauses which provided that, in the case of disputes which cannot be resolved by negotiations, either party may sue in the People’s Court of Hedong District, Tianjin, i.e. in China. Other than these, no known Contracts contained jurisdiction clauses. e. Certain of the Contracts stated that they were made “in accordance with the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China”, pursuant to “the General Principles of the Civil Law, the Contract Law and other relevant rules and regulations” or other such formulations. No known Contract states that it is made in accordance with the laws of any jurisdiction other than China. Certain of the Contracts between BNLI (as the insurer) and Victims (as the insured) contain clauses which state “depending upon applicable law of the insured’s host country, the insurer will issue BTC or fiat currency at its sole discretion” and/or “Definition of business day stated in applicable law of the insured’s host country shall apply”; insofar as such clauses had any meaning, the “host country” of each relevant insured would have been China as their place of residence. In addition, certain BNLI contracts state that “December 24 – 25 will be off work for Christmas Day according to British Law”. 12. Victims made payments in Chinese currency through one or more methods including: a. Point of sale transactions, including debit and credit card payments. These transactions took place within China, using debit or credit cards issued and managed by Chinese institutions. b. Cash payments, which took place within China. c. Transfers from Victims’ bank accounts, which were registered with Chinese banks (including, for example, Agricultural Bank of China Ltd), at bank branches located within China. 13. All such payments were credited, in the first instance, to multiple personal bank accounts held in the names of Assistants and/or Promoters. These bank accounts were registered with Chinese banks at bank branches located within China. 14. A bank account was registered in the Company’s name with a Chinese bank but it was rarely used. 15. During July 2017, law enforcement in China froze the personal bank accounts used by the Assistants and Promoters to receive investor funds, and seized real property and other assets.

According to an audit carried out by the Zhongyi CPAS Tianjin Office (on the instruction of the Hedong Sub-Bureau), at least 128,409 investment contracts were entered into in connection with the Fraud. [Whether that is the number of Victims or the number of ‘investment contracts’ is not yet known]. The known investors (Victims) were all Chinese nationals, were all resident in China at the time they invested, and the majority of Victims are believed to remain resident in China.

Relying upon fraudulent misrepresentations, some Victims signed written documents at the time they invested in the fraudulent schemes (Contracts); others made payments as part of the fraudulent schemes without signing any written documentation. [The DPP notes that it will be for each s.281 applicant to prove whether they relied upon such representations.] Where Contracts were signed:

The counter-party to the Contracts was generally the Company. Sometimes it was BNLI, which is understood to be a fictitious company. Ms Qian and/or her Assistants and/or Promoters made false claims in promotional materials that BNLI was registered variously in the “City of London, UK” and the Cayman Islands.

Each of the Contracts promised returns to be paid to the Victims in Chinese currency or, in the case of some Contracts, cryptocurrency or digital assets (including purported contracts of insurance of digital assets).

Each of the Contracts was said to relate to a purported investment scheme, being one of the fraudulent schemes designed by Ms Qian. These fraudulent schemes included (i) investment in digital currency schemes and (ii) investment in ‘elderly care’ and related insurance services, and (iii) investment in items such as air purification devices and sterilisers.

Certain of the Contracts contained clauses which provided that, in the case of disputes which cannot be resolved by negotiations, either party may sue in the People’s Court of Hedong District, Tianjin, i.e. in China. Other than these, no known Contracts contained jurisdiction clauses.

Certain of the Contracts stated that they were made “in accordance with the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China”, pursuant to “the General Principles of the Civil Law, the Contract Law and other relevant rules and regulations” or other such formulations. No known Contract states that it is made in accordance with the laws of any jurisdiction other than China. Certain of the Contracts between BNLI (as the insurer) and Victims (as the insured) contain clauses which state “depending upon applicable law of the insured’s host country, the insurer will issue BTC or fiat currency at its sole discretion” and/or “Definition of business day stated in applicable law of the insured’s host country shall apply”; insofar as such clauses had any meaning, the “host country” of each relevant insured would have been China as their place of residence. In addition, certain BNLI contracts state that “December 24 – 25 will be off work for Christmas Day according to British Law”.

Victims made payments in Chinese currency through one or more methods including:

Point of sale transactions, including debit and credit card payments. These transactions took place within China, using debit or credit cards issued and managed by Chinese institutions.

Cash payments, which took place within China.

Transfers from Victims’ bank accounts, which were registered with Chinese banks (including, for example, Agricultural Bank of China Ltd), at bank branches located within China.

All such payments were credited, in the first instance, to multiple personal bank accounts held in the names of Assistants and/or Promoters. These bank accounts were registered with Chinese banks at bank branches located within China.

A bank account was registered in the Company’s name with a Chinese bank but it was rarely used.

During July 2017, law enforcement in China froze the personal bank accounts used by the Assistants and Promoters to receive investor funds, and seized real property and other assets.

16. All funds received from Victims, which (according to the judgment of the Tianjin Hedong District People’s Court on 13 September 2021 convicting Mr Ren) totalled approximately RMB 40,228,350,969 (being approximately £4.1 billion) over the period from 2014 to 2017, were controlled by Ms Qian, either directly or through her Assistants and Promoters. 17. The majority of such funds were ultimately applied: a. In making repayments to some of the Victims pursuant to the purported investment schemes. Approximately RMB 34.1 billion (being approximately £3.4 billion) (according to the judgment of the Tianjin Hedong District People’s Court on 13 September 2021 convicting Mr Ren) was repaid in this way between 2014 and 2017. For completeness, not all of the Victims received such repayments. Those payments were in Chinese currency (CNY) and paid out of personal bank accounts of Assistants and Promoters held with at least three Chinese banks (namely Agricultural Bank of China Ltd, China Merchants Bank Co Ltd and Industrial Bank Co Ltd), at branches located within China. b. In meeting purported operating costs to perpetrate the Fraud, totalling over RMB 300 million, which included rental costs and costs for the payment of goods and services. Those payments were also made in Chinese currency (CNY). 18. Some such funds were converted into various assets, including inter alia real estate in China and Bitcoin. The Bitcoin was obtained either: a. Through a digital currency trading account opened in June 2014 in the name of Mr Ren with a crypto-exchange called Huobi (the Huobi Account). The Huobi Account was controlled directly or indirectly by Ms Qian. The Huobi crypto-exchange was founded in China. Between 2013 and around October 2017, Huobi’s central place of operations was in China though later it expanded its operations to various different jurisdictions, including the Seychelles, South Korea, Singapore and Japan. More than 100,000 Bitcoin were purchased on the Huobi Account between mid-June 2014 and 7 June 2017. b. In “over-the-counter” (OTC) transactions conducted in China between January and June 2017 via a Chinese national called Hua Chen, a former Huobi employee, on Ms Qian’s instructions. c. Using cryptocurrency “mining” machines which were located in China. 19. The funds deriving from Victims which were converted into Bitcoin had been so converted before Ms Qian left China in July 2017 (the Bitcoin).

All funds received from Victims, which (according to the judgment of the Tianjin Hedong District People’s Court on 13 September 2021 convicting Mr Ren) totalled approximately RMB 40,228,350,969 (being approximately £4.1 billion) over the period from 2014 to 2017, were controlled by Ms Qian, either directly or through her Assistants and Promoters.

The majority of such funds were ultimately applied:

In making repayments to some of the Victims pursuant to the purported investment schemes. Approximately RMB 34.1 billion (being approximately £3.4 billion) (according to the judgment of the Tianjin Hedong District People’s Court on 13 September 2021 convicting Mr Ren) was repaid in this way between 2014 and 2017. For completeness, not all of the Victims received such repayments. Those payments were in Chinese currency (CNY) and paid out of personal bank accounts of Assistants and Promoters held with at least three Chinese banks (namely Agricultural Bank of China Ltd, China Merchants Bank Co Ltd and Industrial Bank Co Ltd), at branches located within China.

In meeting purported operating costs to perpetrate the Fraud, totalling over RMB 300 million, which included rental costs and costs for the payment of goods and services. Those payments were also made in Chinese currency (CNY).

Some such funds were converted into various assets, including inter alia real estate in China and Bitcoin. The Bitcoin was obtained either:

Through a digital currency trading account opened in June 2014 in the name of Mr Ren with a crypto-exchange called Huobi (the Huobi Account). The Huobi Account was controlled directly or indirectly by Ms Qian. The Huobi crypto-exchange was founded in China. Between 2013 and around October 2017, Huobi’s central place of operations was in China though later it expanded its operations to various different jurisdictions, including the Seychelles, South Korea, Singapore and Japan. More than 100,000 Bitcoin were purchased on the Huobi Account between mid-June 2014 and 7 June 2017.

In “over-the-counter” (OTC) transactions conducted in China between January and June 2017 via a Chinese national called Hua Chen, a former Huobi employee, on Ms Qian’s instructions.

Using cryptocurrency “mining” machines which were located in China.

The funds deriving from Victims which were converted into Bitcoin had been so converted before Ms Qian left China in July 2017 (the Bitcoin).

The First Defendant’s flight from China and move to England

The First Defendant’s flight from China and move to England

20. On 12 July 2017 Chinese police officers attended a promotional event in order to arrest Ms Qian but she managed to escape without being apprehended. 21. On around 26 July 2017, Ms Qian fled over the border into Myanmar. 22. Ms Qian arrived in London using a St Kitts & Nevis passport in the name of Yadi Zhang on or around 16 September 2017 and has habitually resided in England since then. She met the Second Defendant (Ms Wen) in London in late September 2017. Ms Wen is a Chinese national with British citizenship and at all material times has resided in England. 23. Ms Qian and Ms Wen began to convert some of the Bitcoin into other assets (including cash, jewellery, investments and other cryptocurrency) for their own personal benefit. 24. On 31 October and 1 November 2018, the Metropolitan Police searched a property and safe deposit box rented by Ms Qian and Ms Wen in London and seized several devices used to access the Bitcoin (some of which had been brought to England from China), the “keys” to access some of the Bitcoin and other assets. Additional assets were seized when Ms Qian was arrested in April 2024. The assets seized by the Metropolitan Police (together, the Property) were acquired with the proceeds of the Fraud. The Property includes more than 61,000 Bitcoin. 25. The Property is controlled or otherwise within the jurisdiction of England and Wales and subject to: a. the Property Freezing Order made by the High Court on 21 December 2023 (subsequently varied); b. a Management Receivership Order made by the High Court on 4 June 2025; and c. the Judgment and Declaration made by the High Court on 21 January 2026. 26. Following the making of the Property Freezing Order, numerous applications pursuant to section 281 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (PoCA) have been issued in the High Court by Victims in relation to the Property.”

On 12 July 2017 Chinese police officers attended a promotional event in order to arrest Ms Qian but she managed to escape without being apprehended.

On around 26 July 2017, Ms Qian fled over the border into Myanmar.

Ms Qian arrived in London using a St Kitts & Nevis passport in the name of Yadi Zhang on or around 16 September 2017 and has habitually resided in England since then. She met the Second Defendant (Ms Wen) in London in late September 2017. Ms Wen is a Chinese national with British citizenship and at all material times has resided in England.

Ms Qian and Ms Wen began to convert some of the Bitcoin into other assets (including cash, jewellery, investments and other cryptocurrency) for their own personal benefit.

On 31 October and 1 November 2018, the Metropolitan Police searched a property and safe deposit box rented by Ms Qian and Ms Wen in London and seized several devices used to access the Bitcoin (some of which had been brought to England from China), the “keys” to access some of the Bitcoin and other assets. Additional assets were seized when Ms Qian was arrested in April 2024. The assets seized by the Metropolitan Police (together, the Property) were acquired with the proceeds of the Fraud. The Property includes more than 61,000 Bitcoin.

The Property is controlled or otherwise within the jurisdiction of England and Wales and subject to:

the Property Freezing Order made by the High Court on 21 December 2023 (subsequently varied);

a Management Receivership Order made by the High Court on 4 June 2025; and

the Judgment and Declaration made by the High Court on 21 January 2026.

Following the making of the Property Freezing Order, numerous applications pursuant to section 281 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (PoCA) have been issued in the High Court by Victims in relation to the Property.”

The parties to this litigation are, strictly speaking, the DPP and the defendants. It is, however, clearly convenient for the alleged victims to advance their claims within the framework of the existing litigation. In this judgment they will hereafter be referred to as the Applicants.

One alleged victim, Mr Wang, has taken the initiative of obtaining an order of the court for the appointment of receivers of the Company. Those receivers now also assert claims in respect of assets held by the DPP. Whether the deployment of receivers of a hitherto defunct company which was itself a vehicle through which the Fraud was perpetrated provides a valid basis of claim is a question for another day. For the purposes of this judgment, they are referred to as the “Litigation Receivers”.

Not all of the many thousands of individual Applicants have instructed the same firm of solicitors to represent them. I took the view, however, that it was appropriate, at least for the purposes of resolving the applicable law issue, that one firm should be designated as Lead Firm and that submissions to the court on behalf of all individual s.281 Applicants should be made by one team of counsel instructed by that firm. The Litigation Receivers, whose interests were distinct, were permitted to engage and deploy their own legal team at the hearing. Case management directions were given to this effect.

THE LEGAL BASES BEHIND THE CLAIMS

The DPP contends that, on any analysis, Chinese law applies. The Litigation Receivers support that position.

The Applicants disagree and have identified four legal bases of claim upon which they advance their arguments to the effect that either English law or, alternatively, a hybrid of Chinese and English law applies.

Before moving on to examine in greater detail the respective positions of the DPP, the Applicants and the Litigation Receivers, it may be helpful to consider the nature and broad scope of the statutory scheme laid down in PoCA, as subsequently amended.

Before the coming into force of PoCA, asset recovery laws in the UK were fragmented across numerous statutes including the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988 . As a result of gaps in the statutory regime, however, criminals could frequently and lawfully retain substantial profits derived from criminal activity even, in some cases, after criminal conviction.

One example of the way in which the courts had interpreted the law before PoCA is to be found in Webb v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2000] Q.B. 427 in which the police had lawfully seized money from suspected drug dealers but were found not to be entitled to retain it once their statutory power to do so was exhausted. The Court of Appeal held that even where it had been established, on the balance of probabilities in civil proceedings, that the money constituted the proceeds of drug trafficking, public policy provided no defence to the dealers’ claims since they could nevertheless continue to rely upon their right to possession as against the police at common law.

It was, at least in part, to address the unpalatable outcome of such cases that PoCA introduced a comprehensive framework for tracing, freezing, confiscating and recovering criminal assets which was designed, more broadly, to prevent the enjoyment of the fruits of criminal activity.

One innovation, introduced under Part 5 of PoCA, is the concept of civil recovery proceedings in the High Court with respect to property which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct. Such property is “recoverable property” under s.240(1). Recovery proceedings may be taken only by an enforcement authority (including, as here, the DPP) against “any person” whom the authority thinks holds such recoverable property (see s.243(1)). The DPP did not, therefore, have to wait for the defendants to be convicted before initiating the recovery proceedings in this case.

It is to be noted that a civil recovery order can be made in respect of property “wherever situated” and in respect of a person “wherever domiciled, resident or present”, provided that, where property is outside the UK, there is, or has been, a “connection between the case and the relevant part of the United Kingdom” (see s.282A(1) and (3)).

I will return to the concept of what is “recoverable property” in greater detail when I come, in due course, to consider the Applicants’ third legal basis of claim.

It is s.281 of PoCA which provides the basis upon which all of the Applicants rely in advancing their claims:

“ Victims of theft, etc. (1) In proceedings for a recovery order, a person who claims that any property alleged to be recoverable property, or any part of the property, belongs to him may apply for a declaration under this section. (2) If the applicant appears to the court to meet the following condition, the court may make a declaration to that effect. (3) The condition is that— (a) the person was deprived of the property he claims, or of property which it represents, by unlawful conduct, (b) the property he was deprived of was not recoverable property immediately before he was deprived of it, and (c) the property he claims belongs to him. (4) Property to which a declaration under this section applies is not recoverable property.”

“ Victims of theft, etc.

In proceedings for a recovery order, a person who claims that any property alleged to be recoverable property, or any part of the property, belongs to him may apply for a declaration under this section.

If the applicant appears to the court to meet the following condition, the court may make a declaration to that effect.

The condition is that—

the person was deprived of the property he claims, or of property which it represents, by unlawful conduct,

the property he was deprived of was not recoverable property immediately before he was deprived of it, and

the property he claims belongs to him.

Property to which a declaration under this section applies is not recoverable property.”

In short, s.281 provides a safeguard to ensure, in broad terms, that innocent persons are not penalised by the deployment of the statutory recovery procedure. However, in order to satisfy s.281(3) (c), it is necessary for any given Applicant to demonstrate a proprietary interest. Taken as a whole, the section does not create any broader compensation scheme for those who have otherwise lost out through criminal conduct (see NCA v Robb [2015] Ch 520 at [70]). It would not, for example, be sufficient for any given Applicant to establish merely that he is entitled to claim against the perpetrators in personam as a creditor to the value of the money with which he parted.

I note, in passing, that, even where the statutory requirements in s.281 are met, it is arguable that the Court retains a residual discretion as to whether or not to make a declaration in favour of any given applicant (as indicated by the use of the word “may” in s.281(2) ). However, there is currently no authority on how any such discretion might fall to be exercised and its existence or scope does not call for any further consideration at this stage of these proceedings. I therefore say no more it.

There is no dispute before me that, in a case involving foreign elements, the law applicable to the question of whether property “belongs to” a person for the purposes of ss.281(1) and (3)(c) is to be determined by applying the relevant English private international law rules on the conflict of laws. No definition of “belongs to” is to be found in the statute.

I observed during the course of oral argument that section 5 of the Theft Act 1968 provides a definition of “belonging to another” that is broader than the concept of proprietary ownership more generally recognised at common law. The parties, however, were prepared to agree, at least for the purposes of this hearing, that the provisions of section 5 should be left out of account at this stage and I am content to proceed on that basis without further .

The other limbs in s.281(3) require the application of statutory concepts defined by PoCA, including “unlawful conduct” ( s.281(3) (a)) and “recoverable property” ( s.281(3) (b)) and bear the meanings given to them by the statute itself. The focus for the purpose of resolving the applicable law issue must therefore be upon the question arising under s.281(3) (c), namely, whether the property “belongs to” the applicant.

The value of the recovered Bitcoin is so very high compared to the other assets that the parties have understandably focused their attention on the Bitcoin for the purposes of developing their arguments before me. For the same reason, it is also convenient for me to afford the cryptocurrency centre stage in my assessment of the merits of the competing arguments concerning the applicable law.

In any event, there is no dispute that the Bitcoin is property. The cases of AA v Persons Unknown [2020] 4 W.L.R. 35 and D’Aloia v Persons Unknown [2025] 1 W.L.R. 821 have confirmed that this is the position at common law.

Section 1 of the Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025 , which came into force on 2 December 2025, provides:

“ Objects of personal property rights A thing (including a thing that is digital or electronic in nature) is not prevented from being the object of personal property rights merely because it is neither— (a) a thing in possession, nor (b) a thing in action.”

“ Objects of personal property rights

A thing (including a thing that is digital or electronic in nature) is not prevented from being the object of personal property rights merely because it is neither—

a thing in possession, nor

I note in passing, however, that the term “property” covers a wide range of assets and interests some of which are liable to attract different types of categorisation for the purposes of the identification of the applicable law in any given situation than others. Its deployment is not a conceptual trump card giving rise to a determination, or even a presumption, that the applicable law to any given issue must be that of the location of such property at any given time (the lex situs ).

THE STAGES OF ANALYSIS

The English conflict of laws approach to determining the applicable law requires the court to proceed, issue by issue: first to ‘characterise’ each issue; second to determine which provisions or principles of conflicts of law are relevant to that type of issue; and third to apply those provisions or principles to reach a conclusion as to the applicable law for that issue.

In MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No 3) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 387, Staughton LJ described the position thus at pp. 391-2:

“In finding the lex causae there are three stages. First, it is necessary to characterise the issue that is before the court. Is it, for example, the formal validity of a marriage? Or intestate succession to movable property? Or interpretation of a contract? The second stage is to select the rule of conflict of laws which lays down a connecting factor for the issue in question. Thus, the formal validity of a marriage is to be determined, for the most part, by the law of the place where it is celebrated; intestate succession to movables, by the law of the place where the deceased was domiciled when he died; and the interpretation of a contract, by what is described as its proper law. Thirdly, it is necessary to identify the system of law which is tied by the connecting factor found in stage two to the issue characterised in stage one.”

“In finding the lex causae there are three stages. First, it is necessary to characterise the issue that is before the court. Is it, for example, the formal validity of a marriage? Or intestate succession to movable property? Or interpretation of a contract? The second stage is to select the rule of conflict of laws which lays down a connecting factor for the issue in question. Thus, the formal validity of a marriage is to be determined, for the most part, by the law of the place where it is celebrated; intestate succession to movables, by the law of the place where the deceased was domiciled when he died; and the interpretation of a contract, by what is described as its proper law. Thirdly, it is necessary to identify the system of law which is tied by the connecting factor found in stage two to the issue characterised in stage one.”

The characterisation of issues for conflict of laws purposes under the common law therefore involves taking a broad, internationalist approach to classification based upon the fundamental jurisprudential nature of the relevant issue. It follows that the correct conflict of laws characterisation of an issue is not necessarily the same as it may otherwise appear to manifest itself by the application of English domestic law.

As the authors of Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (16th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2022) (“Dicey”) observe at §2-036 to 2-037, the problem of characterisation is “particularly acute …when an English court is called upon to deal with a claim which, if it were wholly domestic, would be regarded as equitable”.

In this case, however, the process of characterisation must be specifically considered in the context of the potential application of categories originally established by European Regulations and subsequently assimilated into English law. I will deal with the implications of this later in this judgment.

With these features in mind, it is time to consider each of the bases of claim upon which the Applicants advance their arguments on the applicable law issues.

THE FOUR BASES OF CLAIM

The individual Applicants identify four bases of claim as follows:

“(1) The s.281 Applicants contend that by application of English law: (a) they have elected (or intend to elect) to rescind in equity any investment contracts into which they entered; (b) upon such rescission they are (or will be) entitled to assert that the recipients of their investment payments or their proceeds held those proceeds on constructive/rescission trust (applying NCA v Robb [2015] 3 WLR 23 and Shalson v Russo [2005] Ch. 281); and (c) they are entitled to trace that proprietary constructive/rescission trust interest in equity through all subsequent dispositions of the proceeds of those payments into the Property which forms the subject of these proceedings. (2) In the alternative, the s.281 Applicants contend that by application of English law: (a) their investment payments were received by the recipients of those payments on constructive trust on the basis that the purported investment contracts were instruments of fraud (applying Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentral v Islington Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 716C-D, Martin J Halley v Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97 at [45]-[48] and D'Aloia v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch) at [340]-[341]); and (b) they are entitled to trace that proprietary constructive trust interest in equity through all subsequent dispositions of the proceeds of those payments into the Property which forms the subject of these proceedings. (3) In the further alternative, the s.281 Applicants contend that the principle stated by sections 305 and 306 of POCA, which addresses the tracing of property obtained through unlawful conduct for the purpose of identifying property as recoverable, should be applied, by parity of reasoning to identify, within that recoverable property, property which is to be regarded as belonging to the s.281 Applicants. (4) To the extent any obligations on those who perpetrated the unlawful conduct are governed by the law of any other jurisdiction (whether by reason of contract, restitution or otherwise), English law (as the lex situs of the Property) would regard them as giving rise to a proprietary interest in equity such that the s.281 Applicants are entitled to trace that proprietary interest in equity through all subsequent dispositions of the proceeds of those payments into the Property which forms the subject of these proceedings.”

The s.281 Applicants contend that by application of English law: (a) they have elected (or intend to elect) to rescind in equity any investment contracts into which they entered; (b) upon such rescission they are (or will be) entitled to assert that the recipients of their investment payments or their proceeds held those proceeds on constructive/rescission trust (applying NCA v Robb [2015] 3 WLR 23 and Shalson v Russo [2005] Ch. 281); and (c) they are entitled to trace that proprietary constructive/rescission trust interest in equity through all subsequent dispositions of the proceeds of those payments into the Property which forms the subject of these proceedings.

In the alternative, the s.281 Applicants contend that by application of English law: (a) their investment payments were received by the recipients of those payments on constructive trust on the basis that the purported investment contracts were instruments of fraud (applying Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentral v Islington Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 716C-D, Martin J Halley v Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97 at [45]-[48] and D'Aloia v Persons Unknown [2024] EWHC 2342 (Ch) at [340]-[341]); and (b) they are entitled to trace that proprietary constructive trust interest in equity through all subsequent dispositions of the proceeds of those payments into the Property which forms the subject of these proceedings.

In the further alternative, the s.281 Applicants contend that the principle stated by sections 305 and 306 of POCA, which addresses the tracing of property obtained through unlawful conduct for the purpose of identifying property as recoverable, should be applied, by parity of reasoning to identify, within that recoverable property, property which is to be regarded as belonging to the s.281 Applicants.

To the extent any obligations on those who perpetrated the unlawful conduct are governed by the law of any other jurisdiction (whether by reason of contract, restitution or otherwise), English law (as the lex situs of the Property) would regard them as giving rise to a proprietary interest in equity such that the s.281 Applicants are entitled to trace that proprietary interest in equity through all subsequent dispositions of the proceeds of those payments into the Property which forms the subject of these proceedings.”

This claim has been described as the rescission constructive trust claim.

I proceed on the basis that, as a matter of English domestic law, the rescission of a contract voidable for fraud is capable of giving rise to a claim based upon a constructive trust. Although the contrary was argued on behalf of the Litigation Receivers, I agree with the Applicants that the point need not and should not be decided at this stage.

The proper approach to the determination of the applicable law must here involve a taxonomical analysis of the relevant legal categories arising from the operation of distinct European Instruments, where relevant, against a background of residual domestic private international law rules.

For the purposes of this case, the potentially relevant European Instruments are:

Regulation (EC) No 583/2008 (“Rome I”) on the law applicable to contractual obligations; and

Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (“Rome II”) on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations.

These Regulations ceased to have direct effect as EU Regulations at the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020. However, they were thereafter preserved in domestic law as "retained EU law" by section 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 which incorporated directly applicable EU legislation into domestic law as it stood at the end of the transition period and the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and Non-Contractual Obligations (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which made certain amendments to Rome I and Rome II. Then, under the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 , the category of "retained EU law" was abolished from 1 January 2024 and replaced with the concept of "assimilated law".

No argument has been raised before me to the effect that this transition has had any impact upon the applicable law issues which now arise in the circumstances of this case.

Accordingly, the traditional common law approach to the characterisation of issues for the purposes of determining the applicable law must, where the scope of the Rome Regulations is in issue, yield to an autonomous approach to classification. Thus national domestic classifications cannot predetermine the scope of the Regulations. Otherwise the Regulations would fall far short of achieving consistency between the approaches of the individual states which have adopted them. In this respect, I agree with the observation in Dicey at 2-037:

“…where obligations owed by one party to the other are governed, for choice of law purposes, by the statutory choice of law rule in the Rome I or Rome II Regulations, the first question will be whether, on its true construction, the Regulation stipulates the choice of law rule which the court must apply. For if the answer is that it does, there is neither room nor need for a separate exercise in characterisation.”

“…where obligations owed by one party to the other are governed, for choice of law purposes, by the statutory choice of law rule in the Rome I or Rome II Regulations, the first question will be whether, on its true construction, the Regulation stipulates the choice of law rule which the court must apply. For if the answer is that it does, there is neither room nor need for a separate exercise in characterisation.”

Where the characterisation process involves deciding whether the claim fits within the categories established by European Regulations, the authors of Dicey conclude at §2-042 that:

“If, for example, an English court has to decide whether the matter before it is one of contractual or non-contractual obligation, in order to determine whether the choice of law rules are those of the Rome I or Rome II Regulation, or neither, the answer is not to be found by asking whether the common law rules of the conflict of laws would regard the issue as contractual, or tortious, or otherwise. The answer is instead to be arrived at by interpreting the language of the Regulations.”

“If, for example, an English court has to decide whether the matter before it is one of contractual or non-contractual obligation, in order to determine whether the choice of law rules are those of the Rome I or Rome II Regulation, or neither, the answer is not to be found by asking whether the common law rules of the conflict of laws would regard the issue as contractual, or tortious, or otherwise. The answer is instead to be arrived at by interpreting the language of the Regulations.”

In Nicholls v Mapfre España Cia de Seguros y Reaseguros SA [2025] 1 W.L.R. 660, a case whether the calculation of interest on awards was a substantive or procedural matter, Dingemans LJ observed:

“ The approach to the interpretation of Rome II 26. There was much common ground between the parties the proper approach to the interpretation of Rome II. Terms used in European instruments such as Rome II should have a uniform, autonomous meaning and a uniform sphere of application… 27. It is common ground that the recitals to Rome II are a relevant aid to the proper interpretation of Rome II. As appears above, recital (6) emphasised enhancing the predictability of litigation and recital (11) emphasised the autonomous concept of terms used in Rome II… 33. In my judgment the court's task is to give Rome II an independent and uniform interpretation, having regard to the wording, the context in which it occurs, and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. The objectives of Rome II were to ensure a uniformity of approach to determining the applicable substantive law.”

“ The approach to the interpretation of Rome II

There was much common ground between the parties the proper approach to the interpretation of Rome II. Terms used in European instruments such as Rome II should have a uniform, autonomous meaning and a uniform sphere of application…

It is common ground that the recitals to Rome II are a relevant aid to the proper interpretation of Rome II. As appears above, recital (6) emphasised enhancing the predictability of litigation and recital (11) emphasised the autonomous concept of terms used in Rome II…

In my judgment the court's task is to give Rome II an independent and uniform interpretation, having regard to the wording, the context in which it occurs, and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. The objectives of Rome II were to ensure a uniformity of approach to determining the applicable substantive law.”

These observations are equally applicable to the proper approach to issues relating to the potential application of Rome I.

I note, at this stage, that the continued application of the autonomous approach is not without its academic detractors who argue that the departure of the UK from the EU justifies a realignment to an enlightened lex fori approach to the process of characterisation. This approach has not, however, been argued before me and I therefore proceed on the basis that an autonomous approach remains appropriate. I am, in any event, satisfied that my analysis would have reached the same conclusion regardless of the starting point.

In the circumstances of this case, it is therefore apt to start with a consideration of the scope of Rome I.

“Material scope 1. This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. It shall not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.”

This Regulation shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.

It shall not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.”

Article 2 provides: “Universal application

“Universal application

1. Any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether o...