Emitter channel keys are not integrity-protected. The key format ( internal/security/key.go ) encrypts the key payload but applies no MAC or signature, so anyone holding any valid key for a channel can modify the key — including rewriting its permissions byte to master ( 0x01 ) — and the server accepts the forged key as genuine. A read-only key can therefore be turned into a master key for its channel.
Product: Emitter (emitter-io/emitter)
Vulnerability type: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature / Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm (CWE-347 / CWE-327)
Affected component: internal/security/key.go (channel key generation/parsing)
Severity: CVSS 8.8 (as reported)
Verified manually against the official emitter/server image: a genuine read-only key presented as a master key is rejected, while a modified copy of the same key with the permissions byte set to master is accepted and can mint further keys (e.g. a vault/ key).
This issue was reported to VulnCheck for coordinated vulnerability disclosure on 2026-11-02 (submission 33d44ea2-fcf7-4893-a744-b4246c2b8650). VulnCheck validated the finding as CVE-eligible and requested a public reference to proceed with CVE publication; this issue is that reference. This report was prepared with AI assistance; all findings were verified manually by the reporter.
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