Europe's defense technology sovereignty in the face of the Starlink test.

The restoration of Starlink connectivity in Ukraine by the US resolved the disruption to battlefield communications, but it did not erase the shortcomings revealed by the incident.

When a crucial military capability can be dictated by the decisions of a foreign technology supplier, the European Union's (EU) ambitions for strategic autonomy face a real test. Against the backdrop of increasing defense investments by member states, particularly in the space sector, the Starlink story shows that Europe needs not only to possess technology but also to control its own security infrastructure.

Satellite connectivity becomes a strategic leverage .

On October 24th, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that restrictions on the Starlink and Starshield systems had been lifted. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, devices using Starshield – a specialized satellite communication service for the government and military – maintained stable connections even at speeds exceeding 400 km/h. This has enabled the Ukrainian military to restore its ability to operate high-speed unmanned vehicles, including interceptor UAVs.

Previously, from mid-October 2026, terminals in Ukraine experienced connectivity limitations when traveling at speeds exceeding approximately 160 km/h. This situation affected the interception of Russian jet-powered UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack missions, and logistical support at the front lines.

The process of imposing and then lifting restrictions highlights the complexity of the relationship between service providers, the US government , and users. Billionaire Elon Musk, CEO of SpaceX, argues that decisions related to Starshield fall under the authority of the US military.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump denies responsibility for these limitations. U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal demanded that the Department of Defense clarify who makes the decisions and the extent of the U.S. military's dependence on Starlink.

This incident illustrates a reality: Modern military strength depends not only on the quantity of weapons but also on access to the technological infrastructure that ensures their effective operation. Ukraine may possess UAVs, organize operating forces, and receive financial support from partners, but it does not fully control the satellite network that ensures communication. A decision from an external supplier could directly impact military operations, while Kyiv lacks the immediate capability to replace them.

This risk also poses a challenge for Europe. EU countries have provided significant financial and equipment support for Starlink in Ukraine. Poland alone has supplied 24,400 terminals, accounting for approximately half of the equipment currently operating in the country, according to the cited document. However, the core issue is that access and service delivery conditions could still be subject to influence by entities outside the control of Ukraine and European countries.

Space technology autonomy - an urgent requirement for Europe.

The Ukraine conflict has prompted European policymakers to reconsider the role of space in security and defense. Satellites are no longer simply for telecommunications or scientific research; they have become essential infrastructure for military command, control, reconnaissance, , and logistics operations.

To close the gap with the US, the EU is pushing forward with IRIS², a secure satellite communications system expected to consist of 348 satellites, with the first launches planned for operation from 2029. However, compared to Starlink – a network with more than 10,000 satellites in orbit, according to the cited document – ​​IRIS² still lags far behind in scale and deployment progress.

During the transition period, OneWeb, part of the Eutelsat group, is a crucial option. With approximately 650 operational satellites, this system provides the foundation for Europe to strengthen its controlled communications capabilities. By 2025, France aims to increase its ownership stake in Eutelsat to around 30%. The French military has also signed a contract worth up to €1 billion for priority access to OneWeb services for military purposes.

However, this network is not yet capable of replacing Starlink on a large scale. A military communications system requires not only a sufficient number of satellites but also adequate coverage, transmission capacity, terminal equipment, and integration with combat systems.

Alongside infrastructure development, the EU seeks to strengthen its space industry through Project Bromo, involving Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales. The plan to merge the space operations of the three corporations aims to form a single entity with approximately 25,000 employees and estimated annual revenue of €6.5 billion. The goal is to concentrate research and production resources and enhance Europe's competitiveness.

However, the project also sparked debate regarding internal competition. German satellite manufacturer OHB and Spanish company Indra Space feared that the merged consortium could dominate the market, disadvantaging smaller businesses. The EU therefore had to reconcile two requirements: forming globally competitive conglomerates while maintaining a diverse industrial ecosystem.

European investment in military space is projected to exceed $109 billion by 2030. Germany has committed €35 ​​billion over five years, while France plans to invest €10.2 billion between 2026 and 2030. However, if these programs continue to be implemented separately, large sums of capital may not necessarily translate into commensurate self-sufficiency.

Germany developed the SATCOMBw 4 network, France invested in OneWeb, while the EU deployed IRIS². The lack of coordination on technical standards, data sharing, and operational mechanisms may mean Europe possesses multiple systems but still lacks a unified military communications architecture. This is the paradox in the rearmament process: defense spending is increasing, but technological capabilities are not keeping pace with ambitions.

From technology ownership to de facto control.

The biggest lesson from the Starlink incident is that national defense technology sovereignty cannot be measured solely by the number of satellites or the scale of investment. The decisive factors lie in the right to operate, control over data, service delivery conditions, and the ability to maintain continuous connectivity, especially in emergency situations.

A nation may possess advanced weapons but remain dependent if it does not control the communication systems, software, and supporting data. Similarly, the fact that satellites are manufactured in Europe does not automatically mean complete self-reliance if the operational stages, key components, or control platforms still depend on external suppliers.

Therefore, technological sovereignty must be built throughout the entire capability chain, from research, production, satellite launching to operation, data protection, and service maintenance. This process requires long-term capital, highly skilled personnel, and close cooperation among member states.

For the time being, the EU is unlikely to replace Starlink in Ukraine on a large scale. Continuing cooperation with US suppliers remains a realistic option during the transition period. However, defense contracts need to clearly specify conditions restricting connectivity, supplier responsibilities, and access to services in emergency situations. Essential security capabilities cannot be entirely dependent on the unilateral decisions of businesses.

The Starlink incident in Ukraine demonstrates how a technology service can directly impact military operations. Restoring connectivity addressed an urgent need, but it did not erase the strategic challenges Europe faces. In an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment, possessing new weapons is only a necessary condition; the ability to control the technological infrastructure that ensures their operation is what forms the foundation of lasting power. The Starlink test, therefore, not only spurred Europe to develop more satellites but also highlighted the urgent need for control over technologies essential to the bloc's security and defense.

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