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Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • November 22, 2026

**Your Ghostscript version is not the question — whether an uploaded file can reach it is. This checker answers both in 0.06 seconds: it reads your Ghostscript version and traces every delivery path (ImageMagick, CUPS, WordPress/Roundcube) that could hand it an attacker's file.**

A stdlib-only Python CLI. No installs, no network calls, no exploit code — it only reads version strings, delegate lists, and config files.

On **2026-11-17**, security firm pwn.ai disclosed **Upload2Shell (CVE-2026-125396)**: a use-after-free in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader that escapes the `-dSAFER` sandbox. A file named `.jpg` can trigger remote code execution when the server renders it. The story hit the Hacker News front page on **2026-11-22**.

- **Affected: Ghostscript before 10.08.0. Fixed in 10.08.0** (released 2026-09-08). CVSS 4.0 **8.5**.

- **The version is the easy half.** pwn.ai reached Ghostscript without calling it directly, through ten everyday paths: an anonymous print job to a shared **Debian 13** CUPS queue, a **Roundcube** attachment thumbnailed the moment the recipient opened the message, and public upload forms in WordPress plugins (Forminator, Essential Addons for Elementor). ImageMagick, Pillow, libvips, and Qt plugins all hand PostScript/EPS content to Ghostscript — even when the file is named `.png`.

- **Coverage is uneven.** As of last week, Debian 12 was still listed vulnerable and several distros had fixes pending. Checking `gs --version` tells you the number; it does not tell you whether anything on the box can feed it a file. That is what this tool adds: one command, one verdict — `EXPOSED`, `VULNERABLE`, `PATCHED`, or `NOT_INSTALLED`.

Sources: [The Hacker News, 2026-11-22]( · [Cyber Security News, 2026-11-22]( · [Hacker News discussion]( (pwn.ai advisory linked from the HN post)

| What you know | `gs --version` says 10.06.0 — is that bad? | `EXPOSED`: 10.06.0 **plus** ImageMagick handing it PS/PDF/EPS, CUPS accepting jobs, Roundcube + WordPress installed |

| Time to answer | Grep five configs by hand | **0.057 s** median (7 runs, measured 2026-11-22 on this machine) |

| False comfort | "We patched Ghostscript" | The checker also verifies the ImageMagick policy actually blocks the coders |

git clone

python3 upload2shell_check.py # check this machine

No pip installs, no dependencies. Python 3.8+ only. Exit code 1 means something on the box is `VULNERABLE` or `EXPOSED`, 0 means clean, 3 means nothing could be detected.

python3 upload2shell_check.py --demo # labelled fixtures: EXPOSED / PATCHED / NOT_INSTALLED

python3 upload2shell_check.py --version-string 10.06.0 # judge one version string

python3 upload2shell_check.py --version-string 10.08.0 # PATCHED

python3 upload2shell_check.py --scan-path /var/www # also look for WordPress/Roundcube installs

python3 upload2shell_check.py --json # machine-readable output for CI

python3 upload2shell_check.py --fail-on never # report only, always exit 0

Verified from a clean copy (fresh checkout in `/tmp`, 2026-11-22): the live check runs, `--demo` reproduces byte-for-byte, and the full test suite passes, 25/25, exit 0.

Real output of `python3 upload2shell_check.py --demo` (captured verbatim to `demo.txt`; re-runs reproduce it byte-for-byte, sha256 `f5683e6d26eec442036106f7acd94d1bec31fec389b018ce088298946b085aa1`):

CVE-2026-125396 — Upload2Shell exposure check

Debian 13 print + web server (fixture): EXPOSED

- Ghostscript 10.6.0 is below the fixed 10.08.0 (CVE-2026-125396)

- ImageMagick hands eps, pdf, ps to Ghostscript (policy does not block it)

- CUPS scheduler running, printer(s) accepting jobs: OfficeJet

- Web app(s) with upload/thumbnail pipelines found: Roundcube, WordPress

- Ghostscript 10.8.0 is at or above the fixed 10.08.0

- ImageMagick delegates eps, pdf, ps to Ghostscript but policy.xml blocks them

Container with no Ghostscript (fixture): NOT_INSTALLED

Fix: upgrade Ghostscript to 10.08.0 or later, or remove it;

until then, block PS/PDF/EPS in ImageMagick policy.xml and

do not let untrusted files reach a vulnerable renderer.

Note: a plain `--demo` exits 1 by design — the first fixture is `EXPOSED`, and a finding is not a bug. `--demo --fail-on never` exits 0.

- **Checks:** Ghostscript version; ImageMagick delegate list and `policy.xml`; CUPS scheduler and accepting printers; WordPress/Roundcube installs under `--scan-path`.

- **Does not:** send any file to Ghostscript, run exploit code, touch the network, or modify anything. It is a reader, not a prober.

- **Limit:** a `PATCHED` verdict means the Ghostscript on PATH is fixed. A second, older Ghostscript bundled inside another app (a container image, a vendored binary) is out of scope — point `--gs-binary` at it to check it directly.

The full story

This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.