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Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • November 17, 2026

Memory corruption in OpenJDK HotSpot's AVX-512 VBMI Base64 decoding intrinsic. A malformed 65-byte input (`"A"×64 + "="`) causes an integer underflow in the output mask calculation, producing a full 64-bit write mask. The resulting `VMOVDQU8` writes **62 bytes past the end of the heap buffer**.

Discovered by [Quang Luong]( of Calif.io using AI-assisted vulnerability research. Pre-auth RCE demonstrated against Keycloak, Jira, Confluence, Jenkins, Artifactory, and PingFederate.

**Author:** [Qi Deng](  |  **Disclosure:** [calif.io/java4shell](  |  **Date:** 2026-11-17

| **CVSS v4.0 / v3.1** | 9.2 Critical / 8.1 High |

| **CWE** | CWE-191 (Integer Underflow) → CWE-122 (Heap Buffer Overflow) |

| **Component** | `hotspot/compiler` — `StubGenerator::generate_base64_decodeBlock()` |

| **Fix** | [JDK-8393212]( — 3-line `length < 4` guard |

| 21 | All before 21.0.13.1 | 21.0.13.1 |

**Hardware requirement:** x86-64 with AVX-512 VBMI — Intel Ice Lake+ (Xeon 3rd Gen+) or AMD Zen 4+ (EPYC Genoa / Ryzen 7000+). **ARM64 is NOT affected.**

All OpenJDK-based distributions are vulnerable: Oracle Java SE, Temurin, Corretto, Zulu, Liberica, SapMachine, Red Hat OpenJDK, GraalVM.

- Keycloak · Atlassian Jira · Atlassian Confluence · JFrog Artifactory · Jenkins · PingFederate

- Apache Kafka Broker · Apache Solr · Elasticsearch · Gerrit · Spinnaker

**Attack surface:** Any Java application that decodes untrusted Base64 via `java.util.Base64` — HTTP Basic Auth, JWT tokens, SAML assertions, file uploads, API payloads, TLS (client-side).

output_size -= 1 = -1 (UNDERFLOW)

bzhiq(-1, 0xFF) = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (all bits set)

evmovdqub [dst+48], mask, zmm → writes ALL 64 bytes

The `BZHI` instruction treats the index as `unsigned [7:0]`. When `output_size = -1`, the low byte is `0xFF = 255`, which exceeds the 64-bit register width, so no bits are cleared — full mask → full 64-byte write.

The trigger proves the memory corruption is real. It uses a 4096-byte destination array so the overflow stays contained (safe to run).

rejected=true changed=62 first=50 last=111

**Verified on:** GCE `c3-standard-4` (Intel Xeon Platinum 8481C, Sapphire Rapids) + Temurin 21.0.13+9-LTS.

| 21, 25, 27 | `"A" × 64 + "="` (65 bytes) |

| 17 (17.0.6+) | `"A" × 128 + "="` (129 bytes) |

Tests the trigger, then confirms both mitigation flags (`-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics` and `-XX:UseAVX=2`) prevent the corruption.

Checks all Java installations on the local machine for vulnerability:

Verifies: CPU flags (AVX-512 VBMI) → Java version → running JVM mitigation flags.

Probes remote hosts for vulnerable Java versions via HTTP headers, TLS certs, and service banners:

python3 scanner/java4shell_scan.py --host app.example.com

python3 scanner/java4shell_scan.py --cidr 10.0.0.0/24 --ports 8080,8443

python3 scanner/java4shell_scan.py --targets hosts.txt --threads 50

python3 scanner/java4shell_scan.py --host app.example.com --json

Pre-built IDS / WAF / SIEM rules in [`detection/`](detection/):

| `java4shell.rules` | Suricata / Snort | 6 rules — malformed Base64, trigger patterns, warm-up, crash indicators |

| `java4shell.yaml` | Sigma | 5 rules — web logs, JVM crashes, GC SIGSEGV, exception floods |

| `modsecurity.conf` | ModSecurity v2/v3 | 6 rules — drop-in for Apache/Nginx |

- Malformed Base64 padding in `Authorization: Basic` headers (length % 4 ≠ 0)

- Exact trigger patterns (`"A"×64 + "="` or `"A"×128 + "="`)

- High-frequency Base64 auth requests from single source (JIT warm-up phase)

- `IllegalArgumentException` from Base64 decoder (thrown after corruption)

- `hs_err_pid*.log` crash files with `SIGSEGV` in G1 GC / `StubRoutines`

git clone && cd java4shell-poc

# Start the lab (requires x86-64 Docker host with AVX-512 VBMI)

cd lab && chmod +x setup.sh && ./setup.sh

# Or run directly (if Java is installed locally)

cd poc && javac Base64Trigger.java && java Base64Trigger

│ ├── Base64Trigger.java # Memory corruption trigger (CVE-2026-114938)

│ ├── verify_corruption.sh # Full verification with mitigation tests

│ └── run.sh # Quick compile-and-run helper

│ ├── java4shell_scan.sh # Host scanner (JDK + CPU check)

│ └── java4shell_scan.py # Network scanner (HTTP/TLS/banner probing)

│ ├── java4shell.rules # Suricata / Snort IDS rules

│ ├── java4shell.yaml # Sigma SIEM detection rules

│ └── modsecurity.conf # ModSecurity WAF rules

│ ├── Dockerfile # Vulnerable Java environment

│ ├── docker-compose.yml # Lab with optional Keycloak

│ └── setup.sh # One-click lab setup

│ ├── ANALYSIS.md # Full technical analysis

│ └── cover.svg # Cover art

[JDK-8393212]( — committed 2026-11-16, titled "Base64 optimization improvements":

+// A padded Base64 tail shorter than one complete block is handled by Java.

Routes tails shorter than 4 bytes to the safe scalar decoder before the BZHI underflow can occur.

**Upgrade Java immediately** to 17.0.21.1 / 21.0.13.1 / 25.0.5.1 / 27.0.1.1.

# Interim — disable Base64 intrinsic (recommended, narrow impact)

# Interim — disable AVX-512 entirely (x86-64 only — do NOT use on ARM)

export JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS="-XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics"

After upgrading: restart all JVM processes, rebuild container images.

| | Heartbleed | Log4Shell | Spring4Shell | **Java4Shell** |

| **Bug class** | Over-read | Injection | Class manipulation | Integer underflow → heap overflow |

| **Trigger** | TLS heartbeat | `${jndi:…}` | HTTP params | `"A"×64 + "="` |

| **Exploitation** | Trivial | Trivial | Moderate | Complex (heap feng shui) |

| **Universal** | Yes | Yes | Partial | No (per-target + HW-gated) |

- [Calif.io disclosure]( — Original research by Quang Luong

- [OpenJDK advisory](

- [Oracle CPU](

- [Fix commit 5177a70b385c](

- [Datadog Security Labs analysis](

- [JFrog analysis](

- [Upwind / java4shell.net](