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Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • September 23, 2026

# CVE-2026-94545 - .js ` /og` ImageResponse SVG Injection (GHSA-vcvr-r3jv-pc5j)

Security-research material for reproducing and validating **CVE-2026-94545**,

the .js `ImageResponse` SVG-serialization injection (upstream: Satori

**GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp**), in an isolated, loopback-only lab.

- **Affected:** .js `>=16.2.0 attacker

controls the embedded SVG document; RCE per the advisory depends on the

- **Upstream:** [vercel/satori GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp](

> **Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test.** The

> scanner is non-destructive: it renders an image and counts pixels. Nothing

> is written, stored, or executed on the target.

Against the advisory's exact route pattern (attacker value into

16.3.5 (vulnerable): injected 500x150 red rect rendered into the PNG

(75,000 #FF0000 pixels measured in the response)

16.3.6 (patched) : value escaped, 0 red pixels

satori 0.25.0 (vuln) : payload present raw in the serialized SVG string

satori 0.33.5 (fixed) : payload escaped to

This proves the injection primitive end-to-end (serializer -> embedded SVG ->

rasterized output). It does not demonstrate remote code execution: the

advisory ties RCE to the downstream SVG parser, whose vulnerable details are

not public at the time of writing. No file read, SSRF, or code execution is

## Root cause (verified against the fix commit)

Satori serializes `` nodes with `translateSVGNodeToSVGString()`

(`src/handler/preprocess.ts`), which interpolated into the output XML without

1. Text nodes returned via `String(node)` - unescaped (now `escapeXMLText`).

2. Attribute values interpolated raw inside quotes - `"` breaks out.

3. Attribute names interpolated raw - space/quote injects new attributes.

5. The embedded-SVG data-URL encoder did not encode `&`, so inner XML

6. `expand.ts` passed internal style properties (prefix `_`) into serialized

The fix ([satori@26a52aff](

routes everything through a hardening `buildXMLString()` that escapes values

and validates XML names. This lab verifies all of it behaviorally; the exact

request and pixel evidence are in `poc/`.

Requirements: Docker with Compose v2, Python 3.10+ on the host (for the

scanner), network access to npm on first run.

Builds the vulnerable app (vendored ` /og` from ` @16.3.5`), requires

the marker rect to render in the HTTP response, then the patched app

(` @16.3.6`) and requires its absence.

[*] #FF0000 pixels: 75000 (threshold 10000)

[!!!] INJECTION CONFIRMED: the attacker value escaped and

became a rendered SVG element in the generated image.

./lab start vulnerable # 16.3.5 app on

./lab test # assert injection renders

./lab test # assert absence

Run the scanner by hand (loopback default; authorized external targets need

python3 poc/scan.py

python3 poc/scan.py --param value \

--allow-authorized-non-loopback [--insecure]

## How the detection works (and why it is safe)

The payload is balanced XML carrying a 500x150 pure-red ``. On a

vulnerable endpoint the value escapes `` and the rect becomes a real

element in the embedded SVG document; the scanner counts exact `#FF0000`

pixels in the returned PNG (75,000 expected; threshold 10,000). On a patched

endpoint the value is escaped text and no red renders. The probe changes

nothing on the target: one GET request, one image render.

Note the carrier is deliberately a ``, not text: text inside the

embedded SVG has no loadable font in the renderer and would be invisible

The proof of this vulnerability is the pixel content of a rendered raster,

and nuclei matchers cannot decode PNGs. A size-differential template was

built and rejected: on a patched app the escaped payload still renders (as

literal inert text), so benign-vs-payload sizes differ on patched systems

too, and the separation between vulnerable and patched deltas is

app-specific compression noise. Shipping a matcher that fires on patched

systems is worse than shipping none. Use `poc/scan.py`; it evaluates the

| .js 16.3.5 (vendored @vercel/og) | Injection reproduced end-to-end over HTTP |

| .js 16.3.6 (vendored @vercel/og) | Patched negative control reproduced |

| satori 0.25.0 (npm) | Raw injection in serialized SVG (source level) |

| satori 0.33.5 (npm, 22 Sep 2026) | Escaped (source level) |

| .js 16.2.0-16.3.4 | Affected per advisory; not individually tested |

| .js 15.x | Not affected by the RCE issue per vendor blog |

│ └── server.mjs # advisory route pattern over loopback HTTP

└── scan.py # non-destructive scanner (Python stdlib: urllib + zlib)

Not committed: `assets/` (npm-packed tarballs + extracted bundles),

| SVG-serialization injection in satori < fix | Proven (source + behavior) |

| End-to-end rendering of injected markup via /og 16.3.5 | Proven |

| Patched negative control (16.3.6 / satori 0.33.5) | Proven |

| Attribute/style carriers (same root cause) | Root cause confirmed in fix diff; text carrier proven |

| SSRF / file read via injected resource references | Not tested |

| Remote code execution | Not claimed (depends on undisclosed downstream parser details) |

- [GHSA-vcvr-r3jv-pc5j ( .js)](

- [GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp (Satori)](

- [ .js security update, 22 Sep 2026](

- [Satori fix commit 26a52aff](

- [Netlify customer advisory (CVE-2026-94545)](

Run this repository only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to

test. The lab driver refuses variants other than `vulnerable`/`patched`, the

scanner refuses non-loopback targets unless

`--allow-authorized-non-loopback` is supplied, and the Compose port is bound

See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for disclosure handling. This repository does

not include production targets, customer data, access tokens, or evidence

Extracted Entities