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Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • November 19, 2026

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Read-only audit for **CVE-2026-114952**, a critical flaw in the **"Client

programs"** component of Oracle **MySQL Server** and **MySQL Cluster**, published

on 2026-11-17 in Oracle's November 2026 Critical Patch Update.

Written in **POSIX sh**, so it runs as is on busybox `ash` (Alpine, Synology), on

dash and on bash. It never sends a request, never runs an exploit and never

It finds every MySQL server program on the machine (running and merely installed,

containers included when their processes are visible) and the classic client

programs, identifies the product (Oracle MySQL, MariaDB or a fork), judges the

version **against Oracle's affected list**, and, for a server inside the list,

**Read the section first: the public sources are thin, and this audit says

What the sources state (the CVE record published by Oracle as the CVE Numbering

Authority, NVD, and the CWE added by CISA):

- **Component:** "Client programs", in MySQL Server and in MySQL Cluster.

- **Description:** an easily exploitable vulnerability that allows an

**unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols** to

compromise the product. Successful attacks can result in unauthorized create,

delete or modify access to data, and unauthorized access to all accessible data.

- **Score:** CVSS 3.1 base score **9.1**,

`AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N` (no availability impact).

- **Weakness:** CWE-287, Improper Authentication (added by CISA).

- **Affected versions, as Oracle lists them:**

| MySQL Server | 8.4.0 to 8.4.13, 9.7.0 to 9.7.4, and 26.10 |

| MySQL Cluster | 8.0.0 to 8.0.50, 8.4.0 to 8.4.13, 9.7.0 to 9.7.4, and 26.10 |

- **Not in the list:** MariaDB (a different product). MySQL **8.0 Server** is not

in Oracle's Server list (8.0 *Cluster* is). Every other train (5.7, 8.1 to 8.3,

9.0 to 9.6, Cluster 7.x, ...) is not listed either.

- **Status as of 2026-11-19:** no exploitation reported, not in the CISA KEV list.

What **no source states**, and this script does not invent:

- **Fixed versions.** Neither the CVE record nor any other source used here names

one. The listed ranges end at 8.4.13 and 9.7.4, which only *suggests* that later

releases are not affected; that is a guess, not a statement. NVD has no CPE

- **What the flaw is**, why a bug in "client programs" has a network attack vector

("multiple protocols"), what the attack path is, and whether any workaround

- **The exact version form of the new year-style release "26.10".** The script

reads `26.10` and `26.10.N` as the listed `26.10`; if Oracle ships it in another

form (for example `26.10.0-1`), that is read the same way, and anything that

command line tools, so the affected list above comes from the CVE record. Check

the advisory and Oracle's patch availability document yourself.

# review it first, then run as root (other users' /proc entries need root)

sh cve-2026-114952-mysql-audit.sh --quiet # verdict only

sh cve-2026-114952-mysql-audit.sh --no-banner # text report without the banner

On a remote host, nothing is copied to disk:

`MITIGATED` > `PATCHED`); `NOT_APPLICABLE` only when every instance is. A running

`mysqld` whose binary path cannot be read lowers a clean result to `UNKNOWN`.

1. **Instances.** Running `mysqld`, `mysqld-debug` (and MariaDB's `mariadbd`)

processes through `/proc`; a process in another mount namespace is marked as a

container and is never executed. Installed server binaries in the usual places

(`/usr/sbin`, `/usr/libexec`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/local/mysql/bin`,

`/opt/mysql*/bin`, ...) and the classic client programs `mysql`, `mysqldump`,

`mysqladmin`, `mysqlcheck`, `mysqlimport`, `mysqlshow` and `mysqlbinlog`,

because the vulnerable component is named "Client programs". Instances are

deduplicated by resolved path and container (two containers with the same

program path stay separate, as do a host and a container).

2. **Product and version.** From `PROGRAM --version` when it is safe to run, else

from the strings inside the file (never executed). `MariaDB` in the banner:

`NOT_APPLICABLE`. `Percona`, `XtraDB`, `Galera`, `TiDB`, `Aurora`: `UNKNOWN`

("a fork; Oracle's list names Oracle MySQL, check the fork vendor"). A banner

with a version and no fork name (`MySQL Community Server`, `MySQL Enterprise`,

a source build, a distribution tag such as `(Ubuntu)`) is read as Oracle code.

3. **Server or Cluster.** Cluster when the banner says so (`-cluster` in the

version, `MySQL Cluster`, the word `NDB`) or when `ndbd`, `ndbmtd` or `ndb_mgmd`

is installed to the program or in a usual program directory. It matters:

a Cluster node at 8.0.50 is in the list, a plain Server at 8.0.50 is not.

4. **Package.** `dpkg`, `rpm` or `apk` ownership of the binary, and the package

changelog for the CVE id (`CVE-2026-114952`).

5. **Exposure of a server inside the list.** The sockets the process really

listens on: its socket descriptors (`/proc/PID/fd`, `socket:[N]`) matched to

the LISTEN entries of `/proc/PID/net/tcp` and `tcp6` (the net namespace of the

process; a host process may fall back to `/proc/net/tcp`). Loopback is

`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1` and `::ffff:127.x.x.x`; everything else, including `::`

and `0.0.0.0`, is reachable. This covers 3306, the X plugin port 33060 and any

other port. Also the configured `bind-address`, `mysqlx-bind-address`, `port`,

`mysqlx-port`, `skip-networking` and `mysqlx` of the `[mysqld]` group (text

parse of `/etc/my.cnf`, `/etc/mysql/my.cnf`, `!include` and `!includedir`,

`--defaults-file` and the command line of the process): shown as information,

and used as the verdict only when the live sockets cannot be read.

Apply the **November 2026 Oracle Critical Patch Update** for your MySQL release

and restart `mysqld`. **The fixed version numbers are not published in the sources

[advisory]( and its patch

availability document for the release you run. Update the **client programs** too:

they are the named component. Distribution builds may carry the fix under an older

version number: read the package changelog or the vendor tracker.

**MariaDB is a different product and is not affected** (it is not in Oracle's

**If you cannot update yet:** Oracle names no workaround and no attack path.

Keeping `mysqld` off non-loopback addresses (`bind-address=127.0.0.1` **and**

`mysqlx-bind-address=127.0.0.1`, or `skip-networking`, which also closes the X

plugin port) or behind a firewall is a precaution. It is not a stated mitigation:

because Oracle does not say how the bug is reached, "not reachable from the

network right now" is only what this audit can see.

Per instance, using the running binary when there is one. First the **product and

| MariaDB | not affected (`NOT_APPLICABLE`) |

| a fork (Percona, Galera, ...) or an unidentified product | **unknown** |

| version cannot be parsed or has no patch level (`8.4`) | **unknown** |

| a train Oracle does not list for that product kind (Server 8.0.x, 5.7, 8.1 to 8.3, 9.0 to 9.6, 9.8 and later, Cluster 7.x, ...) | not affected (`NOT_APPLICABLE`): "not in Oracle's affected list". No end-of-life claim is made |

| same train as a listed range but **above its last listed release** (8.4.14 and later, 9.7.5 and later, Cluster 8.0.51 and later) | `PATCHED` with the basis "not in Oracle's affected list; Oracle names no fixed version, so this relies on the list only" |

| inside a listed range (or `26.10`, `26.10.N`) | **affected**, then the package rules below |

**What `PATCHED` therefore means:** the version is above the end of Oracle's

affected list in its train. It is **not** a statement that Oracle fixed it in that

release, because no source says so. Treat it as "not in Oracle's list", and

For an affected version the package decides:

| the package changelog names `CVE-2026-114952` (id must end at a non-digit) | `PATCHED` (backport) |

| Oracle repository package (`mysql-community-*`, `mysql-commercial-*`, `mysql-cluster-community-*`, `mysql-cluster-commercial-*`) | unpatched: judged by version |

| distribution package (`mysql-server`, `mysql-server-core-*`, ...) with no changelog mention | **unknown**: a backport cannot be excluded |

| container image | **unknown**: the image provenance is unknown, pull a newer image |

| not owned by any package manager (tarball, `/usr/local/mysql`) | unpatched: judged by version |

An unpatched server is then judged by exposure: running with at least one

non-loopback TCP listener is `VULNERABLE`; running with only loopback or

unix-socket listeners is `MITIGATED`; not running is `MITIGATED`; if the process

cannot be inspected the configuration decides (a non-loopback bind: `VULNERABLE`,

loopback or `skip-networking`: `UNKNOWN`). A **client program** inside the list

(and not covered by a changelog) is `UNKNOWN` with the reason that the component

is named "Client programs" and Oracle publishes no attack path, so the affected

client binaries are listed and should be updated. A client alone is never

`--json` prints `script_version`, `cve`, `matrix_date`, `verdict`, `exit_code`,

`os`, `instances`, `instance_reports` and `reasons`. Each entry of

| `exe`, `kind` | program path; `server`, `cluster` or `client` |

| `product`, `version` | `Oracle MySQL`, `MariaDB`, `fork: NAME` or `unknown`; the version token read |

| `running`, `pid`, `container`, `binary_replaced` | process facts |

| `package`, `package_vendor` | owning package; `true` for Oracle's repository, `false` for a distribution, `null` when none |

| `list_state`, `list_basis` | `affected`, `newer`, `not_listed`, `unknown` or `n/a`; the basis text |

| `listeners`, `external_listeners` | the TCP listeners found; how many are non-loopback (`null` when they could not be read) |

| `config_bind` | the configured bind and networking options |

| `verdict`, `reasons` | the instance verdict and its reasons |

- **The attack path is unpublished.** "Reachable from the network" is judged from

listening TCP sockets because the CVSS vector is `AV:N`. If the flaw is reached

through a client program that connects *out* to a hostile server, a loopback or

stopped `mysqld` says nothing, which is why affected client programs keep the

result at `UNKNOWN`. A `MITIGATED` verdict is "not reachable right now", not a

- **No fixed versions.** `PATCHED` for an 8.4.14 or 9.7.5 rests on the end of the

affected list. If Oracle's advisory turns out to fix a different set, the rule

(`last_affected` in the script) is the one place to change.

- **"26.10".** The exact version form of the year-style release is unverified. It

is read as `26.10` or `26.10.N`, any patch level, in both product kinds. A later

`26.x` train is "not in Oracle's affected list".

- **Distribution backports.** A distribution package whose upstream version is in

the list reads `UNKNOWN` unless its changelog names the CVE. Ubuntu keeps only

the last ten changelog entries in a binary package, and `rpm -q --changelog`

depends on the package; a package may also fix the bug without naming the id.

- **Containers** are never executed. The version comes from the strings in the

binary (the source tree name, `mysql-8.4.13/`) and the option files from the

container's root. The package database inside a container is not read, so an

affected image is `UNKNOWN`. The listeners come from the net namespace of the

container process; with docker the audit needs `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` (or to run on

the host as root) to read `/proc/PID/exe` and `/proc/PID/fd` of a server that

- **Forks.** Percona, Galera and similar builds are `UNKNOWN`: Oracle's list names

Oracle MySQL only; check the fork vendor.

- **Non-root runs.** A server owned by another user cannot be inspected; the

- **Cluster detection** needs the banner or an `ndb*` program in a usual directory.

A Cluster node whose binary says neither is judged as a plain Server (8.0.x

- **Address decoding assumes a little-endian host** (x86, ARM, RISC-V, ppc64le):

the kernel prints `127.0.0.1` as `0100007F`. On a big-endian machine loopback

listeners would read as non-loopback (a false `VULNERABLE`, never a false clean

- **Strings fallback.** When a binary is not safe to run, the product is guessed

from `MariaDB`, `Percona`, ... text and the version from the source tree name. A

- **A binary is run only when it is trusted:** owned by root (or by the user who

runs the audit), not writable by others or by a group other than root, and the

same for its directory (and for the target and directory of a symlink, as for

`mysql -> mariadb`). Otherwise the version is read from the file.

- Local firewall rules, port mappings of containers and proxies in front of the

sh tests/run_tests.sh # 638 regression tests on a fake root; run as a normal user

sh tests/docker_tests.sh # the same suite under ash, dash, bash 4.2 and 4.3 in

# containers, plus end-to-end tests on real servers

The unit tests run the audit against a fake root with fake `mysqld` and client

programs, a fake `/proc` (fd links, `net/tcp`, `net/tcp6`, `ns/mnt`, `comm`, `exe`,

`cmdline`) and fake `dpkg-query`, `rpm` and `apk`; the test hooks

(`MYSQL_AUDIT_TEST_ROOT`, `MYSQL_AUDIT_TEST_PATH`) are ignored when the script

runs as root. They cover every boundary of every listed range for Server and

Cluster, product identification, loopback decoding for IPv4 and IPv6, the listener

and configuration rules, the package and changelog rule (with a 400 KB padded

changelog), containers, the trust rules for binaries (with a positive control for

every "never executed" check), aggregation and the output formats.

The end-to-end tests need docker or podman:

- real **Alpine** with a running **MariaDB** server and the clients (`apk add

mariadb mariadb-client`): they must come out `NOT_APPLICABLE`, the real `/proc`

and socket mapping must find the listener (0.0.0.0, 127.0.0.1, and

`skip-networking` with none), plus `--json`, `--quiet` and the banner. A second

run without `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` checks that the unreadable server process gives

- the official **Oracle `mysql:8.4`** image with a real running Oracle MySQL,

whatever version it has: the audit must classify it as Oracle's list says (the

expectation is written down in the test, independent of the script), including

the X plugin port 33060 and `skip-networking`. `NO_ORACLE=1` skips it.

The exact version form of 26.10 and the behaviour on a real Cluster install were

**not** tested against a real server (none was available).

- Oracle Critical Patch Update, November 2026 (answers 403 to command line tools):

Extracted Entities

Attack Types (1)

Companies (2)