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Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • October 21, 2026

[![CVE](

[![GHSA](

[![Affected](

[![Fixed](

[![License](

**[Full technical analysis →](docs/ANALYSIS.md)**

`php_request_startup()` parses the multipart body, and with it runs the

`session.upload_progress` callback, **before** `PHP_RINIT(basic)` resets

If a session decode runs out of memory, `zend_bailout()` skips

`PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY`. The global is left at `level = 1`, pointing into a

request heap that is to be freed. The request on the same worker

reaches the callback before RINIT and **reuses the freed pointer**.

| **Bug class** | Use-after-free (cross-request, stale global state) |

| **Component** | `main/main.c` startup order · `ext/session` · `ext/standard/var_unserializer` |

| **Reachability** | Any endpoint that accepts `multipart/form-data`. No auth, no `session_start()` needed |

| **Deterministic result** | Pre-auth worker crash (SIGSEGV) |

| **RCE** | Conditional: needs a sink, an ASLR/PIE leak and heap grooming |

| **Fix** | `php_basic_early_rinit()` in PHP 8.5.12 (21 Oct 2026) |

Note over A,G: Request 1 · large session (a:1048576:{...})

A->>W: multipart POST + PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS

W->>G: php_var_unserialize_init() → level=1, data=ptr

W->>W: array_init_size(1M) exceeds memory_limit

W--xW: zend_bailout() skips PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY

Note over W,G: request heap freed, but level=1 and data=ptr (dangling)

Note over A,G: Request 2 · small session (x|i:1;)

A->>W: multipart POST + PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS

Note over W: php_hash_environment() runs BEFORE RINIT

W--xW: tmp_var() reads (*var_hashx)->last_dtor → SIGSEGV

The ASAN stack shows the whole path running inside `php_request_startup()`,

before a single line of application code:

==PID==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x00000000013a

#0 tmp_var ext/standard/var_unserializer.c:173

#1 var_tmp_var ext/standard/var_unserializer.c:195

#2 ps_srlzr_decode_php ext/session/session.c:1149

#3 php_session_decode ext/session/session.c:320

#4 php_session_initialize ext/session/session.c:540

#5 php_session_rfc1867_cleanup ext/session/session.c:3199

#6 php_session_rfc1867_callback ext/session/session.c:3364

#7 rfc1867_post_handler main/rfc1867.c:1273

#13 php_hash_environment main/php_variables.c:794

#14 php_request_startup main/main.c:1945

Full report: [`poc/asan-trace.txt`](poc/asan-trace.txt).

Requirements: Linux, a C compiler, `make`, `curl`, `xz` and Python 3.8+.

git clone

./build.sh # PHP 8.5.11, normal build

./build.sh asan # optional: PHP 8.5.11 with AddressSanitizer

python3 poc/repro_uaf.py --php build-asan/php-8.5.11/sapi/cli/php --verbose

`build.sh` downloads the official tarball, checks its SHA-256 and builds with

`--disable-all --enable-session --enable-cli`. Everything stays inside the repo

[*] php build/php-8.5.11/sapi/cli/php

[*] server memory_limit=16M

[*] req1 seeded session: 4194317 bytes (1048576 elements)

[*] req1 HTTP/1.0 500 Internal Server Error oom=True alive=True

[+] worker crashed: BG(unserialize) reused the freed php_unserialize_data

The script exits `0` only when the worker dies from a signal. On a patched build

the second request returns `200`, the worker survives and the script exits `1`:

python3 poc/repro_uaf.py --php build-patched/php-8.5.12/sapi/cli/php

> The large session is written to `session.save_path` by the script to

> simulate an existing session of that size. This is a lab shortcut that

> isolates the startup-order bug. The server runs on `127.0.0.1` with a

> throwaway temporary directory, which is removed at the end.

| ≤ 8.1, 7.x, 5.x | — | ⚠️ no official fix (EOL) |

Reproduced on **8.5.11**. Other branches are listed according to the official

PHP 8.5.12 adds `php_basic_early_rinit()`, called from `php_request_startup()`

**before** `sapi_activate()` and `php_hash_environment()`. It resets

`BG(serialize_lock)`, `BG(serialize)` and `BG(unserialize)`, so no early

consumer can find stale state from a request.

The same release adds `incomplete_classes_only` while `PS(in_rfc1867_update)`

is set, so objects found in the session during the upload-progress update

become `__PHP_Incomplete_Class` and no magic methods run.

- Upgrade to a fixed release. This is the only full fix.

- If you don't use upload progress, disable it: `session.upload_progress.enabled = Off`.

- Recycle workers regularly (`pm.max_requests` in FPM) to shorten the window.

This reduces the risk but does not remove it.

├── build.sh # downloads, verifies and builds PHP (normal | asan | patched)

│ └── ANALYSIS.md # full write-up: root cause, exploitability, fix

├── repro_uaf.py # two-request reproducer

└── asan-trace.txt # ASAN report from the reproduction

- [GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp]( *RCE via stale global state* (CVE-2026-109619)

- [GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w]( *RCE via OOM corruption* (CVE-2026-109618)

- [PHP 8.5.12 changelog]( "Avoid state corruption via bailout"

This is an independent reproduction of a publicly disclosed and patched

vulnerability, done in a local lab on my own builds. It is published for

research, education and defense. The reproducer only crashes a local

`php -S` server that it starts itself. Don't run it against systems you don't

Extracted Entities

Attack Types (1)

CWE Weaknesses (1)