 of VMware vCenter, rated CVSS 9.8 (CWE-288). Broadcom documents
**no workaround**: the only fix is a patched release.
Written in **POSIX sh**, so it runs as is on bash, dash and busybox `ash`. It needs `curl`.
It never logs in, never sends a proof of concept and never changes anything on the target.
You name the hosts. For each one it asks ` for the public vSphere
ServiceContent, reads the product type, version and build, and tells you whether that host is
Broadcom's advisory says that a malicious actor with network access to vCenter may bypass
authentication and gain unauthorized access to the system. It publishes no technical detail.
The issue was reported privately by Mandiant and disclosed on 2026-11-19.
| Advisory | [VMSA-2026-0009]( (Critical, CVSS range 6.7 to 9.8, this CVE 9.8) |
| Affected | vCenter **7.0**, **8.0** before 8.0 U3m, **9.0** before 9.0.2.0200, **9.1** before 9.1.1.0200; VCF 5.x before 5.2.5; Telco Cloud Platform 3.0, 4.x, 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2; Telco Cloud Infrastructure 3.0 |
| Fixed in | **8.0 U3m**, **9.0.2.0200**, **9.1.1.0200**, **5.2.5** (VCF, KB88287); Telco products through KB463116 |
| vCenter 7.0 | affected; fixed only for customers with Broadcom extended support |
| Not affected | ESXi on its own is not a product of this advisory |
**What is and is not confirmed.** The advisory gives no mechanism and no exploit. CISA's SSVC
entry in NVD on 2026-11-19 reads `exploitation: none`, `automatable: yes`,
`technical impact: total`, and the CVE was not in the CISA KEV list that day. That describes the
day of disclosure only. Mandiant reported it privately, so a public exploit is a matter of time.
**The CVE.org record is incomplete.** Its affected-versions list leaves out vCenter 7.0, which
Broadcom's own response matrix lists as affected. This script follows the advisory.
The same advisory also covers CVE-2026-123891 to CVE-2026-123894 (SDDC Manager and VMware
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh HOST [HOST...] # text report
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --json HOST [HOST...] # JSON report on stdout
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --quiet HOST [HOST...] # only the verdict line + exit code
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --no-banner HOST # text report without the ASCII banner
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --ssh HOST # ESXi: also ask over SSH if a vCenter manages it
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --timeout 10 HOST # seconds per connection (1..300, default 10)
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --fixed-build 8.0=BUILD HOST # also 9.0=BUILD, 9.1=BUILD (repeatable)
`HOST` is a name or an address, optionally with `:PORT`. IPv6 literals are not supported.
Exit codes (overall; with several hosts the worst one decides):
| 0 | PATCHED or NOT_APPLICABLE for every host |
| 1 | MITIGATED (never used: there is no workaround) |
| 2 | VULNERABLE: some vCenter is in the affected range or below the fixed build |
| 3 | UNKNOWN: unreachable, patch level not verifiable, or a version the advisory does not cover |
| 4 | ERROR: bad usage or a missing tool |
| ESXi (`apiType` HostAgent) | NOT_APPLICABLE |
| vCenter 7.x | VULNERABLE (extended support is the only fix) |
| vCenter 8.x, 9.0, 9.1, build at or above the `--fixed-build` for that series | PATCHED |
| the same, build below it | VULNERABLE |
| the same, no `--fixed-build` given for that series | UNKNOWN |
| a numeric build is missing, malformed or implausibly long | UNKNOWN |
| any other version (6.x, 9.2 and later) | UNKNOWN |
| no vSphere answer (closed port, firewall, some other web server) | UNKNOWN |
**Why UNKNOWN and not PATCHED.** Broadcom names the fixed releases (8.0 U3m, 9.0.2.0200,
9.1.1.0200) but the advisory carries no build numbers, and the version string a vCenter reports
over the API does not tell the update level. The script therefore never assumes a vCenter is
fixed. Take the build number of the fixed release from Broadcom's release notes and pass it:
./cve-2026-123890-audit.sh --fixed-build 8.0= vcenter.example.net
A fixed build of one series never clears another: `8.0=...` does nothing for a 9.1 host.
- It sees only what a vCenter or ESXi tells anyone without logging in. A vCenter behind a firewall,
on a port you did not name, or reached through a proxy that answers for it is not found.
- It does not discover hosts. It never scans a network; you name every target.
- TLS certificates are not verified: lab hosts use self-signed ones. Nothing secret is sent, so
the only exposure is that a man in the middle could lie the version.
- `--ssh` uses your SSH configuration in batch mode (no password prompt). It reads
`managementServerIp` from `vim-cmd hostsvc/hostsummary` and only informs; it never changes a verdict.
- The advisory publishes no mechanism, so the script cannot test for the bug itself, only for the
- Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure are fixed through KB463116 and are not
sh tests/run_tests.sh # 93 tests, no network: a fake curl and a fake ssh
sh tests/docker_tests.sh # the suite under busybox ash, dash, bash 4.2 and 4.3, plus an end-to-end run as root
The test hook `CVE_2026_123890_TEST_PATH` is ignored when the script runs as root, so the suite
refuses to run as root. Two tests need `python3` (JSON parsing) and are skipped where it is
missing (91 tests run); the two terminal-colour tests need `script` and pass with a note where it
- Broadcom, [VMSA-2026-0009]( 2026-11-19
- [CVE.org record]( and [NVD record](
The full story
This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.
