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Exploit for CVE-2026

Exploit for CVE-2026

Sploitus • November 22, 2026

# CVE-2026-107853 — tiny-secp256k1: stale-buffer `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` accepts invalid tweak derivations

[![License: MIT](

[![Research status: validated](

| **Component** | tiny-secp256k1 — `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` 3-argument path (`src/index.ts` over the wasm backend) |

| **Fixed in** | **2.2.5** — commit `ba1af1fc` (GHSA-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh) |

| **CWE** | CWE-457 (Use of Uninitialized Variable), CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual/Exceptional Conditions) |

| **Impact** | The three-argument `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` path ignores the wasm failure return and compares an unchanged input buffer. When the tweak result is the point at infinity, this stale-buffer comparison can return `true` for an invalid derivation — an attacker can craft a tweak whose "checked" result equals the input itself and have it accepted by any consumer that trusts this check |

| **Vector** | Library callers (wallets/protocols) verifying tweaked output keys against attacker-influenced (point, tweak, claimed-result) triples |

| **Trigger** | `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(G, n−1, G)` — the derivation lands on the point at infinity and fails |

The vulnerable path discarded the wasm failure return:

X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT2.set(resultToCheck);

return wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(tweakParity) === 1;

wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweak(); // return ignored (-1 on failure)

const newKey = X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.slice(0, validate.X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);

return compare(newKey, resultToCheck) === 0; // stale buffer = the input itself

`x_only_point_add_tweak` in `lib.rs` returns `-1` and leaves

`X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT` untouched when the tweak addition fails. The fix

refactors to remove `throw_error` calls in the wasm surface so every failure

returns a proper code and the check handles it.

`x_only_point_add_tweak` (Rust/wasm) returns `-1` when

`secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add` fails — notably when

`P + G·t` lands on the point at infinity. The JS wrapper discarded that

return value and compared `X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT` (which still holds the

original `point`) against the caller-supplied `resultToCheck`. Passing the

input as its own claimed result therefore yields `true` for a derivation

that failed: with `point = G` and `tweak = n−1` (the largest valid tweak),

the result is the point at infinity and the check still reports success.

The fix removes the wasm `throw_error` paths so failures return proper codes

and the check evaluates the real derivation result.

| `ecc-vuln` | `cve-2026-107853:vuln` | tiny-secp256k1 **2.2.4** from npm |

| `ecc-fixed` | `cve-2026-107853:fixed` | tiny-secp256k1 **2.2.5** from npm (vendor fix) |

| `poc` | `cve-2026-107853-poc:local` | stdlib-only Python driver |

The harness calls the real `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(G, n−1, G)` — the

generator point as both input and claimed result, with the largest valid

tweak `n−1` whose addition produces the point at infinity and therefore

fails. Both sides differ only in the npm package version.

./run-lab.sh build # installs 2.2.4 / 2.2.5 from npm (node:22-alpine)

./run-lab.sh up # cve107853lab network: ecc-vuln / ecc-fixed

* **check** — exit 1 when the invalid derivation is accepted (`true`), 0 when

the failed derivation returns `false`; 3 no worker, 2

* **exploit** — narrated chain: crafted infinity-tweak derivation → wasm

failure → stale-buffer comparison → `true` for the invalid case.

* **probe** — verdict and vulnerable flags.

* **mitigation** — 2.2.5 / commit `ba1af1fc` / failure-code refactor.

A standalone full-chain exploit ships at `exploit/exploit.py`:

python3 exploit/exploit.py --host=ecc-vuln

# exit 1 on confirmed invalid-derivation acceptance, 0 on a safe target

| call | `ecc-vuln` (2.2.4) | `ecc-fixed` (2.2.5) |

| `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(G, n−1, G)` (derivation fails) | **`true` — invalid derivation accepted** | **`false` — failure handled** |

Captured runs: `evidence/check-*-run.txt`, `evidence/exploit-*-run.txt`,

`evidence/probe-*-run.txt`, `evidence/mitigation-*-run.txt`,

`evidence/exploit-standalone-run.txt`, `evidence/exploit-standalone-fixed-run.txt`,

`evidence/versions.txt`, `evidence/0day-sweep.txt`.

* Podman (or Docker); bounded containers on the isolated `cve107853lab`

* Real-world impact applies to consumers that rely on

`xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` to validate tweaked output keys against

attacker-influenced (point, tweak, result) triples — e.g. taproot

## 7. Additional findings (0-day sweep on the fixed line)

The same commit `ba1af1fc` removes `throw_error` calls across the whole wasm

surface so every failure path returns a proper code. The four-argument path

(explicit `tweakParity`) already compared the wasm return value and was not

affected. The fix also bumps the package version metadata so dependents pin

run-lab.sh environment driver (build / up / sweep / down)

Makefile convenience targets

poc/poc.py the PoC (check / exploit / probe / mitigation)

exploit/exploit.py standalone full-chain exploit

lab/lab.Dockerfile installs tiny-secp256k1 2.2.4 / 2.2.5 from npm

lab/test.js the real xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck invocation

lab/service.py HTTP wrapper (POST /check)

evidence/ captured runs of every mode on both sides

TRACKING.md excluded (working record)

* CVE record —

* GitHub advisory —

* Fix commit —