Back Sploitus Exploit for Improperly Controlled Sequential Memory Allocation in Php
([GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp](
"RCE via stale global state", CVSS v4.0 **9.2 Critical**, CWE-416) — the
sibling advisory of CVE-2026-109618, fixed by the same PHP core commit on
**2026-10-21** (8.2.35 / 8.3.36 / 8.4.27 / 8.5.12).
> **Overview** — PHP keeps worker-global state
> session `PS(id)`/`PS(save_path)`, the var-layer `BG(serialize)`/
> `BG(unserialize)` contexts, OPcache per-worker map frontier) that can point
> into request-owned memory. A fatal error (or OOM bailout) that abandons an
> operation before its matching reset leaves the global dangling after the
> request heap is freed. A later operation running **before normal request
> initialization** consumes the stale value: a cross-request use-after-free
> the vendor developed into unauthenticated RCE.
## Producer / consumer model (from the advisory, verified against php-src)
- **Producers**: fatal errors that skip the matching global reset — OOM,
uncaught errors, `require` failure, `Maximum execution time exceeded`; or
nonfatal diagnostics that repopulate error state after shutdown cleared it.
- **Consumers** (both run pre-RINIT, before the executor reinitializes
state): per-request INI diagnostics (mod_php `php_value`/`.htaccess`, FPM
`PHP_VALUE`/`PHP_ADMIN_VALUE`), and the session upload-progress early
machinery (application-agnostic, no `session_start()` needed).
| Producer: application-phase fatal publishes a request-owned backtrace (`fatal_error_backtraces=On`, compiled default on 8.5) | **captured** (3/3) on vulnerable php-8.5.11, patched php-8.5.12 and the ASAN twin | `evidence/01-fatal-backtrace-producer.txt` |
| Consumer: pre-RINIT diagnostic fires on an over-limit multipart POST (`main/rfc1867.c:697` gate, no body read needed) | **captured** on mod_php | `evidence/02-consume-diagnostic-pre-rinit.txt` — `Warning: PHP Request Startup: POST Content-Length of 10485760 bytes exceeds the limit of 8388608 bytes in Unknown on line 0` |
| Cross-request UAF sanitizer receipt / RCE | **documented, not reproduced here** | vendor-confirmed RCE (fatal-backtrace path on mod_php; session-lifecycle path on mod_php AND php-fpm; OPcache type confusion on WordPress — Wiz). Public audits report the exploit tiers need per-build offsets + heap grooming |
Two independent peer-review passes were performed on this material
(reject-and-fix iteration, then a zero-blocking confirmation pass).
poc/exploit_opt.py producer + consumer driver (compact)
poc/exploit_readable.py same, tutorial-grade
evidence/ captured lab transcripts (paths scrubbed)
lab/ self-contained docker compose lab (shared with
the companion advisory's lab; see its README)
python3 poc/exploit_opt.py --url --rounds 3
python3 poc/exploit_readable.py --url --rounds 3
Lab assumptions: the ASAN twin runs `php -S 0.0.0.0:8080 -t /www` inside the
container, and the PoCs read the server log via
`docker logs cve-2026-109618-asan` — both are wired for the shipped `lab/`
compose; if your container/app names differ, adjust `LAB_CONTAINER` and the
Each round: `produce` (fires the lab fixture fatal that publishes the
backtrace state) then `consume` (over-limit declared `Content-Length` — the
diagnostic fires before any body byte is read, so the transport is
fire-and-half-close; waiting on a full response would hang by design).
Output tiers are printed separately: `published=True` marks the producer
receipt; an `AddressSanitizer` report after rounds would be the UAF-tier
receipt (not yet captured in any tested configuration — the tool says exactly
## Notes that matter if you study this bug
- The consume gate compares the **declared** length only, pre-body-read —
the same property that enables the chunked bypass documented in the
- The INI-diagnostic consumer path is real on mod_php (the tested
`report_memleaks=0` per-dir deprecation fired per-request; earlier
"does not fire" reports were probe artifacts — the diagnostic goes to the
display layer, not the buffered log a naive grep watches).
- The shared fix (`31c0ea7d7f`) removes the OOM bailout class entirely
(delayed soft OOM at VM safe points + hard `_exit()`), resets the
"may be accessed before php_request_startup()" globals early, and locks
the pre-RINIT session decode to `__PHP_Incomplete_Class`.
1. **Only complete fix: update** to 8.2.35 / 8.3.36 / 8.4.27 / 8.5.12+.
2. On 8.5: `fatal_error_backtraces=0` (removes the confirmed producer)
and/or `session.upload_progress.enabled=0`, then restart every worker.
3. Eliminate attacker-reachable fatals (including upload/import/plugin
paths); apply INI via startup config instead of per-request overrides;
`pm.max_requests=1` limits each worker to a single request as a stopgap.
4. Audit with `log_errors=On` + `error_reporting=E_ALL` for repeated
pre-script diagnostics, fatals and max-execution-time events on
attacker-influenceable routes (absence of log entries is not proof of
A self-contained `docker compose` lab ships in `lab/` (identical to the
companion advisory's lab; either copy runs standalone): `cd lab && docker compose
build && docker compose up -d` — ports 8080=vuln(8.5.11), 8081=fixed
(8.5.12), 8082=asan. The producer fixture (`lab/www/fatal.php`) ships in the
- Fatals/uncaught errors followed by worker churn on the same pool.
- Repeated diagnostics appearing with `Unknown on line 0` (startup stage)
- FPM pool logs: same-child producer+consumer pairing anomalies.
For **authorized security research and defense on systems you own or are
explicitly permitted to test**, in isolated lab environments. Test the
vulnerable behavior from a source build of the last vulnerable tag
(`php-8.5.11`). No warranty, see `LICENSE`.
- [GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp — RCE via stale global state](
- [GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w — companion advisory (OOM corruption)](
- Wiz Research "PHP2Shell" blog; OpenAI + Calif disclosure blogs
- xuehuolll independent audit repo; JackalSyn "php-up-2026" writeup
Prepared with the b63 exploit-foundry tooling: advisory verification against
primary sources, a reproducible pinned-build lab, two PoC variants, captured
transcripts, and two adversarial review passes. Feedback and corrections
The full story
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