France warns Iran of retaliation over IRGC hack of supermarket freezers

Flight-tracking data showed nine KC-135 refueling tankers and three V-22 Ospreys leaving Mildenhall in Suffolk on Monday afternoon and evening, Sky News reported. Most of the tankers went to bases in Germany and Spain and one to Prestwick in Scotland. The Ospreys moved to nearby RAF Lakenheath.

The exact nature of the threat was still under discussion among US officials, the Journal said. Washington raised the security level at Mildenhall and Lakenheath to FPCON Charlie, the second-highest on the Pentagon’s scale, which applies when intelligence indicates that some form of terrorist action is likely.

US European Command said aircraft move between locations “for a variety of reasons” and that it could not force protection measures.

Britain’s Ministry of Defense said it did not on other nations’ activity. “We’re constantly keeping the security of our bases under review,” cabinet minister Lucy Powell told Sky News, “and as we’ve seen with other cases recently, we take firm and quick action where we need to.”

The move comes six weeks after police arrested five men in the early hours of September 27 near RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, which US bombers used to strike Iran during the war, after a local farmer reported three white vans and a group of men, some with their faces covered. The United States pulled all 12 of its B-1B bombers from Fairford on October 4.

Two men were charged last month under the National Security Act. Prosecutors said one, a British-Iranian dual national, had arranged for the men to drive to the base on the instructions of a man known only as “Ali,” and accused him of assisting a foreign intelligence service; police said they believed that country to be Iran. Six others remain on bail. Prime Minister Andy Burnham said the plot was “almost certainly” directed by the Revolutionary Guards.

Iran’s ambassador in London has denied any involvement. The Revolutionary Guards warned Britain in July that Fairford and any other base used to attack Iran would be a legitimate target.

Bill Emlyn Jones told jurors at Woolwich Crown Court that the defendants had visited addresses, taken photographs and recorded videos as requested by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Their actions assisted the group even though no attack followed, he argued.

Mostafa Sepahvand, 41, Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, and Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57, deny charges under Britain’s National Security Act. The alleged targets included Iran International journalists Kambiz Hosseini and Mojtaba Pourmohsen, as well as barrister Jonathan Turner.

Prosecutors say Sepahvand was expected to carry out an attack and recruited Javadi Manesh and Noori to help locate and monitor targets.

Sepahvand says he acted under threats against himself and his family while deliberately frustrating the operation. Javadi Manesh and Noori deny knowing that their activities were assisting Iranian intelligence.

Demands for better information

Jones challenged Sepahvand’s account by pointing to his repeated demands for more accurate information the targets.

The IRGC had supplied overhead photographs and a description of a car without its registration number, the prosecutor said. Javadi Manesh consequently went to the correct street but filmed the wrong people.

Jones argued that Sepahvand’s frustration with incomplete or inaccurate information showed that he was genuinely trying to locate the targets. He asked why Sepahvand had worked so hard to obtain better information if, as he claimed, he had no intention of completing the task.

The prosecutor also challenged Sepahvand’s defense that threats had compelled him to cooperate.

Jones acknowledged Sepahvand’s repeated accounts of family members suffering at the hands of Iranian authorities. But he argued that the issue was whether the IRGC had placed Sepahvand under duress in this case, rather than whether it was capable of doing so.

He said there was no evidence supporting Sepahvand’s account of acting under such pressure.

A deal to return to Iran

Jones argued that Sepahvand wanted his Iranian criminal case, involving 32 burglary offenses, resolved so he could return to Iran.

The messages showed bargaining over which side would act first, he said: Sepahvand wanted the case fixed before carrying out the task, while the IRGC wanted him to complete the work before resolving it.

Jones cited messages from Vahid Malmir expressing hope that the case could be resolved and Sepahvand could return to Iran, followed by Sepahvand’s affirmative response.

He also referred to messages from Mostafa Ghorbani relaying assurances that Sepahvand’s case was settled, that he would be provided with a house and that people would meet him at the airport.

In another exchange cited by Jones, Sepahvand indicated that even if he got into trouble in Britain, he would be free in Iran.

The prosecutor argued that Sepahvand’s desire to return contradicted his account of being terrified of the Iranian authorities. That wish explained why the criminal case mattered so much to him and why the IRGC could use it as a “bargaining chip,” Jones said.

Co-defendants’ explanations challenged

Jones said the prosecution had to establish that the defendants’ conduct materially assisted the IRGC. He argued that they had done precisely what the group wanted in Britain: visiting supplied addresses, locating targets and conducting surveillance.

Javadi Manesh and Noori accepted visiting locations and taking photographs and videos, Jones said. The disputed issue was whether they knew why they were doing so.

He questioned whether they could spend hours with Sepahvand, repeatedly visit locations and photograph buildings and vehicles without asking the purpose.

The suggestion that they simply followed his instructions without asking why “defies common sense,” Jones argued.

He challenged Javadi Manesh’s explanations in police interviews, including his account that Sepahvand was helping him find somewhere to live when they visited Malthouse Court.

The prosecutor said Sepahvand went there because the IRGC had supplied it as a possible address for Pourmohsen.

Jones also cited Javadi Manesh’s explanation that he photographed Iran International’s building because it was “pretty,” and that he had been nearby to obtain painkillers.

He rejected Javadi Manesh’s account that a visit to St Dunstan’s Avenue concerned selling car insurance, pointing to messages from Sepahvand the street, a blue car and Hosseini’s dog, Niko.

Jones also questioned Javadi Manesh’s explanation for receiving and forwarding information Turner, including his office locations. Javadi Manesh had told police that a relative of his partner needed a solicitor.

Javadi Manesh did not give evidence during the trial. Jones argued that he had avoided cross-examination because he could not defend the explanations he had given police.

Turning to Noori, the prosecutor accused him of concealing the nature of his relationship with Sepahvand despite accompanying him on repeated surveillance trips, including one shortly before midnight.

Jones pointed to calls Sepahvand made to Amin and Ghorbani in Iran while Noori was in the car. The conversations concerned what they could see at a location and complaints missing information, he said.

Noori, who speaks Persian and Lori, would have heard enough to understand what was happening, Jones argued. He also suggested that the calls could be heard through the car’s speakers.

The defense’s closing arguments are scheduled to begin on Tuesday with Tyrone Smith speaking for Sepahvand.

CSIS said it assesses that “Iranian threat-related activities directed at Canada and its allies are likely to continue in 2026.”

The agency declined to specific investigations or operational details, citing the need to protect its sources, tradecraft and methods.

Iranian intelligence services and their proxies have targeted individuals they perceive as threats to the Iranian government, according to CSIS.

“In more than one case this involved detecting, investigating, and disrupting potentially lethal threats against individuals in Canada,” the agency said.

It added that it works with foreign partners and domestic law enforcement to counter such activity and engages communities across Canada to strengthen their resilience against potential threats.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) also told Iran International that it was aware of reporting and allegations possible foreign involvement in the incidents but declined to attribute them to Iran or another state while investigations remain underway.

“As these matters remain under investigation, the RCMP is not in a position to on specific intelligence, investigative findings, or potential attribution,” the force said.

The RCMP said it was aware of foreign interference activity in Canada involving several states, including Iran, and takes allegations of foreign interference, transnational repression and foreign state-linked criminal activity seriously.

The RCMP said it works with Canadian and international partners through intelligence sharing, threat assessments, coordinated investigations and enforcement actions.

Gun-for-hire investigations

The responses come amid investigations into suspected gun-for-hire networks operating in the Greater Toronto Area.

Toronto police say young people are being recruited through encrypted messaging apps to carry out attacks for payment, while investigators are still working to determine who is directing and financing the violence.

Police have identified a recurring pattern in some of the attacks involving stolen vehicles, encrypted messaging apps and gunmen recording shootings on their phones.

Police say recruits are required to record the attacks as proof in order to receive payment.

Toronto police said ballistic evidence linked two firearms seized during the investigation to numerous shootings across the Greater Toronto Area, including the attack on the US Consulate.

Iran International previously reported in June that an armed assailant fired 17 rounds at a Toronto athletic facility owned by Iranian-Canadian opposition activist Salar Gholami, hours after the killing of senior Iranian officials in Tehran.

The facility has served as a gathering place for opponents of the Islamic Republic and a hub for anti-regime demonstrations.

Surveillance footage captured an assailant whose physical profile was described in the report as consistent with young individuals allegedly recruited in other shootings.

The attack has not been publicly established as part of the same criminal network involved in other shootings under investigation in Toronto.

Conservatives call for action

Conservative Party leader and opposition leader Pierre Poilievre has warned that foreign-backed networks are exploiting criminal groups to carry out attacks in Canada.

"Iran's terrorist regime is suspected of financing gun-for-hire shootings on Canadian soil. Synagogues, a school, businesses, and the U.S. Consulate targeted. Jewish Canadians and Iranian dissidents are being terrorized," Poilievre said.

He called on the federal government to identify and deport Iranian Revolutionary Guard operatives unlawfully present in Canada.

Canada and more than two dozen other countries said earlier this month that they condemned Iran’s use of violent attacks, including lethal plotting, arson, sabotage, cyberattacks and other hostile activities, and pledged to identify, investigate and disrupt such activity.

At Woolwich Crown Court, prosecutors alleged that Shapoor Qalehali Khani Noori, 57, and Farhad Javadi Manesh, 46, knowingly assisted Mostafa Sepahvand, 41, in targeting Iran International journalists Mojtaba Pourmohsen and Kambiz Hosseini.

All three defendants deny the charges brought under Britain's National Security Act. Prosecutors allege they gathered information for Iranian intelligence to prepare for serious violence against at least one target, with Sepahvand expected to carry out an attack.

Prosecutor Bill Emlyn Jones accused Noori of being a trusted member of Sepahvand's surveillance team, citing photographs, messages and mobile phone location data. Noori denied knowingly participating in the alleged plot, saying he had taken photographs and videos at Sepahvand's request without understanding their purpose.

Late-night filming and repeated visits

Jones questioned Noori a video filmed on St Dunstan's Avenue, an address linked to Hosseini, and sent to Sepahvand via WhatsApp at 11:56 p.m. on December 12, 2024.

Noori acknowledged taking the video but said they had gone for a drive because they were bored. He said Sepahvand asked him to film near a park, send the recording and delete it.

Jones challenged that account, suggesting the camera had deliberately focused on a particular house rather than randomly filming the area.

The prosecutor also cited phone and vehicle location data indicating repeated visits to the Malthouse Court area, linked to Pourmohsen, arguing that the movements were part of coordinated surveillance.

Noori said he did not know the significance of the locations and believed the recordings might have been connected to Sepahvand's business activities.

Jones also questioned him four videos recorded over more than three hours in Kingston upon Thames on March 4, 2025, near premises associated with a business called Need a Fixer.

The prosecutor cited messages discussing recordings at hourly intervals to demonstrate Sepahvand's presence at a location, suggesting Noori knowingly participated in reconnaissance intended to help identify and ultimately attack targets.

Noori denied the allegation, saying he had never suspected Sepahvand of planning violence.

Prosecutor challenges Noori over police interviews

Jones questioned why Noori had not identified Sepahvand as a friend or explained the recordings during police interviews following his arrest in May 2025.

The prosecutor suggested Noori had remained silent because he had not yet developed an innocent explanation for his activities.

Noori said he had followed his solicitor's advice and was distressed by accusations that he had assisted a government he had fled.

He told the court he had been imprisoned three times in Iran and fled the country in 2019 because he feared for his life. During questioning by his defense lawyer, the court heard that Noori was granted asylum in Britain in 2024.

Earlier hearing examined £150,000 payment for alleged attack

During Monday's hearing, prosecutors challenged Sepahvand's claim that he had been deceiving the Revolutionary Guards, arguing that he was motivated by money and assistance with a criminal case in Iran.

Sepahvand acknowledged that a proposed £150,000 payment was conditional on harming a journalist but maintained that he demanded the sum to deter the IRGC and never intended to carry out an attack.

Noori and Javadi Manesh accept visiting locations and taking photographs or videos but deny knowing they were assisting Iranian intelligence.

The trial is scheduled to resume on November 2.

Kuwait Times reported that the State Security Criminal Court’s anti-terrorism division handed down the sentences on Monday over charges including espionage, planning attacks against Kuwait, membership in an outlawed organization and actions deemed harmful to national interests.

The death sentences are not final and are subject to review by Kuwait’s Court of Appeals.

Explosives alleged in assassination plan

Prosecutors accused some of the defendants of preparing to use explosives in the assassination plot, while one was accused of attempting to smuggle explosives into Kuwait for use in the planned attacks.

The court said the defendants sought to undermine state security, create instability and weaken public confidence in the authorities’ ability to maintain order, according to Kuwait Times.

AFP, citing two judicial sources, identified one of those sentenced to death as Hussein Abdallah al-Maatouq, a religious figure and secretary-general of the National Islamic Alliance. The sources said another of the three had previously been convicted on terrorism charges in 2016, later pardoned by Kuwait’s emir and arrested again in April.

Similar cases in Kuwait

The ruling follows another Iran- and Hezbollah-linked espionage case in Kuwait earlier this year.

In July, Kuwait’s State Security Court of Appeal sentenced a Kuwaiti citizen to life imprisonment after overturning an earlier 10-year term. Local reporting said he had been convicted of cooperating with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah and had traveled to Qom, where prosecutors said he received weapons and drone training.

The allegations in that case included meetings with security figures linked to Iran and Hezbollah and preparations for activity deemed harmful to Kuwait’s national security.

Bahrain has also prosecuted alleged IRGC networks

Bahrain has brought several similar cases this year involving alleged cooperation with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

In May, a Bahraini court sentenced nine defendants to life imprisonment and two others to three years after convicting them of collaborating with the IRGC in what authorities described as hostile and terrorist activities against the kingdom.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry had earlier said it arrested dozens of people it linked to the IRGC as authorities investigated alleged networks operating during the wider regional conflict.

The cases have unfolded amid heightened tensions between Iran and states across the Persian Gulf, with governments in the region increasing scrutiny of alleged Iranian-linked security and espionage networks.