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GHSA Pr74 8wxx Gj2h

GHSA Pr74 8wxx Gj2h

github.com • November 6, 2026

A user-supplied workflow/evaluator revision url is validated only by scheme+netloc, then POSTed server-side with follow_redirects=True while a minted agenta Secret is forwarded in the Authorization header — yielding SSRF to internal/cloud-metadata targets and leakage of the Secret token (through redirects). The webhook path was hardened with a real validate_webhook_url / _is_blocked_ip ; the workflow path was not.

sdks/python/agenta/sdk/models/workflows.py:196-198 ( _is_valid_http_url ): scheme∈{http,https} + non-empty netloc only — accepts , , RFC1918.

api/oss/src/core/workflows/service.py:415-455 ( _post_service_json ): httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=60, follow_redirects=True) → client.post(url, json=, headers={Authorization: Secret }) . parse_url ( utils/helpers.py:72 ) only does docker-hostname rewrite — no IP guard.

service.py:1614-1666 ( invoke_workflow ): mints the Secret token and forwards it.

Reachable on OSS: POST /api/simple/evaluations/{id}/start → worker; the if is_ee(): gates only EE permission checks, not the call.

Authz/SSRF-twin: the webhook path DOES block — core/webhooks/utils.py:25 validate_webhook_url DNS-resolves and blocks private/loopback/metadata.

Ran the real validators: _is_valid_http_url accepted every internal URL while validate_webhook_url blocked them; the httpx sink reached a local 127.0.0.1 marker and forwarded the Secret header through a 302 redirect.

Internal-network/cloud-metadata SSRF + exfiltration of a minted agenta credential, by an authenticated low-priv user.

Apply the webhook path's validate_webhook_url (DNS-resolve + block private/loopback/link-local/metadata) before any workflow fetch; disable redirects (or re-validate each hop); do not forward the Secret token to non-allowlisted hosts.

The issue is fixed in version 0.122.5. The API now gives the run credential with the secret-resolve grant only to the operator's own service URL ( AGENTA_SERVICES_URL ). Other workflow URLs receive a credential without that grant. Requests to other workflow URLs go through the egress check, which refuses private, loopback, link-local and metadata addresses and pins the connection to the checked address. No workflow service call follows redirects.

Self-hosted operators who run custom workflows on a private network or on plain http must now set AGENTA_GATEWAYS_INSECURE_EGRESS_ALLOWED=true or list the host in AGENTA_MCP_GATEWAY_HOST_ALLOWLIST .

Extracted Entities

Vulnerabilities (1)