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GHSA Rcqq 5qmv 7fxp

GHSA Rcqq 5qmv 7fxp

github.com • November 10, 2026

A structural vulnerability was identified in the Datagram Retransmission (DGR) convergence layer. The issue stems from an improper conversion between 64-bit and 32-bit integers during memory allocation, combined with an unbounded memory copy operation.

If successfully triggered, an attacker could cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via heap corruption or potentially achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Standard UDP deployments were largely protected from remote exploitation by implicit network read limits that naturally capped incoming datagram sizes.

However, the vulnerability could still be triggered locally or via synthetic datagrams that bypass the physical UDP layer constraints.

Systems relying on DGR via internal IPC or custom transports are at a higher risk of exploitation.

The vulnerability consisted of two chained architectural flaws:

Integer Wrap: The parser decoded a 64-bit svcDataLength and calculated a 32-bit allocation size without bounds checking. A maliciously large 64-bit value could wrap the 32-bit integer, resulting in a dangerously undersized heap allocation.

Unbounded Copy: The dgr_receive API trusted the parsed contentLength blindly, executing a memcpy into the destination buffer without validating the caller's actual memory capacity.

Users are strongly advised to update to the patched version. The fix implements strict defense-in-depth principles across the library:

A pre-allocation bounds check now prevents 32-bit integer wrapping by verifying contentLength against INT_MAX .

The dgr_receive API signature was hardened to require an explicit capacity parameter.

All downstream convergence layers (AMS, BP) were updated to pass strict buffer capacities, allowing dgr_receive to independently abort memory operations that exceed allocated limits.

Fixed in ION 4.2.1-a.2. Both parts of the resolution above have shipped:

The receiver-side bound rejects any segment that declares more service data than the received datagram actually carries.

dgr_receive() now takes an explicit destination-capacity argument and aborts any delivery that would exceed it, and every convergence layer (BP, AMS) and the bundled dgr2file utility passes its real buffer size.

Automatically discovered by SecMate ( )