Global Affairs Canada

In the months leading up to the 2026 Armenian elections, the Armenian information ecosystem became a regular target of Russian state-aligned and state-funded foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of G7 RRM observations with the view to raise awareness and build societal resilience.

It is highly likely that several known Information Manipulation Sets (IMS) Footnote i and malign actors worked to discredit Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract Party, including by undermining the integrity of Armenia’s electoral process by alleging large-scale fraud and foreign interference by the European Union (EU) and portraying Russia as the better ally for Armenia.

As Russian state-aligned actors escalate their efforts to leverage online infrastructure and known IMS actors to target Armenian and Western audiences, several G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM) partners joined efforts to monitor foreign information threats targeting Armenia’s information space leading up to its parliamentary election on June 7, 2026.

This report provides an overview of the G7 RRM’s observations, including:

Over 174 pieces of FIMI content targeting Armenia and the 2026 parliamentary elections, which have been linked to Russian state-aligned IMS Storm-1516, Operation Overload, and Portal Kombat. Most content portrayed Pashinyan as corrupt and acting against Armenia’s sovereignty, while positioning Russia as Armenia’s only reliable security guarantor.

A wide range of fabricated content, such as manipulated official statements and press releases, fake investigations, defamatory accusations, out-of-context and impersonation videos, and fake newspaper covers. Much of this content incorporated materials likely generated by AI or otherwise manipulated.

The seeding and promotion of IMS content was observed mainly on X and Telegram, though amplification was observed across TikTok, , Bluesky, and Instagram.

Incidents of foreign interference

Actors, networks, and channels

The Russian state-aligned IMS Storm-1516 has been active since 2023 and is known for producing videos and fake news websites to seed and amplify inauthentic narratives targeting pro-Western leaders. This content is amplified across a known network of verified X accounts that France’s VIGINUM agency believes are being paid to distribute Storm-1516 content. Footnote ii

From January to June 2026, G7 RRM partners identified 17 incidents that are likely linked to Storm-1516. This content is estimated to have gained over 200 million views on X in total, though it is unclear how many of those views were organic or the result of inauthentic activity; it is also unlikely to have reached significant domestic Armenian audiences. Storm-1516 likely aimed to undermine the Armenian elections and Pashinyan by promoting allegations of corruption surrounding the elections and accusations that Pashinyan is taking decisions against what are portrayed to be Armenian “values and national identity,” such as revoking awards related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, forwarding a bill to protect Islam (see Figure 3 below), and supporting an LGBTQ+ parade (see Figure 4 below). Many incidents were laundered through fringe media outlets. There were also at least four incidents in which narratives targeting Armenia were seeded on inauthentic news pages.

Screenshot of likely Storm-1516 video, which claims France is deploying 800 Foreign Legionnaires to Armenia to protect and potentially evacuate Pashinyan if he loses the elections.

Screenshot of likely Storm-1516 video that seeds the claim that Pashinyan contracted HIV while serving in prison in 2010.

Screenshot of the likely Storm-1516 video that falsely claims Pashinyan is proposing a bill to protect Islam in Armenia.

Screenshot of likely Storm-1516 video that promotes the inauthentic narrative that Pashinyan is holding Armenia’s first LGBTQ+ parade.

The Russian state-aligned IMS Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka, Footnote iii usually operates via coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB) networks on X to disseminate short-form videos that impersonate authentic news outlets and exploit narratives. Footnote iv During the monitored period, we G7 RRM partners identified at least 131 incidents that are highly likely linked to Operation Overload. These posts mimicked authentic media outlets, including Euronews, France24, BMF, and local Armenian news sites. These identified videos likely received little organic engagement. Platform moderators removed several videos shortly after publication, and they received little to no pickup in local Armenian media. Operation Overload videos were largely focused on discrediting Pashinyan and his party, promoting claims of electoral fraud, and negatively portraying EU-Armenia relations (see Figure 6). One likely Operation Overload video with Armenian subtitles claimed that foreign bot networks from Europe and Türkiye boost online support for Pashinyan, suggesting his popularity is artificially inflated (see Figure 5 below). Footnote v

Screenshot of a likely Operation Overload video, shared on Telegram, which claims that online support for Pashinyan is boosted by foreign bot networks from Europe and Türkiye.

Screenshot of likely Operation Overload video that claims Pashinyan had “expected” the EU to allocate 50 million euros in support of “visa liberalization.”

Screenshot of likely Operation Overload video, which was manipulated from a CNN clip, to claim that a "hired operative" tied to Pashinyan attempted to kill an opposition journalist by pushing him in front of a train in Seattle. The original CNN video stated that an individual suffering from schizophrenia attempted to push a stranger into a moving train in Seattle.

Screenshot of likely Operation Overload-developed image of an alleged Vogue cover, which depicts Anna Hakobyan, Pashinyan’s wife, as one of the European first ladies wearing the “most expensive outfits” of 2025.

Screenshot of a likely Operation Overload video which claims that Pashinyan has been diagnosed with cancer.

Portal Kombat, also known as the Pravda network, is a Russian state-aligned coordinated IMS comprising at least 193 websites that aggregate and disseminate pro-Russian content across numerous different languages. Footnote vi Portal Kombat targeted Armenian audiences through its dedicated domain, armenia[.]pravda-news.com, which shares content in both English and Armenian. This activity likely received little organic engagement. While the narratives and articles during the reporting period were wide-ranging, the domain amplified stories the Armenian elections with a pro-Russian slant, including allegations of electoral fraud Footnote vii and government suppression of the Armenian political opposition. Footnote viii In addition, many other Portal Kombat-linked multilingual domains targeting audiences in English, Russian, and French, among many others, also pro-Kremlin content targeting the Armenian elections.

Pravda Armenia homepage in Armenian.

English-language version of the Pravda Armenia website

Foundation to Battle Injustice

The Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is an organization linked to the late Russian malign influence actor Yevgeny Prigozhin. The outlet regularly produces pseudo-investigations, usually as videos or long-form articles. G7 RRM partners found that R-FBI published 16 articles on their website. The articles inauthentic claims largely targeting the Armenian government, claiming Pashinyan is “silencing opposition voices” ahead of the elections Footnote ix and organizing a “black market for organs” in which the government sells “pieces” of Armenian citizens to France for transplants (see Figures 12 and 13 below). Footnote x

Screenshot of R-FBI article, which claims that Prime Minister Pashinyan is behind a “black market” scheme to sell organs of Armenian citizens to France.

Screenshot of R-FBI article, which claims that Pashinyan is actively attempting to silence oppositionists and political dissent ahead of the upcoming elections.