The Democrats’ capture of both chambers of Congress has created the impression that lifting sanctions on Turkey and approving F-35 sales to Ankara will now be harder unless Turkey relinquishes its Russian S-400 missile systems. But the Trump administration retains considerable freedom of action, especially before the new Congress takes over, leaving Greece and Cyprus with both risks and opportunities.
The sanctions imposed on Turkey in 2020 could be lifted before the new Congress convenes on January 3. In March, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan sought relief before the midterms, and Trump pledged to remove the sanctions at July’s NATO summit in Ankara. With a December 11 federal funding deadline approaching, the outgoing Congress has little time left to intervene. Any measure to block relief could face a presidential veto, which only two-thirds majorities in both chambers could override.
Congressional opposition has already shown its limits, as the administration demonstrated in June by advancing the sale of approximately 80 F110 engines for Turkey’s KAAN fighter despite an informal hold by Democratic Representative Gregory Meeks, who is expected to chair the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January. Until Ankara develops its own engine, currently projected for 2032, the aircraft will remain dependent on American export authorizations.
For Athens, statutory safeguards therefore offer greater protection than informal congressional objections. US lawmakers set a precedent in 2023 by barring the president from withdrawing from NATO without Senate consent or an act of Congress. In the same spirit, Greece could press the incoming Congress to enforce Section 620C of the Foreign Assistance Act. Enacted in 1978, it requires the president to certify, with a full explanation, that qualifying arms sales to Greece or Turkey comply with principles including preservation of the regional military balance. Athens could seek scrutiny as rigorous as that protecting Israel’s qualitative military edge.
May 2027 offers another opening, marking five years since the amended US-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement entered into force. Although the agreement does not automatically lapse, Athens could use the anniversary to seek a written reaffirmation of Washington’s 2020 position on the maritime entitlements of islands.
The deadline for Cyprus falls later, on September 30, 2027, when the annual US waiver of the arms embargo on the island expires. Unless Congress first enacts a longer-term arrangement, renewal will again depend on certifications concerning anti-money-laundering cooperation and the denial of port access to Russian naval vessels.
In Washington, the Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with bipartisan support, would require the State Department to prioritize the region, including Greece, in energy and defense cooperation and to report to Congress on its progress for 15 years. Unless enacted by January 3, however, it will have to be reintroduced in the new Congress. In the region, Greece can pursue energy exploration in the zone delimited with Egypt in 2020 while seeking to extend it, and sustain the dialogue that has helped contain disputes with Ankara.
Pursuing these avenues could make Greek interests less dependent on the decisions of any single US administration.
George Kalpadakis is a senior researcher in foreign policy at the Academy of Athens (KEINE).
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