Back Thehackernews Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and ...
An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation to plant malicious code in some of the scripts that customers' websites load from the service, Optimizely said early today.
Visitors to sites run by at least 178 organizations, including CNN, the BBC and Zoom, received the code yesterday, according to Report URI, a firm that monitors the scripts websites run.
The code was built to replace crypto wallet addresses with the attacker's own addresses and to capture card details, but the firm cannot see how many card numbers were exposed to the attacker. The vendor says it has fixed the flaw and removed the code.
On iPhones and iPads, the code was also set up to load a second stage that the firm identifies as an iOS exploit kit, but it reports no iPhones actually being taken over.
In an incident notice posted at 01:02 UTC, Optimizely said the attacker had "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects.
The vendor has also taken steps to secure affected user accounts and added protections to stop unauthorized code from being delivered. The notice does not say how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, when the fix went in, whether the attacker still has any access, or what customers should do.
Smartsheet's script was cleaned once and then re-infected with a hidden version of the code, which indicates the attacker still had access at that point, according to the firm.
Writing before the notice appeared, the firm said it did not know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: "That's for Optimizely to explain."
Sites that use the service to run experiments on their pages load a script from the vendor, called a snippet. The snippet updates itself whenever the customer changes a setting, according to the vendor's snippet documentation . Each time it loads, it runs a field of custom code called Project JavaScript.
The attacker wrote a loader into the Project JavaScript of customer projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched, Report URI said in its technical analysis . The snippets were still served from cdn.optimizely.com with the vendor's own certificate, so every page that loaded one also ran the loader.
Some sites serve the snippet from their own domain, and those were affected too, because the content comes from the same project.
The loader came in three versions. Most snippets loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js directly, one version hid that address in base64 so a text for the domain would miss it, and another carried a full copy of the payload that runs if the domain is blocked.
Cynet, whose endpoint detection flagged browser connections to the attacker's server, traced the loader to a file served from cdn.optimizely.com in an endpoint investigation . Its researchers also captured the code on CNN and Zoom pages. A site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised, the researchers say.
The firm checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets, mostly identified through its own crawl data, and found code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organizations. It says the real number is likely higher because it could only check the snippets it found in time. Its post lists all 178, with their domains.
Besides CNN, the BBC and Zoom, the infected snippets belonged to Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, among others. The vendor's own main site and login page also carried the code. Some researchers call the campaign OPTIMJACK .
The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC yesterday, in the BBC's snippet. A mass cleanup began at 20:40 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still carried the code.
That first injection loaded webshell[.]lol, which the firm calls the same actor's injector. The injector had also been planted through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts since late last week, and it first appeared on Turkish sites on September 17.
The payload, a file called track.js, replaces valid crypto wallet addresses with the attacker's in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests.
It swaps only an address that passes its chain's checksum and sits near a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send, according to a payload analysis by StepSecurity. Copying is not safe either: an address a visitor copies from one of these pages may already be the attacker's by the time it is pasted into a wallet.
A card skimmer, added at 13:43 UTC, captures the card number, expiry date, and CVV when they are submitted via the site's form fields and sends them to the attacker's server. It cannot read cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe, such as Stripe's hosted fields or Adyen's.
The code sends the visitor's cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker only after it swaps an address near wallet or payment wording. It cannot read cookies marked HttpOnly.
The firm identifies the iOS exploit kits as Coruna and DarkSword, as documented by Google researchers. The Coruna exploit kit targets iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1, and the DarkSword exploit kit targets iOS 18.4 to 18.7.
On iPhones and iPads, the code loads a script called boot.js from two .icu domains. That script reads the iOS version and opens an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and, for iOS 26, a separate chain that so far only collects details the device.
Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, the attacker also added a Coruna iframe to every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier. Those pages reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, a sign a visitor could notice. The kit's own mark iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched, according to the firm.
Cynet's researchers retrieved the second stage using an emulated iPhone browser and describe what they saw as conditional delivery, "not a successful compromise of a physical iPhone or iPad."
The firm says crypto has already been stolen. As of 19:25 UTC yesterday, the attacker's wallets had received $7,040, all within roughly nine hours.
StepSecurity put the total across the same addresses at $6,600. Two of the addresses were already in use before the injections began, and its analysts wrote that "the chain does not show which transfers came from victims."
What Site Owners and Visitors Should Check
Report URI recommends these checks for sites that use Optimizely Web Experimentation:
Open the Project JavaScript in every project and the custom code in every experiment, and look for 1688360, atob( or any script you did not write. The atob( check finds the base64 version of the loader.
Review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to your account, and rotate their credentials.
If your own forms take card details, treat cards entered on Monday as possibly exposed.
Treat session tokens or other secrets kept in cookies without the HttpOnly flag as exposed, and rotate them.
Deploy a Content Security Policy with a strict script-src and connect-src. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com does not help, because the code came from that host, and strict-dynamic or unsafe-eval let the payload run on some sites.
Consider telling your customers that your site served them the code.
The firm kept a copy of every infected snippet, with hashes and timestamps, and could them with affected organizations and CERTs (computer emergency response teams) on request.
For anyone who visited an affected site on Monday, the firm advises:
Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
Compare any crypto payment made that day with the address you meant to pay. If the two differ, the address may have been swapped.
If you paid by card on one of the sites, watch your card statements.
A snippet that is clean now may still have served the code on Monday. StepSecurity also advises:
Block the indicators below, and logs back to 08:00 UTC on Monday.
Fetch every snippet you serve, it for 1688360, .icu and track.js, and record its Last-Modified header.
Ask Optimizely which of your project IDs were changed, and when and how.
Keep third-party tags off checkout pages, and take card details through the payment provider's own fields in a cross-origin iframe.
Replace any card entered on an affected site on Monday, and check wallet addresses on a hardware wallet's screen rather than against copied text.
Consider having iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier that visited affected sites checked for signs of compromise.
Cynet treats cdn.optimizely.com as a legitimate delivery host rather than an indicator, and it advises against broad blocks of that host or of the affected news sites.
The payload changed multiple times during the day, so a single file hash will not capture every version. These indicators come from the researchers' published lists:
Domain : 1688360[.]cc , the payload host, with the paths /track.js , /card.php and /hit.php
IP : 136.113.106[.]136 , the address 1688360[.]cc pointed to
Domain : 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu , iOS stage
Domain : eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu , iOS stage
Domain : webshell[.]lol , the injector loaded by the first injection, seen at 04:21 UTC on Monday
SHA-256 : f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 , final version of track.js
SHA-256 : 617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3 , earliest captured version of track.js
The full story
This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.
