JAKARTA - The case of alleged illegal wiretapping of President Prabowo Subianto has opened attention to the ability of communication surveillance technology owned by law enforcement. One of the technologies that is in the spotlight is the Lawful Interception Management System (LIMS), an interception system that allows communications through telecommunications networks to be monitored through operator infrastructure.
This matter became a concern after the Criminal Investigation Unit of the National Police named three high-ranking police officers as suspects in the case of alleged illegal wiretapping of a number of phone numbers, including President Prabowo's.
Head of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the National Police, Inspector General Asep Safrudin, revealed that the alleged wiretapping took place in the period 2025 to 2026. A number of phone numbers were allegedly entered into the LIMS server without going through the verification process and without relating to the legitimate law enforcement process.
Investigators also investigated the alleged deletion of files from the LIMS system computer. In this case, the police have examined a number of witnesses and experts and seized electronic devices suspected of being related to wiretapping activities.
This information was conveyed by Asep at a press conference at the National Police Headquarters, Tuesday (3/11/2026).
This case also shows how communication interception technology can become a surveillance instrument with broad capabilities if used without the proper control and authorization mechanisms.
LIMS is basically a system designed to support lawful interception of communications based on legal authority and procedures. The system works through the telecommunications network infrastructure, not by installing a spy application on the target phone.
Technical standards regarding this communication interception mechanism are regulated, among others, in the documentation of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) through the Lawful Interception working group. The standard explains how telecommunications networks can provide requested communication information through a structured interception mechanism.
In the interception mechanism, the target phone number can be entered into the system after going through the authorization process. The operator infrastructure can then provide a copy of certain communications to the authorized monitoring center.
The information obtained can include the content of communications that can be intercepted as well as data related to communications or metadata. Metadata includes, among others, the number that communicates, call time, duration of communication, and available network information.
Thus, the ability of LIMS is not only related to the content of the conversation, but can also help map the pattern of a person's communication. However, LIMS does not automatically provide access to the entire contents of the phone, such as photo galleries, documents, cameras, and all encrypted message application conversations.
The main issue in the case of alleged wiretapping against Prabowo is the alleged use of the system without verification procedures and without the basis of the law enforcement process as conveyed by the Criminal Investigation Unit.
Apart from LIMS, another technology that is often the focus of discussion in communication surveillance is the IMSI catcher. This device has a different mechanism because it works by disguising itself as a cellular network transmitter tower or Base Transceiver Station (BTS).
IMSI catchers emit signals that resemble BTS so that surrounding mobile phone devices can try to connect. Through this mechanism, these devices have the potential to identify customer identification numbers and detect the presence of mobile phones in an area.
The European Council's study in document ST-15941-2024 explains the use of IMSI catcher technology as a device that can mimic BTS to identify mobile devices in the vicinity. The technology also raises privacy issues because it can reach devices belonging to people who are not the target of surveillance.
Under certain conditions and configurations, the technology can also be used to intercept communications. However, the ability to read the contents of communications is not automatically available because it depends on network technology, device configuration, and the encryption system used.
Unlike LIMS which utilizes the operator's infrastructure, IMSI catchers work through transmitter devices placed in certain areas. This technology allows surveillance of mobile devices within the range of the transmitter, so its use has serious implications for public privacy.
The third technology is spyware or spyware software that works by obtaining direct access to the victim's mobile device.
One of the technologies known in this category is Pegasus, which was developed by the Israeli technology company, NSO Group.
Spyware with advanced capabilities can exploit operating system security gaps to get into a phone without the owner's knowledge. In certain conditions, even no user action is required to open a link or install an application.
Once successfully gained access, certain spyware can collect messages, lists, documents, photos, and location information. Depending on the level of access obtained, the software can also activate the microphone and camera to monitor activity around the device.
This ability makes spyware have different characteristics from LIMS and IMSI catchers. If LIMS works through the operator network and IMSI catchers through transmitters disguised as BTS, spyware tries to take control of the device directly.
This difference is also important in understanding WhatsApp's communication protection. The application uses end-to-end encryption so that the contents of the message cannot be read just by the party who is only monitoring the network traffic.
In Katadata's coverage of the alleged wiretapping of Prabowo, experts explained that interception through LIMS does not automatically allow the wiretapper to read the contents of WhatsApp messages protected by end-to-end encryption.
However, encryption protection does not automatically guarantee security if the device has been successfully taken over by spyware. Spyware that gains access to a mobile phone can potentially read messages when they are open on the device, before or after the encryption process.
Although the three technologies are both related to communication surveillance, there has been no official statement proving that IMSI catchers or spyware were used in the case of alleged wiretapping against President Prabowo. Information provided by the Criminal Investigation Unit so far specifically mentions the use of the LIMS system.
The case of alleged wiretapping against Prabowo thus not only concerns violations of procedures for using interception devices. This matter also highlights the importance of supervision of information collection technology that has the ability to access a person's communications and digital activities.
Moreover, when the target of the alleged wiretapping is the head of state, the problem has a broader dimension because it concerns the protection of the communication of the highest officials of the state and the security of strategic information of the government.
Therefore, the disclosure of this case needs to explain publicly how phone numbers can be entered into the LIMS system, who gave the order, who accessed the interception results, and how the data is managed and used.
Transparency regarding the oversight mechanism is important so that the technology provided to support law enforcement does not turn into an interception instrument without a legal basis.
Communication network
Phone around the device
Penetrating the mobile phone system
Depending on technology
Depends on access and encryption.
Yes, if access is possible.
Can be through network data
Can be through the device
Must install the app?
The full story
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