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Mooncake Issues 4445

Mooncake Issues 4445

github.com • October 2, 2026

The P2P handshake daemon of mooncake-transfer-engine appends every received notify message to an in-memory vector with no cap, no expiry, and no per-peer quota. Any host that can reach the handshake RPC port grows the hosting engine process's memory without limit by sending notify frames, roughly one byte of RSS per byte sent. Runtime-confirmed on 0.3.13.post1 (latest release). No fix available. Suggested severity: Medium, CVSS 6.5.

TransferMetadata::receivePeerNotify (src/transfer_metadata.cpp) is the handler for notify frames (handshake message type 2). Its entire body under the spinlock is:

There is no limit on notifys.size() , no expiry, and no per-peer accounting. The message body is attacker-controlled up to the handshake message limit (default 1 MB via MC_HANDSHAKE_MAX_LENGTH ).

Entries are drained only when the application calls getNotifies() . The vLLM Mooncake connector never calls it; even an application that drains the vector periodically faces no rate limit, so the push rate is entirely attacker-chosen.

The handshake daemon accepts these frames from any peer without authentication; the notify name field is also free-form, so entries never collide or deduplicate.

Environment: Linux x86_64, Python 3.11, pip install mooncake-transfer-engine==0.3.13.post1 . Victim (a plain engine that never calls get_notifies , like the vLLM connector):

Run with GLOG_logtostderr=1 MC_FORCE_TCP=1 python victim.py and watch its RSS: watch -n 1 'grep VmRSS /proc/$(pgrep -f victim.py)/status' .

Observed on 0.3.13.post1: 2979 frames were accepted in 20 seconds and the victim RSS grew from 50 MB to 2672 MB, a 1:1 ratio with the sent payload bytes. The RSS then stayed flat at the peak during 5 idle minutes - nothing is reclaimed. Expected secure behavior: a bounded queue with per-peer quotas and rejection (or eviction) once the limit is reached.

This is an uncontrolled-resource-consumption issue (CWE-400). The attacker needs no credentials, only reachability of the handshake RPC port (documented 15000-17000 range, published in the mooncake/rpc_meta/* metadata).

At the measured rate the hosting engine process (sglang scheduler or vLLM EngineCore in real deployments) reaches multi-GB RSS in tens of seconds and is killed by the OOM killer shortly after, taking the whole engine instance down. The attack is a plain socket loop with no rate requirement, and memory is never returned, so a single short burst has a permanent effect until the process restarts. Availability-only impact; no confidentiality or integrity effect was observed. Suggested CVSS:3.1 vector AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (6.5). Affected: mooncake-transfer-engine <= 0.3.13.post1, no patched version yet.

Ensure you searched for relevant issues and read the [documentation]

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