Ongoing npm Supply Chain Attack Affecting Keyv and Related Packages ("Shai-Hulud" Worm)

Security researchers have identified an active software supply chain attack involving malicious versions of Keyv and related npm packages. The Shai-Hulud malware steals developer credentials and spreads by compromising additional packages. Organisations using Node.js should immediately review their dependencies and treat credentials on affected systems as potentially compromised.

Security researchers observed an active supply chain campaign involving ‘ChainDrop’, a self-propagating malware variant from the Shai-Hulud malware family. The campaign has compromised over 1,300 package versions on the npm registry, representing a combined 2 billion monthly downloads. Affected packages include widely used caching libraries such as keyv, cacheable, flat-cache, and file-entry-cache and the campaign has propagated into the software supply chains of several organisations.

This advisory provides a list of known compromised packages, along with corresponding security updates that include mitigation measures and indicators of compromise. Organisations using affected components are advised to review the corresponding security updates and assess their environments for potential compromise.

Affected Product Versions:

Notable compromised packages are listed as follows:

Affected Software Ecosystem

@cacheable/node-cache

For the full list of compromised packages, please refer to .

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The list of Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the activities is as follows:

https[:]//npm-cache[.]com[:]443/router

Exfiltration Endpoint

eth-mainnet.nodereal[.]io

54dc7ea54a1317cca0e890a2770630cf7fa6c97813e0cb9d2caa93012b350668

fd3ca4007b225fdf8de7af4345a19179d5efa8c4bb9205f88cda806e5684b1eb

9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc

Math_Symbol.js and math_init.js

Identify and remove the affected package versions from development, build, and CI/CD environments.

Treat affected systems as potentially compromised and rebuild them if the malicious packages were installed.

Rotate exposed credentials, including cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, SSH keys, Kubernetes configurations, Terraform credentials, and other developer secrets.

Review cloud and source code environments for unauthorized access or suspicious activity following package installation.

Monitor for the published IOCs, including the identified domains, file artifacts, and other indicators associated with the campaign.

Strengthen software supply chain defenses by enabling dependency allowlisting, package integrity verification, and provenance controls where available.

Monitor for activity involving GitHub repository with a description containing "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again".

Refer to the CSA Advisory on Securing the Software Supply Chain and Development Workflows for additional best practices on securing software supply chains and development workflows: