Back www.stepsecurity.io Optimjack Optimizely Hosted Scripts Crypto Clipper Card Skimmer
Update, November 17, 07:30 UTC: Optimizely has confirmed the incident. Its status page says an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and a spokesperson told Gizmodo the flaw was in the account signup flow. Optimizely says it has fixed the flaw and removed the injected code. Scott Helme has also published the full list of affected organizations. We have revised this post to match, and corrected earlier statements the loader, the exposure window and the wallets.
On November 16, 2026, an attacker injected malicious JavaScript into the Optimizely Web projects of 178 organizations, including CNN, BBC, Fox News, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, KLM and IKEA. Optimizely's CDN served it, so every visitor to an affected site loaded it. The payload swaps copied crypto wallet addresses and steals card numbers from checkout forms. Helme's analysis says it also loads the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits on iPhones and iPads.
Helme found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets he checked. The attacker wrote it into each project's Project JavaScript field, a custom-code field that runs on every page. The rest of each snippet was untouched, and the CDN served the file with Optimizely's own certificate. A write-up by Amirul Cyber named the campaign OPTIMJACK.
We checked the public scan records, DNS and WHOIS, the live payload and the attacker's wallets. Since we first published, three things have changed:
Optimizely says the flaw is fixed. It removed the injected code from affected projects and secured affected accounts. Helme found one snippet still infected at 21:52 UTC on November 16.
The payload server is down. The registry put 1688360[.]cc on hold at 00:37 UTC on November 17, and it no longer resolves.
The attacker has emptied the wallets. The LTC, ETH and BTC addresses were swept between 04:11 and 05:39 UTC on November 17.
Action required: Block 1688360[.]cc , webshell[.]lol and the .icu hosts in the IOC table , and logs back to 04:00 UTC on November 16. If you use Optimizely Web, read the Project JavaScript field of every project. Searching the served snippet for 1688360 is not enough, because one loader variant hides the URL in base64. Check snippets served from your own domain too.
Helme's write-up lists all 178 organizations and the domains involved. Banking and finance is the largest group with 32, then technology and SaaS with 23 and retail with 20. It also names streaming (12), news and media (10), airlines and travel (9), telecoms (7), crypto and trading (6) and insurance (6). Examples include Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely's own sites were affected too: the snippets for and login.optimizely.com carried the loader.
We checked this against public urlscan.io data. Between 08:28 and 21:23 UTC, 76 scans of third-party pages, across 30 domains, recorded a request to 1688360[.]cc . For 17 of those domains, urlscan stored the payload itself: the exact file with SHA-256 f7b84b9a… , served with HTTP 200 to a page on the site between 17:57 and 21:23 UTC. They are:
News: CNN, BBC and Fox News.
Software: Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Hootsuite and Smartsheet.
Airlines and retail: Air France, KLM, American Eagle, American Girl, Scheels and Stamps.com.
Insurance and housing: Mutual of Omaha and two property-management portals ( loftliving.com and managebuilding.com ).
The other 13 domains in the scan data also recorded a request, but urlscan has no stored copy of what they were served. We confirmed the loader chain on two pages. On a GitLab page, a consent manager ( cdn.cookielaw.org ) loads cdn.optimizely.com/js/5113954737848320.js , and that file loads 1688360[.]cc . On a Mutual of Omaha page, cdn.optimizely.com/js/25010540072.js requests track.js directly.
Each Optimizely Web customer loads a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's CDN, usually at /js/ .js . The snippet holds Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional Project JavaScript field. The attacker wrote their loader into that field in customer projects, so the file still came from cdn.optimizely.com . Helme says this was not CDN cache poisoning: the CDN served exactly what it was given. Some customers serve the snippet from their own domain, and Helme names opt.scheels.com and . Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same project.
Helme saw three versions of the loader. Most snippets carry a plain script tag for . A second version hides the URL in base64 and decodes it with atob() , so a for 1688360 does not find it. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with this version, which Helme reads as the attacker still having access at that moment. The third version carries a full inline copy of the payload that runs through eval if 1688360[.]cc is blocked. Blocking the domain is therefore not enough. The code has to come out of the project.
Helme's timeline puts the first injection at 04:21 UTC on November 16, when a BBC snippet began loading code from webshell[.]lol , a domain he ties to the same actor. 1688360[.]cc was registered at 05:23 UTC, and the first public scan to record a request to it was at 08:28 UTC. Mass clean-up ran from 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, and one snippet was still infected at 21:52 UTC. For most sites the exposure window was 16 hours.
Optimizely says it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, secured affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorized code being delivered. It has said the flaw was in the account signup flow. It has not said how that gave the attacker write access across unrelated customer projects, and Helme asks the same question.
The payload is one JavaScript file of 30 KB with three independent blocks and an iOS branch. We read the final version as text and did not run it.
Crypto address swapper
The script holds replacement addresses for ETH, TRX, BTC, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH and DOGE. It only swaps an address that passes the chain's checksum, so the replacement is valid and the victim's wallet will accept it, and only when nearby text contains a payment word such as wallet , deposit or send .
It rewrites addresses in page text, form inputs, link and image attributes, copy events, the clipboard API, navigator. , and the URL and body of fetch and XHR requests. It also replaces Function.prototype.call and apply , so a string that looks like a wallet address is rewritten before it reaches any function.
Because it hooks the copy event, an address copied from an affected page can already be swapped when you paste it into a wallet app. Check the address on your wallet or hardware-wallet screen against the one you meant to use, not against what you copied.
Screenshot and cookie exfiltration
After the first swap on a visible element, the script loads html2canvas.min.js from the payload server, captures the visible page as a JPEG, and POSTs it to /hit.php with the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of document.cookie and up to 20 of the original addresses. This happens once per page load and only after a swap, so a visitor who never handles a wallet address does not send cookies. HttpOnly cookies are out of its reach.
A second block wraps fetch and XHR and listens for form submits. It looks for a card number that passes the Luhn check and has a known brand prefix, a valid expiry date and a three- or four-digit CVV, and sends them with the page URL to /card.php using navigator.sendBeacon . Helme dates its addition to 13:43 UTC. It does not collect the cardholder name or billing address, and it cannot read card fields inside a cross-origin payment iframe. It also stores each captured card in sessionStorage under a key that starts with cc_ so it does not send the same card twice, which leaves card data in the victim's browser storage.
If the user agent is an iPhone, iPad or iPod, the script adds two boot.js scripts from .icu hosts. On iOS 18.6 or earlier it also adds a hidden iframe that loads /JIUJIU888/weifile.html . Helme's analysis identifies the chains: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18.x, plus a separate iOS 26 chain that only fingerprinted the device when he looked. He reports that the kit's own list iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched, and that pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reload every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. We did not retrieve or analyze these files ourselves.
The payload changed 26 times in a day
Helme counts 26 builds of track.js on November 16, starting at 08:10 UTC. urlscan's captures show the decoded size growing from 28,877 bytes at 16:02 UTC to 29,461 at 16:19, 29,871 at 17:34 and 30,430 at 18:11, where it stayed. The final version went live at 17:56 UTC. The server sends cache-control: max-age=15 , so the operator can swap the file within seconds.
The hash in Amirul Cyber's write-up ( f7b84b9a… ) is the final version, and its Last-Modified header reads 17:56:07 UTC. urlscan's first capture ( 617df364… ) is a different file. Match on behavior and domains, not on one hash.
The iOS infrastructure was in use before this campaign
The .icu domains were registered in three batches:
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu on October 28, behind Cloudflare.
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu on November 9 at 17:52:42 UTC. Both resolve to 34.96.213.201 in Hong Kong.
eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu , 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu and gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu on November 16 at 16:38:42 UTC. All three resolved to 34.87.36.58 in Singapore.
Three domains created in the same second and hosted on one IP address are one operator's batch. Public scans show 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu serving /A8/a.html on November 12, four days before this campaign. Helme ties the same actor to an earlier wave through other third-party scripts from November 13, and to the webshell[.]lol injector since September 17. We have not verified that link.
The domain q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu[.]icu , which Helme listed, did not exist at 22:07 UTC on November 16. It was registered at 23:44:57 UTC, three hours after he published it, and now sits behind Cloudflare. We do not know who registered it.
The payload server has been taken down
1688360[.]cc was registered at 05:23:08 UTC on November 16 and pointed at 136.113.106.136 , a Google Cloud address in us-central1. The registry put it on clientHold at 00:37 UTC on November 17, and it now returns NXDOMAIN. As of 07:30 UTC, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu , 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu and gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu no longer return an address. 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu and p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu still resolve to 34.96.213.201 , and l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu is still behind Cloudflare. No new public scans of affected pages appeared after 21:23 UTC.
The wallets were emptied by morning
Helme's write-up puts the attacker's take at $7,040 as of 19:25 UTC on November 16, including stablecoins on TRON and BSC, and reports an earlier sweep of those at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. The USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. We checked the addresses on public block explorers at 07:30 UTC on November 17. The LTC, ETH and BTC addresses were empty.
Balances from BlockCypher and Trongrid. The TRON row combines our check with Helme's figures, which we did not reproduce.
The TRON wallet has been in use since March, which fits Helme's reading that this actor was active before this campaign. The money is a small part of the damage. Stolen cookies, card data and any iOS compromise leave no trace on-chain.
Why the Usual Defenses Miss It
The site's own code is clean. The change is in a vendor-hosted file, so code review and repository scanning never see it.
A consent banner does not help. In the GitLab scan the consent manager is what loads the Optimizely bundle. It controls when the script runs, not what the script contains.
Subresource Integrity is hard to apply. A snippet that changes whenever a team publishes an experiment cannot be pinned to one hash.
Content-Security-Policy helps, with one exception. A host allowlist in script-src blocks the download of track.js , and a connect-src allowlist blocks the exfiltration. A policy that uses strict-dynamic with a nonce does not, because it trusts scripts that a trusted script adds.
Block the indicators. Add 1688360[.]cc , webshell[.]lol and the .icu hosts to your DNS and proxy blocklists, and logs back to 04:00 UTC on November 16.
Read your Optimizely projects. Open the Project JavaScript field of every Optimizely Web project you own. Do not rely on searching the served snippet for 1688360 : one variant hides the URL with atob() and another carries the payload inline. Check snippets served from your own domain as well.
Review account access. Optimizely says the attacker came in through the account signup flow. List the users and API tokens on your Optimizely account, remove any you do not recognize, and ask Optimizely which of your projects were modified, when, and through which accounts.
Look for blocked requests. Check CSP reports and browser telemetry for failed requests to the payload server. Those are pages where the loader was present.
Protect payment pages. Remove third-party tags from checkout where you can, and use the payment provider's hosted fields in a cross-origin iframe, which this skimmer cannot read.
Treat exposed cards and wallets as compromised. If staff or customers entered card details or copied a wallet address on an affected site between 04:00 and 21:00 UTC on November 16, replace the card and verify wallet addresses on a hardware-wallet screen.
Update iOS devices. Treat iPhones and iPads on iOS 18.6 or earlier, and any device still on iOS 17 or earlier, that visited affected sites in that window as candidates for forensic triage.
Still unknown: how the attacker turned the signup-flow flaw into write access across unrelated customer projects, and who is behind it. Optimizely's status page still showed the incident as monitoring at 07:30 UTC on November 17. We will update this post as those points are confirmed.
Indicators of Compromise
Sources are marked in each row. “Our analysis” means the payload review, DNS and WHOIS checks and wallet checks described above. “Helme” marks details we have not reproduced.
Optimizely: Web Experimentation Security Incident (status page)
Scott Helme: World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
Scott Helme on X: thread on the breach
Amirul Cyber: OPTIMJACK write-up
Gizmodo: Sprawling Malware Attack Reportedly Affects Zoom and Other Major Brands (Optimizely's statement)
urlscan.io: scan of 1688360[.]cc/track.js and scan of a GitLab page
r/cybersecurity: first report of the script on gitlab.com and foxnews.com
The full story
This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.
