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Paicoding

vul.yulun.ac.cn • November 14, 2026

loginByZsxq registers a local account when a member logs in through ZSXQ for the first time. Both the username and the password are built from the ZSXQ number and contain no random component:

Before the number is stored, StarNumberUtil.formatStarNumber pads it to five digits, and the username and the password are built from the padded value. The number in the formula therefore looks like 01234 :

The attacker obtains the ZSXQ number from the user’s profile page. Rendering the profile includes an edit form that writes the number into an input as its value , and this template is delivered with the /user/{userId} page to every visitor:

Anyone who opens the profile page can read the number. Since the username and the password are a fixed function of the number, reading the number is enough to compute both, and /login/username issues a session once the pair matches.

Reproduction Environment

The official repository does not ship a compose file, so the application is built from source and started with compose. The build needs a JDK and Maven, the runtime is Java 8, and the container keeps the official port 8080 while the host publishes 18070. The build and start commands are:

Once the site is up, create a member account through the site’s own ZSXQ login callback to simulate that member’s first login. The script is:

Each section below starts with docker compose down -v and docker compose up -d so the environment returns to its initial state.

The attacker does not log in and opens the victim’s profile page. The page HTML carries an input with id="starNumber" whose value is the ZSXQ number:

With the number in hand, the attacker computes the username and the password and logs in:

Reading the user profile with that session returns the victim Alice’s record and a FORMAL membership:

In the browser the session is already inside Alice’s account, and the page shows the ZSXQ number and the membership expiry:

2. Image transfer SSRF reads Actuator heap dump

/image/save only requires login, takes img from the caller and performs no address validation:

The file extension comes from the URL path suffix and the content comes from the remote response. LocalStorageWrapper then writes the stream to the local directory and uses that suffix as the file type:

The Actuator admin port is bound to loopback but exposes every endpoint:

Binding the admin port to loopback does not protect it, because the transfer endpoint runs inside the same host. When fileType is empty, LocalStorageWrapper.upload reads the whole stream into a byte array to detect the magic number, which exhausts memory for a heap dump of several hundred megabytes, so the request path needs a suffix. With the path written as heapdump;x=.txt , path.lastIndexOf(".") picks up the suffix inside ;x=.txt , so that branch is skipped and the dump is written straight to disk as /forum/image/xxxx.txt .

Reproduction Environment

First log the administrator in once so an active session exists in the JVM heap, then register an ordinary account as the attacker and call the transfer endpoint. The script is:

hello_world is the plain value of paicoding.jwt.secret , and PAICODING_DB_PASSWORD is the name of the environment variable that holds the database password. Besides the password and the secret, the heap also retains the f-session values written when other users logged in, and the u=1 session recovered above reaches the admin endpoints.

3. Image upload XSS (CVE-2026-129140)

validateStaticImg decides the type from the Content-Type declared by the request, and svg is explicitly allowed:

The file content is not validated, so an SVG that carries a script is stored as .svg unchanged. Local storage puts the file into the static directory, spring.web.resources.static-locations serves that directory, and .svg is returned as image/svg+xml . The session cookie f-session carries no HttpOnly flag, so the script can read it.

Reproduction Environment

The attacker registers an ordinary account and uploads an SVG that carries a script:

The victim opens the link and the script reads the session:

4. JSON-LD XSS on profile pages (CVE-2026-129141)

The page emits the JSON-LD through th:utext :

The JSON-LD is serialized by Hutool and inserted into the page unchanged, without escaping inside the profile closes the JSON-LD’s script element early and the rest of the input runs as a script.

Reproduction Environment

The attacker registers an account and changes the profile:

Reading that profile anonymously yields the following JSON-LD fragment:

The victim opens the profile and the script reads the session:

5. Payment notice template XSS (CVE-2026-129142)

The pending payment notice inserts the payer’s display name into the notice body:

Here payUser.getUserName() is the display name submitted at registration and it is not escaped. The notice template outputs the body through th:utext :

The display name is limited to 50 characters, which is enough for a short payload such as . Starting a pending payment only requires a call to paying after login and no real payment.

Reproduction Environment

Same as section 1. The victim account needs a paid article whose payWay is email , and the script creates it.

The author opens the system notice page, the script runs and shows the session:

6. Unauthenticated article detail API leaks paid and draft content (CVE-2026-129143)

The detail API converts the full body to HTML and returns it without consulting the read permission:

Only the page rendering path truncates the body:

formatArticleReadType truncates the body according to readType , but the detail API never passes through it. In addition, ArticleDao.queryArticleDetail only restricts articles under review, so the draft state is not covered:

The bodies of drafts, paid articles and member articles are therefore returned unchanged by this API. The article short link entry ArticleSlugViewController renders the detail by id, so drafts are readable through the short link page as well.

Reproduction Environment

First create a paid article and a draft as the administrator, then read them with an anonymous session. The script is:

An ordinary user cannot read the PAYWALL_SECRET_9Z part of the paid article:

7. Enumerable confirmation code for payment QR (CVE-2026-129144)

The confirmation code is built from a fixed prefix, a global increasing counter and the payment record id:

INCR is a counter inside the process that starts each day from a random value between 0 and 499, so the counter part only has around 2000 possible values. The payment record id comes back to the payer in the toPay response.

The callback endpoint requires no login and passes the request parameters to the payment service:

The payment service reads verifyCode , payId and succeed from the request:

updatePayStatus only compares the verifyCode stored in the record and never checks who the caller is, so enumerating the counter marks the record as paid.

Reproduction Environment

Extracted Entities