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PHP2Shell

PHP2Shell

Sploitus • October 22, 2026

| CVE-2026-109618 | [GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w]( | RCE via OOM corruption | 9.2 |

| CVE-2026-109619 | [GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp]( | RCE via stale global state | 9.2 |

Fixed in PHP **8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and 8.5.12** (released 2026-10-21). Branches 8.1 and

older are end-of-life and get no upstream fix.

## Read this first: what the scanner can and cannot do

The research (see [`research/`](research/)) found that **no safe behavioural signature

exists for either CVE.** The fix changes PHP behaviour only on allocation failure,

fatal errors and pre-initialisation session upload progress. Benign requests behave

byte-identically on vulnerable and patched builds (lab-validated). Every

code-path-specific difference requires sending the attack-shaped requests the

advisories describe, so the scanner never does that.

The scanner therefore relies on evidence the server already discloses, and grades its

| Exposed `phpinfo()` with a complete Core table **without** `memory_hard_limit_percent` and an affected version | **CONFIRMED_VULNERABLE** |

| Exposed `phpinfo()` listing `memory_hard_limit_percent` (registered by the fix commit; also detects vendor backports) | **CONFIRMED_PATCHED** (HIGH) |

| Disclosed version at or above the fixed release | **CONFIRMED_PATCHED** (MEDIUM) |

| Disclosed version below the fixed release | **POTENTIALLY_VULNERABLE**. Vendor backports cannot be ruled out remotely. |

| PHP identified, version hidden; or nothing identified | **INCONCLUSIVE**. *Not* the same as "not vulnerable". |

| Non-PHP runtime positively identified, no PHP signal | **NOT_APPLICABLE** (for that URL only) |

On a well-hardened site the honest answer is usually INCONCLUSIVE. In that case, check

from the host (see [Host-side verification](#host-side-verification)).

`php2shell.sh` finds a suitable Python, checks the dependencies and starts the tool. If

anything is missing it offers to create `.venv` and install it.

./php2shell.sh check # environment report (Python, deps, optional lab tools)

./php2shell.sh setup # create .venv with runtime + test dependencies

./php2shell.sh scan --url --confirm-authorised

./php2shell.sh research --show-signatures

./php2shell.sh test # offline test suite

Any arguments other than `check`, `setup` and `test` are passed to `python -m php2shell`.

The working directory is not changed, so relative `--targets` and `-o` paths work.

| `PHP2SHELL_PYTHON` | Interpreter to use when there is no `.venv` (must be 3.12+) |

| `PHP2SHELL_AUTO_INSTALL=1` | Install missing dependencies without prompting (CI and other non-interactive use) |

In a non-interactive shell without `PHP2SHELL_AUTO_INSTALL=1`, the launcher refuses to

install anything and tells you to run `setup`.

python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate

pip install -e '.[dev]' # runtime deps: requests, rich; dev: pytest

Or run in place without installing: `pip install requests rich` and then

# Single target (the default is one GET request per target)

python -m php2shell scan --url --confirm-authorised

# Targets file: one URL per line, '#' allowed

python -m php2shell scan --targets targets.txt --confirm-authorised

# JSON and HTML client reports (format chosen by extension, repeatable)

python -m php2shell scan --url -o report.json -o report.html --confirm-authorised

# Parse a phpinfo() page you already know is exposed (must the target's origin)

python -m php2shell scan --url --phpinfo-url --confirm-authorised

# Opt in: also request /phpinfo.php and /info.php (2 extra GETs per target)

python -m php2shell scan --url --check-info-paths --confirm-authorised

# Research data: advisories, signature registry and validation status

python -m php2shell research --show-signatures

python -m php2shell research --show-advisories

Without `--confirm-authorised` the scanner asks for interactive confirmation, and in

| `--timeout` | 10 s | Connect and read timeout per request (max 60) |

| `--max-requests` | 8 | Request budget per target, including redirects (max 25) |

| `--interval` | 1.0 s | Minimum gap between requests to one host (min 0.2) |

| `--concurrency` | 1 | Targets scanned in parallel (max 4); the per-host interval still applies |

| `--max-redirects` | 3 | Only in-scope redirects are followed |

| `--error-threshold` | 3 | Stop a target after N consecutive 5xx or transport errors |

| `--allow-host` | none | Extra authorised host that redirects may reach (e.g. ` variant) |

| `--proxy` | none | Environment proxies, `.netrc` and similar settings are ignored |

| `--insecure` | off | Skip TLS verification |

| `-o/--output` | none | `.json` or `.html`, repeatable |

| `-q`, `-v` | | Quiet or verbose terminal output |

- **Explicit targets only.** http/https URLs; embedded credentials are rejected.

- **No enumeration.** By default one GET per target. phpinfo pages are fetched only when

named by the operator, or with the explicit two-path `--check-info-paths` opt-in.

- **GET and HEAD only**, enforced in the transport layer. No POST, no multipart, no

- **SSRF guard.** Redirects are followed manually and every hop is scope-checked.

Out-of-scope locations (other hosts, IP literals, cloud metadata, non-http schemes)

- **Rate limiting** per host, a **request budget** per target, **timeouts**, and a 2 MB

- **Circuit breaker.** Repeated 5xx or transport errors stop all further requests to

- **No escalation.** There is no active or behavioural probing mode at all. Hypotheses

that need one are kept lab-only (see below).

- Cookie values are never written to reports (only their length). Anomalous PHPSESSID

cookies the server sends on its own are flagged as a possible *indicator of

compromise* (Wiz IOC), never as vulnerability evidence.

Each target lists: PHP detection confidence, PHP version (if disclosed), a separate

assessment for each CVE (classification, confidence, rationale), detection methods,

evidence (with source URL and whether it is lab-validated), assumptions, limitations,

exposure factors (SAPI, `session.upload_progress.enabled`, `fatal_error_backtraces`,

`memory_limit`; recorded but never used to downgrade), and recommended steps.

Examples produced against the local lab: [`examples/`](examples/)

([terminal](examples/example_terminal_output.txt), [JSON](examples/example_report.json),

Use this when the remote result is POTENTIALLY_VULNERABLE or INCONCLUSIVE. Run it with

php -i | grep -c memory_hard_limit_percent # 1 = fix present, 0 = fix absent

For the web SAPI (FPM, mod_php), put this on a temporary, access-restricted page and

<?php var_dump(array_key_exists('memory_hard_limit_percent', ini_get_all(null, false)));

| ID | Signature | Status | Used remotely |

| H1 | Disclosed version vs fixed releases | VALIDATED | yes (never yields CONFIRMED_VULNERABLE alone) |

| H4 | `memory_hard_limit_percent` in phpinfo() | VALIDATED, 0 mismatches across 4 builds × 4 INI profiles × 3 SAPIs × 5 runs | yes (passive) |

| H2 | Upload-progress warning difference with invalid SID | LAB_ONLY (reproducible, but needs a multipart POST into the vulnerable path plus display_errors=On) | **no** |

| H3 | OOM message wording | REJECTED (needs induced OOM) | **no** |

| H5 | Differences on benign requests | REJECTED (lab: byte-identical) | **no** |

Full write-ups: [`research/detection_hypotheses.md`](research/detection_hypotheses.md).

Raw results: [`research/results/`](research/results/).

The lab is optional and independent of the scanner. Never expose it publicly.

**Source builds (no Docker; used for the published results):**

lab/local/build_php.sh /opt/php2shell-lab 8.4.26 8.4.27 8.5.11 8.5.12

python lab/local/validate.py --repeat 5 \

--build 8.4.26=/opt/php2shell-lab/inst-8.4.26 --build 8.4.27=/opt/php2shell-lab/inst-8.4.27 \

--build 8.5.11=/opt/php2shell-lab/inst-8.5.11 --build 8.5.12=/opt/php2shell-lab/inst-8.5.12

This runs H4 (CLI, CGI, HTTP through the real scanner), H2 (php-cgi, local only) and H5,

and writes `research/results/lab_validation.{md,json}`.

**Docker (Apache mod_php and nginx + PHP-FPM; ports bound to 127.0.0.1):**

docker compose -f lab/docker/docker-compose.yml up -d

python lab/docker/validate_docker.py --repeat 3

The Docker lab is provided but **was not executed** in the research environment (no

Docker available). Run it before relying on H4 results for mod_php or FPM targets.

python -m pytest # unit + local integration, fully offline

PHP2SHELL_LAB_BUILDS="8.4.26=/opt/php2shell-lab/inst-8.4.26,8.4.27=/opt/php2shell-lab/inst-8.4.27" \

python -m pytest tests/integration/test_lab_builds.py # optional, against real PHP

Coverage includes fingerprinting, hidden versions, version parsing, vendor backports,

the classification matrix, false-positive prevention, timeouts, redirects (including

SSRF attempts), rate limiting, budgets, the circuit breaker, unreachable targets,

non-PHP sites, HTML escaping and report contents. Real phpinfo() fixtures from each lab

See [`research/limitations.md`](research/limitations.md). In short: hidden versions

give INCONCLUSIVE; version strings cannot exclude vendor backports; phpinfo pages may

belong to a different runtime than the application; CDNs can alter headers; and

exploitability preconditions (SAPI, worker model, configuration) are reported but not

php2shell/ scanner package (cli, scanner, transport, fingerprint, behavioural,

detection, confidence, reporting, config, advisories)

research/ vulnerability, patch and detection analysis; limitations; lab results

lab/local/ source-build lab and validation harness

lab/docker/ Docker lab (mod_php, FPM)

tests/ unit/, integration/, fixtures/

examples/ sample terminal, JSON and HTML output

Extracted Entities

Attack Types (1)