Back Infosecurity-Magazine Russian Espionage Actor Star Blizzard Focuses on Cloud Identities for Mass Data Theft
New analysis from Google has revealed how Russian cyber-espionage group Star Blizzard is using sophisticated social engineering techniques and cloud account compromises to collect intelligence from targets across North America and Europe.
The group, also known as Coldriver , Callisto, Cold Relic and Gossamer Bear, is known for its use of spearphishing techniques to steal credentials from high-value targets in sectors related to policy making and defense.
Once Cold Relic compromises a target, it uses stolen emails and data to establish authentic pretexts and impersonate contacts when reaching out to subsequent targets.
The latest analysis, based on two recent intrusions at US-based organizations, provides new details into the group’s social engineering and post-compromise tradecraft, which includes a growing focus on cloud compromise for data collection and to help facilitate attacks on other organizations.
“Cold Relic’s campaigns demonstrate the convergence of human-centric social engineering and cloud identity abuse. By obtaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services turn legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners,” Google wrote in a blog dated November 17, 2026.
“Their ability to navigate across multiple cloud ecosystems highlights that organizations must defend their entire identity estate holistically,” the researchers added.
Google has also observed evidence of new phishing operations by the threat actor as recently as November 2026, showing that the group remains an active threat.
Read now: Microsoft and US Government Disrupt Russian Star Blizzard Operations
The Latest Cold Relic Techniques
The first intrusion tracked by Google took place in late 2025, when Star Blizzard compromised the cloud productivity environment of a US-based organization.
The threat actor leveraged a residential proxy network in the US located in close geographical proximity to the victim. It used the stolen credentials of a super admin account in combination with a multi-factor authentication (MFA) push notification fatigue attack to gain access.
After the victim user accepted an MFA request, Star Blizzard used its super admin privileges to download the contents of the entire organization’s cloud storage drive by both mass sharing files to an attacker-operated email account and downloading files directly.
It also exported full employee lists and initiated a domain-wide data export via Google Workspace Customer Takeout via the stolen credentials.
Additionally, the actor took steps to remove forensic evidence of its activity, including deleting Alert Center notifications.
Following this activity, Star Blizzard was found to have maintained access to the victim’s environment for several months, continuing to target cloud drive document access related to credentials, email archives, personnel information and other documents related to its intelligence collection aims.
When the actor was removed from the victim’s environment, Google said it observed email accounts used to impersonate employees from the victim organizations to target individuals in the same professional circles.
The second intrusion tracked by the Google researchers arose from Star Blizzard impersonating an employee from the first compromise. The actor initiated communications over a secure messaging app, ultimately sharing phishing links during the course of the conversation.
These links successfully provided the actor with credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID, which was used by the second victim as its federated single sign-on provider (SSO) for Google Workspace.
Upon successful authentication, Star Blizzard registered and used a new MFA device in the SSO solution to retain access to the user account throughout the intrusion.
As in the first case, the group performed bulk download of files accessible in the compromised user’s cloud drive.
Google’s analysis of the two incidents noted that in addition to the mass collection of files and email archives, Star Blizzard undertakes searches for data that can support subsequent spear-phishing operations, including organizational rosters, lists, resumes, and event schedules to build convincing pretexts for future targets.
Organizations Urged to Harden Systems Against Cold Relic Activity
Google set out a range of recommendations for security teams to mitigate the updated tactics deployed by Star Blizzard. These include:
Given Cold Relic’s use of residential proxy networks, organizations should enrich authentication logs with residential proxy and VPN IP reputation feeds and apply conditional access policies to block or detect logons from known proxy networks
Implement cloud storage data loss prevention (DLP) policies to warn or block users attempting to create, upload, or externally files matching sensitive patterns. This is because Cold Relic’s intrusions were helped by users storing credentials and other secrets within their organization’s cloud storage platforms
If an intrusion is identified, revoke all user sessions and force password resets for impacted accounts
Enforce phishing-resistant MFA, particularly hardware keys which cannot be intercepted or approved via fatigue attacks
Restrict and audit passkey registrations
The full story
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