Rutgers Team Targets Cyberattacks With Digital Twin Technology

A Rutgers professor and a team of students have proposed a new approach to defending manufacturers from cyberattacks, using digital twin technology to ensure uninterrupted production of mission‑critical components for national security and infrastructure.

Rajiv Malhotra, associate professor in the Rutgers School of Engineering’s Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, outlines the concept in a new article published in the Journal of Manufacturing Systems. The research explores how geometric and process digital twins—virtual replicas of physical systems—can protect additive manufacturing operations from cyberattacks that alter part geometry or introduce hard‑to‑detect defects.

The team also addresses a longstanding challenge in scaling resilience, including constraints related to materials, cost and supply chain complexity.

Modern manufacturing’s reliance on digital connectivity leaves production vulnerable to malware that can compromise parts used in sectors ranging from aerospace and electronics to biomedical devices and automotive manufacturing. Such attacks, the authors note, can have far‑reaching impacts on economic stability, public wellbeing and national security.

“Traditional approaches for addressing the threat of cyberattacks rely on reporting and detecting the issue and shutting production down, while plugging the gaps in the cyber layer before production starts again, which can take weeks with no guarantees that the attack won't exploit some other gap in the cyber layer,” Malhotra said.

He argues that resilience must allow production to continue even while cyber vulnerabilities are being addressed.

The digital twins “work in tandem to create resilience at key points of the manufacturing digital chain where cyberphysical attacks might occur—such as the part model, machine firmware and the process plan generation software,” he said.

The framework enables rapid repair of compromised digital geometries without repeated fabrication cycles, while also disrupting the formation of local defects—even when the nature of the attack is unknown.

“This scalability to unknown attacks is critical,” Malhotra said.

The team is already working with industry partners to commercialise the framework for use in manufacturing facilities.

Looking ahead, Malhotra said the research will expand to include attacks on sensor signals, machine and human safety, and the use of hybrid manufacturing systems to mitigate defects caused by cyberattacks.

“We are also expanding this approach towards expeditionary manufacturing for defense and space applications—and are also very interested in collaborating with other industry partners beyond our current scope,” he added.