Ssa 390352

.NET Client Library for SIMATIC S7 Webserver API contains multiple vulnerabilities that could allow an attacker to obtain sensitive information or write arbitrary files outside the intended download directory.

Siemens has released a new version for .NET Client Library for SIMATIC S7 Webserver API and recommends to update to the latest version.

Product-specific remediations or mitigations can be found in the section Known Affected Products . Please follow the General Security Recommendations .

As a general security measure, Siemens strongly recommends to protect network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. In order to operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends to configure the environment according to Siemens' operational guidelines for Industrial Security (Download: ), and to follow the recommendations in the product manuals. Additional information on Industrial Security by Siemens can be found at:

As a general security measure, Siemens strongly recommends to protect network access to devices with appropriate mechanisms. In order to operate the devices in a protected IT environment, Siemens recommends to configure the environment according to Siemens' operational guidelines for Industrial Security (Download: ), and to follow the recommendations in the product manuals. Additional information on Industrial Security by Siemens can be found at:

This chapter describes all vulnerabilities (CVE-IDs) addressed in this security advisory. Wherever applicable, it also documents the product-specific impact of the individual vulnerabilities.

Affected applications do not properly validate filenames received from remote servers during ticket downloads.

This could allow an attacker who can manipulate the ticket response to write arbitrary files outside the intended download directory and, when overwriting is enabled, replace existing files accessible to the application.

Affected applications do not properly redact PLC restore passwords from HTTP error exception messages.

This could allow an attacker with access to logs or other diagnostic output to obtain the plaintext restore password and potentially perform unauthorized operations on the PLC.