Back Sldinfo The Waiver That Couldn't Land: Federalism, Presidential Power, and Russian Diesel on the Amazon
Two tankers carrying Russian diesel have reached the Itacoatiara anchorage on the Amazon. The Sierra Leone-flagged Leruo , believed to hold 40,000 tonnes loaded at Primorsk, arrived first and is moving upriver toward Manaus. The Russian-flagged Primorye followed, and a third ship, Beast , is off the South American coast signalling “Brazil For Orders.” What has not happened is the thing the cargoes were supposedly for. As The Maritime Executive put it on 19 November, none of the promised Russian product has reached the United States.
That is a shipping story. It is also a lesson in two things that rarely show up together: how American federalism and the separation of powers constrain presidential foreign policy, and how a large middle power manages its relationship with Moscow without ever having to declare one.
On 9 October President Trump announced that Russia would supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to the American and global marketplace. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control followed with General License 135, which authorises the sale, delivery, offloading and importation of Russian-origin diesel, expressly including importation into the United States, through 7 April 2027. The political logic was legible. Reporting at the time put American diesel at $6.34 a gallon against $3.66 a year earlier, and the administration cast the deal as relief at the pump. A White House official described the aim as adding supply to the global market.
But a license answers one question only: will the Treasury Department enforce its own sanctions against you? It does not answer whether another statute, another branch, or another level of government will stand in the way. And it does not create a buyer. Importing fuel requires banks to finance it, insurers to cover it, terminal operators to take it, and lawyers to sign off. At every one of those points the waiver ran into a problem.
The first source was Congress. The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, passed in April 2022 after the full-scale invasion, bans Russian energy products, diesel included. A bipartisan group of lawmakers warned banks and port authorities that the ban still stands and that importers could face legal action and congressional investigation. Representative Jamie Raskin went further, citing a ten-year statute of limitations and writing that importers would remain exposed long after the current administration leaves office. That sentence matters more than any single legal argument, because it changes the time horizon. A Treasury license expires on 7 April 2027. A statute of limitations does not.
The second source was a state. On 2 November New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill wrote to the state’s port and terminal operators, urging them to turn away any tanker that seeks to use their facilities and warning of penalties equal to the value of the cargo. Her legal argument is that the 2022 Act does not give the president or Treasury blanket authority to waive the ban by license, and that the statutory path to relief, which she says depends on Russia withdrawing its forces from Ukraine, has not been met.
It would be a mistake to overstate what the letter did. Commentators have noted that a governor’s authority to bar the unloading of a federally licensed cargo is uncertain, and no court has tested the question. Federalism did not defeat the president here in the sense of a ruling or an injunction. It worked differently. A governor’s letter converted an abstract legal doubt into a concrete, dated, named risk for the specific people who would have to handle the fuel. It gave terminal operators something to point to when their compliance departments said no. A former Treasury sanctions specialist, David Tannenbaum, called the decision a “hard pass” given the compliance costs, and a former sanctions official told Reuters that refusal was a relatively easy call for businesses. Every downstream party that touches the cargo, Tannenbaum observed, could become the subject of a congressional inquiry.
This is the quiet power of divided authority in the American system. No single actor had to win. Congress’s statute created the liability, a state executive made it visible, and private institutions, which bear the cost of being wrong, did the rest. The president can sign a license. He cannot compel a bank to finance a transaction whose legality a coequal branch disputes and whose liability outlives his term.
The episode sits in a long line of tests over how far executive discretion over sanctions extends when Congress has legislated specifically. The administration’s position, stated by an official to Reuters, is that the waiver complies with all applicable laws. That may yet be argued in court. But the practical result is already clear and it is the more important one: executive authority that depends on the cooperation of private actors is only as strong as their confidence that no one will later hold them accountable. A waiver granted by one administration cannot give that assurance the , or a Congress that has already shown it is willing to investigate.
There is a strategic cost as well. If a presidential commitment to a foreign leader, here a promise tied to a deal with Putin, cannot be delivered because domestic institutions will not carry it, then the counterpart learns something the limits of what Washington can promise. Moscow can read the same Reuters and CNN coverage that we can. Allies read it too.
The tankers did not need to find a new market. They went to one that already existed. According to data from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, between January and October 28 shadow-fleet or sanctioned vessels made 34 deliveries of Russian diesel to Brazil, totalling 1.11 million tonnes, a quarter of the 4.31 million tonnes of Russian diesel the country received. Leruo itself is sanctioned by the European Union, Britain, Canada, Switzerland and Ukraine.
There is a wrinkle worth noting. Reuters reports that Leruo left Primorsk on 16 October signalling Manaus, and only later switched to “Atlantic coast for order.” The Maritime Executive treats the American destination of all three ships as speculation. It is possible, though the record does not prove it, that at least one of these cargoes was always a Brazilian cargo, and that the American framing served the politics of the announcement more than the logistics of the voyage. Until a discharge at Manaus is confirmed, and none has been, that remains an inference.
The Brazilian side deserves careful description, because the easy reading is wrong. These cargoes did not arrive because of a deal between two governments. They arrived because Brazil has built, over several years and under two presidents, a system in which they do not need one.
Brazil has never joined the American and European sanctions on Russian fuels. Il Foglio reports that Russian diesel was 0.2 per cent of Brazil’s diesel imports in 2021 and nearly 59 per cent last year, a transformation that began under Jair Bolsonaro, who announced a deal with Putin on cheap diesel, and grew under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The buying is done mostly by private firms, including Vibra Energia, Manguinhos, Oil Trading Import, Blueway Trading Import and Nimofast. Petrobras, the state company, says it does not import Russian diesel, in part because of exposure to American sanctions. So the state stays formally clean while the national market takes the product.
At the political level the relationship is open. On 4 August Lula and Putin spoke by telephone for an hour, with diesel and fertilisers at the centre of the agenda, according to Reuters and the Planalto’s account, and they agreed to keep coordinating at the United Nations and in BRICS. Lula had been in Moscow in May 2025. The dependence is structural: Brazil’s agriculture ministry says imports supply 93 per cent of fertiliser consumption, with Russia and China leading, and the country imports roughly a third of the diesel it burns.
So the Brazilian government’s posture toward Putin is not alliance and not sanctions. It is a form of managed neutrality in which the state supplies diplomatic cover and regulatory permissiveness, private importers supply the commerce, and the Amazon’s logistics, where Itacoatiara functions as a transshipment point for the North, absorb the cargo. That arrangement is deliberately hard to describe as a policy at all. It is, nonetheless, a policy, and it is the reason a ship that Washington could not legally land was never in doubt where to go .
This connects to a wider argument I have made middle powers: their leverage and their vulnerability both come from the same commodity dependencies, and the labels used for them, such as “Global South,” obscure more than they explain. Brazil’s choice here is practical. It is also a choice that makes Brazil a standing outlet for Russian energy at the moment when Moscow most needs one.
For Moscow the commercial result is close to neutral. The diesel sells in a market that already takes it on sanctioned hulls. The more serious constraint on Russia is supply, not demand: Ukrainian drone strikes have cut Russian refinery throughput by an estimated 45 per cent since late October, according to Reuters. A country trying to sell more diesel abroad while its refineries are being struck is not negotiating from a position of abundance.
Several points are open. No discharge at Manaus has been confirmed. The Agioi Fanendes , the unsanctioned tanker first identified as bound for the United States, is still holding in the Atlantic “For Orders.” The legal question of whether General License 135 can override the 2022 Act has not been tested in court. And it is not yet known whether the administration will try to find a mechanism that gives American buyers the assurance they currently lack, whether through new guidance, a different instrument, or a request to Congress. Representative Brian Fitzpatrick has announced plans for bipartisan legislation that would block such purchases, which suggests Congress will not wait.
Three lessons stand out. First, in the American system a presidential decision sanctions is the beginning of a negotiation with Congress, the states and the private sector, not the end of one. Second, divided authority is not only a constraint on presidents. It also serves as a stabiliser: it makes policy reversals costly, and it lets allies and adversaries see where American commitments are durable. Third, the Brazilian case is a reminder that sanctions policy is only as effective as the weakest large outlet. Where a major economy has chosen not to participate, a ban on the American side redirects trade rather than ending it.
For democracies thinking how their rules hold up under pressure, that is the point. The rules were contested, and the system answered not through a single decisive ruling but through many actors, each making a rational decision their own exposure. The diesel is on the Amazon because that was the one place where nobody had to make a decision at all.
US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. “General License No. 135.” 9 October 2026.
Office of the Governor of New Jersey. “Governor Sherrill Puts Port and Terminal Operators on Notice Against Accepting Donald Trump’s Illegal Russian Diesel.” 2 November 2026.
Reuters, via gCaptain. “Russian Diesel Faces U.S. Buyer Resistance Despite Trump Sanctions Waiver.” 11 November 2026.
Hansler and Schmitz. “Russian diesel under Trump deal struggles to reach US market amid legal fears and criticism.” 15 November 2026.
The Maritime Executive. “Tankers with Russian Diesel Reach Brazil After Bypassing the U.S.” 19 November 2026.
Kyiv Post. On the Lula-Putin relationship and fertiliser dependence.
