The RPC server sent Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * , reflected the preflight CORS headers, and advertised X-Transmission-Session-Id via Access-Control-Expose-Headers on the 409 handshake. Any page a user visited could read the session-id nonce that guards against CSRF.
This PR removes the CORS code & returns no CORS headers at all. It's not clear to me that CORS has a valid use case for the RPC server, so maybe it was a mistake to land #1885 / d11ccf1 :
Native & mobile apps (eg transmission-qt and transmission-remote, and 3rd party apps transdrone, transmission-remote-gui) aren't browser-based
The bundled web UI (and 3rd party replacements like kettu, transmission-web-control) are served by the daemon, so are all same-origin
Server-side frontends (eg Flood and Combustion) proxy the daemon, so the browser never hits the daemon
So the safest & simplest fix is to remove the feature. This is not a breaking semver change since this was never a documented API feature.
This PR also adds, as a safety precaution, a log warning if an RPC server is started with both the whitelist and user authentication disabled.
Reported by Jan Kahmen (turingpoint).
Notes: Fixed a CORS bug that leaked the anti-CSRF nonce.
There was an error while loading. Please reload this page .
There was an error while loading. Please reload this page .
The full story
This article is one source in a clustered incident — the cluster page carries the summary, timeline and every other outlet covering it.
