USENIX — Download More RAM: Dismantling Windows Operating System Defences with Mischievous Memory
Sam Collins, Tom Chothia, William Burgess, and Marius Muench, The University of Birmingham; David Oswald, Durham University
Distinguished Paper Award Winner
Virtualisation-Based Security (VBS) is the cornerstone of modern Windows desktop defences, relied upon by both the operating system and third-party software, with a virtualised secure kernel providing strong security guarantees against even privileged attackers. In this paper, we introduce Download More RAM, software-only memory aliasing attack that breaks these guarantees without physical access. On systems running the most common consumer DIMMs, our attack allows arbitrary memory read/write, letting a privileged user compromise the OS at every level, including the secure kernel, Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI), and all defences it provides. With this access we develop a series of case study attacks targeting VBS-protected processes, Windows Defender, anti-virus & EDR software, and game anti-cheats. Our work breaks the strongest security guarantees offered by the Windows OS, questioning key trust assumptions on such systems. Microsoft have assigned CVE-2026-23670 to our findings and issued a patch that partially mitigates our attack.
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