War Crimes And Crimes Against Humanity In Burkina Faso By All

I found my family and my neighbor’s family massacred. My wives [and] my children were dead…. The only survivor [from my family] was my 11-year-old son…. I found the bodies lying on the ground, bullets in their heads, chests, stomachs. My little one was wounded in the left leg.... I took him out of a pile of corpses. I found five other injured children from my neighbor’s family. –Samer [not his real name], a resident of Bouro village, Sahel region, February 6, 2024

I found my family and my neighbor’s family massacred. My wives [and] my children were dead…. The only survivor [from my family] was my 11-year-old son…. I found the bodies lying on the ground, bullets in their heads, chests, stomachs. My little one was wounded in the left leg.... I took him out of a pile of corpses. I found five other injured children from my neighbor’s family.

–Samer [not his real name], a resident of Bouro village, Sahel region, February 6, 2024

On December 14, 2023, Burkina Faso military forces and allied militias killed 19 of Samer’s relatives in an attack on his neighborhood in Bouro village.

Alone, amid bodies and devastation, Samer tended to six injured children. “I started caring for them with what I had,” he told Human Rights Watch. “I made bandages with clothes I tore off. I did this all evening. There was no one in Bouro. All had fled.” Samer then took the children and fled to neighboring Mali.

Since 2016, Islamist armed groups have waged an insurgency against the government of Burkina Faso. The Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, JNIM), the dominant Islamist armed group in Burkina Faso, controls wide swathes of the country, where it attacks security forces and kills civilians and loots their property, causing thousands to flee.

“They started shooting toward all directions of the camp and I ran to find shelter,” Abdoul (not his real name), a 39-year-old farmer who lived in a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Goubré village, North Region, told Human Rights Watch in June 2024. “People screamed, there was a lot of panic because we were to receive food aid […] Then, they burned the truck carrying humanitarian aid.”

Narrator: There’s a brutal conflict going on in West Africa that many people have never heard of. In Burkina Faso, government forces have been fighting Islamist armed groups for more than a decade. All sides have made attacks on civilians a key part of their strategies, killing thousands. More than 2 million people have been displaced by the fighting.

Soundbite: “That day, 25 people died on the spot. Some were cut up by the impact of the airstrike; others had their heads cut off. Some died from choking on the dust they inhaled after the strike. After the strike, everyone started to flee.”

Narrator: So why haven’t many people heard this crisis? Burkina Faso’s military government has banned or silenced local and international media and created a climate of fear to deter people from speaking out.

Soundbite: “The VDPs [government-backed militia] surrounded us, they told us to watch what they were going to do. There were people who had been stabbed with iron bars. When they finished stabbing, they slit their throats.”

Narrator: Human Rights Watch spent a year and a half documenting 57 attacks across Burkina Faso. We spoke with nearly 400 witnesses over the phone or in neighboring countries where they had fled and documented the killing of at least 1,800 civilians between 2023 and 2025. But this may be the tip of the iceberg.

Narrator: Since President Ibrahim Traoré took power in a military coup in 2022, he has made the fight against Islamist armed groups his main objective.

Narrator: The military has armed tens of thousands of people in a militia called the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, commonly known as VDPs. If a community has VDPs, JNIM, one of the main Islamist armed groups, often targets the entire population.

And government forces have massacred civilians simply for living in areas that JNIM controls.

Narrator: The military and VDPs have especially targeted ethnic Fulani people whom they accuse of supporting JNIM.

Entire Fulani communities have been attacked and forcibly displaced, and their property looted, acts that amount to ethnic cleansing.

Soundbite: They [VDPs] told us: “It’s [President] Ibrahim Traoré who sent us to kill you.” And they began slitting the throats of people in front of us. They called us “terrorists,” which we are not.

Narrator: Military abuses have fueled recruitment by JNIM and the cycle of retaliatory attacks has led to widespread violence against civilians. All sides have committed abuses that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. To seek justice for these crimes, we needed to identify who was responsible.

Narrator: So, we used AI to go through thousands of hours of footage from Burkina Faso’s state-owned news channel and a social media platform used by JNIM. The software we developed identified key information JNIM, military units, and the names of people involved in specific attacks. This information, along with witness accounts, allowed us to identify members of the Burkinabé armed forces and JNIM who were in a position of command during each attack.

Narrator: These include: Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, the president of Burkina Faso, and top military commanders. It also includes the leaders of JNIM, such as Iyad Ag Ghaly, Amadou Kouffa, and Jafar Dicko.

Narrator: None have been held accountable. States should investigate these serious international crimes, and the International Criminal Court should bring perpetrators to justice. Accountability and civilian protection cannot wait.

On May 22, 2024, JNIM fighters attacked the IDP camp in Goubré, killing over 70 civilians, allegedly to punish those who refused to join JNIM ranks.

In response to JNIM’s attacks, the Burkina Faso authorities have carried out brutal counterinsurgency campaigns that, since the military took power in a September 2022, coup, has increasingly targeted civilians.

Human Rights Watch documented widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Burkinabè forces alongside their auxiliaries called the Volontaires for the Défense de la Patrie (Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, VDPs) and by JNIM. Our findings demonstrate that killings and other grave abuses of civilians lie at the heart of the junta’s military tactics as well as those of JNIM.

This report documents 57 incidents that altogether resulted in the deaths of at least 1,840 civilians in 11 regions of the country between January 2023 and August 2025. In one such attack, on February 25, 2024, in the villages of Nondin and Soro in northern Yatenga province, the Burkinabè military summarily executed 223 civilians, including at least 56 children, accusing them of collaborating with JNIM. In another, on August 24, 2024, JNIM killed at least 133 civilians, including dozens of children, in Barsalogho town, in Sanmatenga province, in retaliation against a local community it accused of supporting the VDPs. These and the other incidents documented in this report do not fully capture the extent of the civilian toll of the conflict, as incidents often go unreported. According to the United Nations, two million people have been displaced by the armed conflict.

Human Rights Watch found that the abuses by government forces, including VDPs, and by JNIM amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Combatants on all sides have committed the war crimes of willful killing, attacks on civilians and civilian objects, pillage and looting, and forced displacement. Government forces and VDPs also carried out the war crimes of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment and unlawful confinement.

As part of widespread or systematic attacks on civilian populations, the murder and forcible displacement by all sides amount to crimes against humanity. Government forces have also carried out the crimes against humanity of arbitrary imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts.

Burkinabè military and VDPs have also committed persecution on ethnic grounds, specifically targeting the Fulani community, the country’s second largest ethnic group. In numerous attacks across the country, they have targeted members of the Fulani community, killing entire families, burning and looting their property, and forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands from their homes.

Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, the head of Burkina Faso’s military junta and the country’s president, has rejected that the country is in an armed conflict. He has dismissed accounts from survivors of atrocities and credible reports from media and human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, as “fake” or “manipulation.” Junta authorities have also repeatedly rejected allegations that their security forces and VDPs have committed serious crimes. None of the commanders of the Burkinabè armed forces or JNIM who have been implicated in serious crimes, including in the cases included in this report, have been brought to justice. This includes either direct criminal liability or as a matter of command responsibility.

Human Rights Watch’s research, published across dozens of reports and news releases from September 2017 to May 2022, documented numerous allegations of atrocities perpetrated by all sides, provided background and context, and suggests a pre-existing pattern of atrocities by all sides.

This report is the first effort to systematically document abuses in more recent years with a view to capturing the scale and impact of the conflict in Burkina Faso. It is based on a total of 450 interviews—including with 380 victims of abuses— conducted by Human Rights Watch between March 2023 and February 2026, remotely and in person in Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali. The report also draws from verification and analysis of photographs, videos, satellite imagery, and documents shared by various organizations and individuals, as well as other publicly available information, including social media content and official reports.

Tracking Civilian Casualties and Incidents

The civilian death toll in the conflict in Burkina Faso is unknown as there is no mechanism in place to count victims. Some figures are available, such as from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)—a nongovernmental organization that collects and analyzes data on conflict worldwide—that show that at least 10,600 civilians have been killed since 2016. However, many incidents go unreported. In addition, Human Rights Watch’s own documentation of some of the same cases, based on witness accounts, found a higher number of fatalities. Human Rights Watch also found that the government often suppressed or downplayed conflict-related data and information by banning media outlets from critical reporting, blocking access to websites of media outlets and human rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, and suspending the licenses of foreign nongovernmental organizations documenting security incidents. This reduces conflict-related information to the official government narrative, making accurate reporting more difficult. 56 percent of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch did not appear in the ACLED database, underscoring the difficulties of this data collection.

Political Instability and Restriction of Rights and Freedoms

The conflict has transformed Burkina Faso’s politics and civic life. In 2022, the country faced two coups in eight months. In September 2022, President Traoré ousted Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who had been in power since January 2022, when he himself led a coup overthrowing the democratically elected president, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Under Traoré, the junta has cited the need to counter activities from Islamist armed groups as a pretext to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms, including through arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, and unlawful conscription of political opponents, dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and judicial personnel. Political instability has provided opportunities for Islamist armed groups to gain territory. It has also led to a deterioration of the country’s human rights situation and further entrenched impunity for serious abuses.

Abuses by the Burkinabè Military and VDPs

President Traoré has relied heavily on the VDP auxiliary forces to support the military in counterinsurgency operations. Both the military and the VDPs have committed grave crimes, including the killing and forced displacement of civilians, especially from the Fulani ethnic group, whom they accuse of supporting the insurgency. They have fired on civilians in the path of military-escorted convoys and, during large-scale counterinsurgency operations, have massacred civilians from various ethnic groups simply because they lived in JNIM-controlled areas or maintained relations with local Fulani people.

Attacks against civilians in retaliation for JNIM attacks have become a hallmark of the military’s counterinsurgency approach. Human Rights Watch has found that some attacks directed by the Burkinabè military against civilians constitute a form of collective punishment. International humanitarian law prohibits collective punishment, which is the deliberate punishment of people for an offense that others committed.

Bouro, Samer’s village, in the Sahel region, was one of at least 16 villages and hamlets government forces and VDPs attacked in December 2023, in a punitive operation dubbed Tchéfari 2 (The Warrior’s Honey 2). Soldiers and VDPs targeted communities living under JNIM rule, killing hundreds of civilians. The operation was an apparent reprisal for a major JNIM attack against government forces two weeks earlier in Djibo town, 30 kilometers away, in which JNIM killed several soldiers and at least 40 civilians. The government hailed Tchéfari 2 as a “success” against JNIM, when in reality it was one in a series of atrocities against civilians.

JNIM also targets civilians in its effort to establish territorial control over rural areas. It has used violence and coercion to subjugate populations and has punished and forcibly displaced communities that refused to submit, or that it accused of supporting government forces. JNIM has also laid siege to dozens of towns and villages across Burkina Faso, causing starvation and illness among residents and displaced people. Under the laws of war, sieges are unlawful when they cut civilians off from food, basic necessities, and humanitarian aid. JNIM fighters have planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on roads and destroyed bridges, electric lines, water sources, and communications infrastructure, harming the civilian population. They have also attacked humanitarian convoys as well as villages and towns, summarily executed civilians, and abducted women and girls.

JNIM Targeting of VDPs

Many communities have become more vulnerable to attacks by JNIM since the civilian government led by Kaboré created the VDPs in 2020, and the military junta conducted additional recruitment in late 2022. When a community has VDPs, JNIM treats that entire community as being allied with government security forces, making the community a target for retaliation, attacks, and intimidation. JNIM has imposed sieges on localities where VDPs are present, cutting off civilians from food and necessities and limiting their freedom of movement. Usually, JNIM has targeted VDP positions close to civilians in villages and towns. Thus, when JNIM attacked a VDP position, civilians were also exposed. “Since the VDPs were created, there is chaos,” a Burkinabè refugee in Mali said. “If a village is spared by the jihadists [Islamist armed groups] … [it] is targeted by the VDPs and the military, and if the VDPs protect a village, or if a village has VDPs, this village is targeted by jihadists.”

The Fulani people, who are spread across the Sahel region, make up 8 percent of the population of Burkina Faso. Historically, they have been cattle herders and are predominantly Muslim.

Government forces and VDPs accuse Fulani people of supporting JNIM. While JNIM has focused its recruitment efforts on disaffected youth in the Fulani community, exploiting the continual degradation of the Fulani people’s pastoralist livelihood and the community’s underrepresentation in the government and military, government forces have often failed to distinguish between armed Fulani combatants and civilian members of this community.

In a February 2023 meeting with Fulani leaders, President Traoré enjoined them to “acknowledge that the epicenter of terrorism is in Fulani localities,” adding that members should “call on [their] relatives to disassociate themselves from the forces of evil [Islamist armed groups].” “Otherwise,” he said, “we will throw all our forces into the battle and there will be a lot of deaths. And it will be more complicated for your community. It’s not fun to kill, but if one has no choice, it’s death.”

Human Rights Watch found that the targeting of Fulani people stems in part from widely shared attitudes and stereotypes their loyalties that pervade the military and the VDPs. The highest levels of government appear supportive of military action against Fulani people based on these attitudes. The evidence includes: the geographic scope of the targeting of civilians and the increase in the intensity of anti-Fulani violence since the current junta took power; anti-Fulani statements by senior officials including the president; and many attacks that demonstrate a close coordination between the military and the VDPs across military units and layers of military hierarchy. Taken together, this indicates that the targeting of the Fulani goes well beyond abuses by isolated, ill-disciplined individuals within the ranks of the military and the VDPs, and that it may represent government policy.

A civil society activist and critic of the junta who was kidnapped and unlawfully conscripted into a VDP group told Human Rights Watch that, when he was to be released in September 2023, he met Lt. Aziz Pacmogda, at the time head of the presidential guard. The activist said that Pacmogda asked him and another person “if we think it is easy to secure the country.” Pacmogda said those who went to the frontlines “saw that it is the Fulani who are the terrorists. He said: ‘People say that this is discrimination, but we are going to kill them all!’”

Anti-Fulani rhetoric is widespread online, with charged social media posts frequently painting all Fulani people as members of Islamist armed groups and encouraging hate and violence against them. Social media influencers and supporters of the junta, called “Wayiyans,” who have a large social media presence, including through groups known as BIR-C (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide de la communication, or Rapid Communication Intervention Battalions), appear to be presenting coordinated negative messaging Fulani people.

Civilians Targeted by Warring Parties

While government forces and VDPs have disproportionally targeted Fulani civilians, other communities have not been spared. Civilians described feeling caught between a rock and a hard place. JNIM members threaten to kill them if they join the VDPs, are deemed to collaborate with the army, or fail to abide by JNIM’s requirements and strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law. Meanwhile, government forces demand that civilians provide information the presence of armed groups and carry out collective punishment, including mass killings, when people do not know or cannot provide such information.

The government’s counterinsurgency strategy appears to be failing even on its own terms: belying the government’s claims that it has regained control of territory, JNIM has been expanding its control and is present throughout most of the country. Moreover, abuses by the Burkinabè military and VDPs have fed further Islamist armed group recruitment.

Justice and Accountability

Amid the rampant abuses, the government has failed to bring to justice a single member of its armed forces for serious crimes. In November 2025, in a rare move, a military court in north-western Burkina Faso convicted six VDPs for murder and mutilating a corpse. On a few occasions, in response to reports filed by victims and information collected by human rights groups, international organizations and the media, the authorities promised to investigate reports of mass killings of civilians by the military and VDPs but subsequently failed to do so. Investigations by the Specialized Judicial Unit Against Terrorism-Related Crimes (Pôle judiciaire spécialis é dans la répression des actes de terrorisme), which deals with all alleged crimes by members of Islamist armed groups, have moved slowly. Additionally, the Specialized Judicial Unit’s lack of sufficient resources has contributed to undermining suspects’ fair trial rights.

The grievous harm suffered by civilians in the conflict and the junta’s suppression of public dissent and criticism mean that Burkina Faso’s international partners—including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and their member states, and the United States—need to play a critical role to break the country’s long-standing cycles of abuses and impunity and promote accountability.

The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should open a preliminary examination into war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by all parties to the conflict in Burkina Faso since September 2022. The Burkinabè junta, alongside those of Mali and Niger, announced its intention to withdraw from the ICC in September 2025. Under the ICC’s Rome Statute, withdrawal from the ICC only comes into effect one year after the state has formally notified the United Nations secretary-general of its decision.

All governments should investigate and, as appropriate, effectively prosecute individuals suspected of committing serious international crimes in Burkina Faso through the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws with international fair trial standards.

Burkina Faso’s international partners should also consider imposing targeted sanctions against abusive military and JNIM commanders across levels of their respective hierarchies when responsibilities are clearly established, including those mentioned in this report.

There are limited regional avenues for victims to pursue justice. Burkina Faso’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) means its citizens cannot appeal to the regional body’s Community Court of Justice. Given Burkina Faso’s turn away from ECOWAS, it is doubtful the government would comply with rulings from the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).

Burkinabè Armed Forces and JNIM Commanders Responsible for Mass Killings and Other Abuses

The research found that the gravest and deadliest attacks on civilians by the Burkinabè military and VDPs during the period covered in this report, including the massacres of hundreds of civilians near Solenzo in March 2025 and in villages and hamlets north of Djibo in December 2023, were carried out as part of large-scale operations—Green Whirlwind 2 and Tchéfari 2, respectively—coordinated across government forces and involving soldiers from the regular army and the Rapid Intervention Battalions (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide, BIR), a military force involved in counterinsurgency operations, and the VDPs, all acting in tandem. These operations indicate that the large-scale killing of civilians was a result of government policy.

For many of the incidents documented in this report, Human Rights Watch, in collaboration with the nongovernmental research group Security Force Monitor, established the chain of command identifying members of Burkinabè armed forces who had formal responsibility over the forces involved in the abuses. Under the doctrine of command responsibility, military commanders and civilian officials may be liable for serious international crimes committed by their subordinates when superiors knew or should have known of the crimes but failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the crimes or punish those responsible.

This report names senior military officials whom Human Rights Watch believes may be responsible for the mass killings and other abuses documented in this report as a matter of command responsibility.

As President of the Transition and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré should be impartially investigated for criminal liability for all abuses by the Burkinabè military and VDPs documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes, as a matter of command responsibility. Brig. Gen. Kassoum Coulibaly, Brig. Gen. Célestin Simporé, Brig. Gen. Moussa Diallo, Col. Théophile Nikièma, Col. Maj. David Kabré, and Col. Adam Néré should also be investigated as to whether they are criminally liable as a matter of command responsibility for serious abuses documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes.

This report—which found that JNIM has systematically targeted civilians during numerous attacks across Burkina Faso—also names senior JNIM commanders implicated in abuses. Iyad Ag Ghaly, JNIM supreme leader, and Amadou Kouffa, JNIM second-in-command, should be impartially investigated for criminal liability for JNIM abuses documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes, as a matter of command responsibility. Jafar Dicko, leader of JNIM in Burkina Faso, Ousmane Dicko, Jafar Dicko’s brother and deputy commander of JNIM in Burkina Faso, and Abou Hanifa, JNIM leader in the Niger region but also operating in southeastern Burkina Faso, should all be investigated as to whether they are criminally liable for JNIM abuses documented in this report that amount to serious international crimes, as a matter of command responsibility.

The Burkinabè government should impartially investigate all individuals cited in this report for alleged legal responsibility for serious crimes in Burkina Faso and appropriately prosecute them in fair criminal proceedings.

The path toward a rights-respecting Burkina Faso will be difficult. In the meantime, civilians are bearing the terrible burden of both an insurgency and a military-led government that are committing atrocity crimes with impunity. Civilian protection and accountability cannot wait.

To the Government of Burkina Faso

Investigate and appropriately discipline or prosecute, in accordance with international fair trial standards, security force personnel and VDPs and members of Islamist armed groups responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other international crimes. Promptly make findings of investigations public.

Investigate and appropriately discipline or prosecute, in accordance with international fair trial standards, security force personnel and VDPs and members of Islamist armed groups responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other international crimes. Promptly make findings of investigations public.

Coordinate with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to seek technical, financial, and logistical assistance for domestic investigative and judicial bodies.

Coordinate with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to seek technical, financial, and logistical assistance for domestic investigative and judicial bodies.

Suspend, pending investigations, security force personnel and VDPs credibly implicated in serious rights abuses.

Suspend, pending investigations, security force personnel and VDPs credibly implicated in serious rights abuses.

Adopt robust measures at the national level to counter discrimination, stigmatization, and violence against the Fulani community, including by publicly denouncing abuses against Fulani.

Adopt robust measures at the national level to counter discrimination, stigmatization, and violence against the Fulani community, including by publicly denouncing abuses against Fulani.

Increase resources to provide mental health support for members of the armed forces.

Increase resources to provide mental health support for members of the armed forces.

To the Armed Forces of Burkina Faso

Publicly order all armed forces and VDPs to fully abide by international humanitarian law and human rights law, including by taking all feasible measures to minimize civilian harm.

Publicly order all armed forces and VDPs to fully abide by international humanitarian law and human rights law, including by taking all feasible measures to minimize civilian harm.

Take all necessary measures to protect civilians during counterinsurgency operations and ensure that such operations are in line with international human rights and humanitarian law.

Take all necessary measures to protect civilians during counterinsurgency operations and ensure that such operations are in line with international human rights and humanitarian law.

Cease all unlawful killings, kidnappings, looting, forced displacement, and other serious human rights abuses, as well as threats of violence against civilians.

Cease all unlawful killings, kidnappings, looting, forced displacement, and other serious human rights abuses, as well as threats of violence against civilians.

Publicly order all JNIM fighters to abide by international human rights and international humanitarian law.

Publicly order all JNIM fighters to abide by international human rights and international humanitarian law.

Ensure lawful treatment of enemy combatants captured during operations, notably that all soldiers and VDPs captured should be treated humanely.

Ensure lawful treatment of enemy combatants captured during operations, notably that all soldiers and VDPs captured should be treated humanely.

Immediately lift sieges on villages and cities that unlawfully deprive civilians of access to food, water, necessities and humanitarian aid, and allow free movement of civilians.

Immediately lift sieges on villages and cities that unlawfully deprive civilians of access to food, water, necessities and humanitarian aid, and allow free movement of civilians.

Allow full, safe, and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas under JNIM control.

Allow full, safe, and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas under JNIM control.

To the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court

Open a preliminary examination into the situation in Burkina Faso, including alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity documented in this report.

Open a preliminary examination into the situation in Burkina Faso, including alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity documented in this report.

To the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

Conduct robust monitoring and regular public reporting on the rights situation in Burkina Faso and take measures to address impunity and advance accountability for serious abuses.

Conduct robust monitoring and regular public reporting on the rights situation in Burkina Faso and take measures to address impunity and advance accountability for serious abuses.

Investigate and, as appropriate, effectively prosecute individuals suspected of committing serious international crimes in Burkina Faso through the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws with international fair trial standards.

Investigate and, as appropriate, effectively prosecute individuals suspected of committing serious international crimes in Burkina Faso through the principle of universal jurisdiction and in accordance with national laws with international fair trial standards.

Use public and private diplomacy with Burkina Faso’s government to call on the authorities to conduct fair and effective domestic accountability efforts and to rescind any effort to withdraw from the International Criminal Court.

To Burkina Faso’s International Partners, Including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States

Impose targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on military commanders, officials, and JNIM leaders responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burkina Faso, including the people identified in this report.

Impose targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on military commanders, officials, and JNIM leaders responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burkina Faso, including the people identified in this report.

Abstain from cooperating with and providing any military support to the Burkinabè military to avoid such support being used to commit abuses.

Abstain from cooperating with and providing any military support to the Burkinabè military to avoid such support being used to commit abuses.

This report is based on 450 interviews and verification and analysis of open-source material, including official media and other reports, videos, photographs, and satellite imagery. It documents 57 incidents in 11 regions of the country between January 2023 and August 2025.

Human Rights Watch conducted interviews remotely and in person between March 2023 and February 2026 in Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Mali. Interviewees included 380 victims and witnesses of attacks and their relatives as well as 70 religious and community leaders, VDPs, former Burkinabè government officials, experts on the political and security situation of the Sahel, journalists, Burkinabè civil society activists, members of international organizations, and foreign diplomats. At least 220 interviews were conducted in person in Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Ghana, and 160 were conducted by phone.

Nearly all victims and witnesses to abuse interviewed for this report expressed extreme anxiety retaliation. For this reason, Human Rights Watch has withheld the names of all interviewees, as well as identifying details, including some locations. The names of interviewees have been replaced with initials that do not reflect those of their real names.

Interviews were conducted in French, Bambara, Fulfulde, Gourmantche, and Mooré, at times, through interpreters who translated into French or English.

Researchers informed all interviewees the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews and the ways in which Human Rights Watch would use the information as well as obtained consent from all interviewees. Every effort was made to abide by best practices for ethical research and the documentation of serious abuses, such as torture, and to minimize the risk of re-traumatization of survivors. For in-person interviews, we took measures to access and meet with victims and witnesses discreetly and in confidential settings. We informed all interviewees that they could stop or pause the interview at any time and could decline to answer questions or topics. We did not pay for interviews but covered transportation costs to and from interview locations as needed.

The credibility of each source was assessed. Researchers also probed the veracity of their statements by corroborating information from several other sources and determining consistency with overall patterns that emerged during the research.

Researchers documented the abuses in this report in the face of serious challenges. Burkinabè authorities have brutally cracked down on opposition and dissent and blocked and suspended independent national and international media outlets, fostering an atmosphere of fear across the country. In addition, restrictions on movement and risks of attacks on roads by the warring sides dissuaded some potential witnesses from traveling to meet researchers.

Documenting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

During the research, the team heard several direct reports of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). These cases were difficult to further document without risking the safety, privacy, and well-being of victims and survivors. Human Rights Watch interviewed representatives of four multilateral and civil society organizations to whom victims and survivors of sexual violence might have reported their abuse or might have been referred to for medical attention.

Human Rights Watch also identified the presence of multiple warning indicators of CRSV as laid out in the UN’s “Early-Warning Indicators of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.” [1]

The indicators can signal that there is potential risk, impending risk, or ongoing sexual violence. Examples of indicators for potential risk of sexual violence include: retaliatory attacks against the civilian population for perceived support of/collaboration with the “enemy;” arms bearers undertaking house raids and searches, particularly where women are alone in the . Examples of indicators of ongoing sexual violence include: observable signs of rampage (burned homes, destroyed crops, looted villages, torn clothing, displaced women/civilians); armed elements engage in violent reprisals against civilians in the wake of military operations; attacks on villages in order to replenish supplies/on farmers en route to fields, or women returning from market, coupled with abduction of civilians to carry the stolen goods; women/girls fleeing an area where armed elements are stationed.

The absence of these factors does not rule out sexual violence, nor does their presence confirm it. Similarly, the absence of fully documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence in this report should not be taken as an indication that conflict-related sexual violence is not occurring in this context.

Human Rights Watch has in recent years documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence in Burkina Faso, as described in greater detail in the background section of this report.

There is no official death toll of people killed in the conflict in Burkina Faso, as no national mechanism exists to track civilian casualties. Human Rights Watch researchers used data from ACLED, an organization tracking conflict events worldwide, to assess the scale of violent events against civilians that were publicly reported and for which ACLED aggregated minimum estimate counts of civilians killed.

For the numbers of civilians killed in incidents documented in this report, Human Rights Watch has used the numbers witnesses provided, corroborated through other independent sources whenever possible. In cases of conflicting accounts, Human Rights Watch sought to verify the most reliable figures and indicated where numbers remain uncertain or inconsistent.

Human Rights Watch research found that in some of the cases documented in this report—especially those implicating the military in abuses—the casualty toll for civilians was higher than that reported by ACLED, including because sometimes ACLED used government-related sources. Human Rights Watch found that the government often downplayed or manipulated conflict-related data and information, making accurate reporting difficult.

Researchers also used ACLED, among other sources, to help determine approximate dates of incidents, as in many cases victims and witnesses could not remember the exact date, due to trauma and because months or years had passed since the incidents they witnessed had occurred.

Researchers analyzed photographs and videos taken during or after attacks and sent directly to them, as well as photographs, videos and written content posted across social media platforms, including ChirpWire (used by JNIM), , Instagram, Telegram, TikTok, YouTube, WhatsApp, and X.

Where possible, researchers geolocated the photographs and videos by matching key landmarks with satellite imagery and witness accounts. Researchers also analyzed timestamps of content posted on social media platforms.

Researchers analyzed satellite images of the locations where the incidents documented in this report occurred in order to geolocate photographs and videos, verify and establish the timeline of incidents, detect signs of burning and destruction. Researchers also used satellite images of the locations of the incidents to monitor the movement of military forces and equipment, reconstruct military convoy routes, confirm the construction and expansion of military trenches, analyze the expansion of gravesites after attacks, and document the abandonment of villages following forced displacement and the dismantling of camps for internally displaced people following attacks.

In addition, researchers analyzed visual content and any associated captions and narration to identify actors involved in attacks, and count the number of women, men, girls, and boys who were killed or injured. Human Rights Watch consulted with forensic pathologists who analyzed injuries on the photographs of bodies and shared their assessment of the circumstances of deaths. Arms experts at Human Rights Watch reviewed visual material showing bullet holes and weapons to identify the equipment used.

Human Rights Watch has securely preserved digital files of the photographs and videos referenced in the report. Where possible, researchers have included direct links to social media posts in the relevant footnotes. Researchers did not include links to distressing content, or to online content when doing so might create a security risk for the people visible in the footage or the person creating or posting it. Researchers used ChirpWire, a social media platform used by JNIM, to access content JNIM fighters had posted. In these cases, Human Rights Watch has not directly linked to the Chirpwire posts so as to not amplify the channel and the content posted, but has preserved all the material, including metadata.

Human Rights Watch developed a software that extracted, transcribed, and analyzed 36,243 videos from the YouTube channel of Burkina Faso’s state broadcaster Radiodiffusion-Télévision du Burkina (RTB) as well as 2,476 posts from ChirpWire between September 15, 2022—shortly before the coup led by Captain Traoré—and April 23, 2025. The software then filtered this content and generated a searchable database that captured references to armed activity within Burkina Faso, including mentions of combat operations, geographic deployments of military units, names of members of the military and JNIM, changes in military ranks, and military unit affiliations. This information enabled researchers to identify key elements of the military hierarchy and to corroborate witness accounts on all sides of the conflict. (For a detailed description of the software and the methodology used, please refer to Appendix II.)

Human Rights Watch partnered with Security Force Monitor, a nongovernmental organization focused on investigating chains of command, to establish chain-of-command information members of Burkinabè military forces implicated in abuses documented in this report. This part of the research draws almost entirely on publicly available sources, primarily official sources such as laws and decrees, and official websites. Researchers used state media and, to a lesser extent, independent media to track the continuation of chains of command established in laws and decrees, as well as changes in commanders of military units over time. Whenever possible, researchers identified the start and end dates of commanders’ tenure based on the time of handover ceremonies between one commander and their successor.

Human Rights Watch wrote to Burkina Faso’s justice and defense ministers on December 22, 2025, sharing research findings and requesting responses to specific questions. [2]

Human Rights Watch also shared its findings with JNIM’s Sharia Committee in Burkina Faso (Comité chariatique du GSIM au Burkina Faso) on January 16, 2026. [3]

Key Actors and Alliances

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data): a nongovernmental organization that collects and analyzes data on conflicts around the world.

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data): a nongovernmental organization that collects and analyzes data on conflicts around the world.

AES (Alliance des États du Sahel, Alliance of Sahel States): intergovernmental alliance created by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in September 2023, as a “mutual defense pact.” In July 2024, the three AES leaders announced their intention to form a confederation.

AES (Alliance des États du Sahel, Alliance of Sahel States): intergovernmental alliance created by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in September 2023, as a “mutual defense pact.” In July 2024, the three AES leaders announced their intention to form a confederation.

BIR (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide, Rapid Intervention Battalions): special military units deployed in counterinsurgency operations.

BIR (Bataillons d’Intervention Rapide, Rapid Intervention Battalions): special military units deployed in counterinsurgency operations.

BSIR (Brigade Spéciale d’Intervention Rapide, Special Rapid Intervention Brigade): a large military unit headed by a commander who, since January 2024, controls the BIRs along with other rapid intervention units.

BSIR (Brigade Spéciale d’Intervention Rapide, Special Rapid Intervention Brigade): a large military unit headed by a commander who, since January 2024, controls the BIRs along with other rapid intervention units.

CEMAT (Chef d’Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre, Chief of Army General Staff): the head of the army (ground forces), under the command of the chief of staff of the Armed Forces.

CEMAT (Chef d’Etat-Major de l’Armée de Terre, Chief of Army General Staff): the head of the army (ground forces), under the command of the chief of staff of the Armed Forces.

CEMGA (Chef d’Etat-Major Général des Armées, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces): the commander of the armed forces, overseeing forces including the army, the air force, and the BIRs.

CEMGA (Chef d’Etat-Major Général des Armées, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces): the commander of the armed forces, overseeing forces including the army, the air force, and the BIRs.

CEMGAA (Chef d'Etat-Major Général Adjoint des Armées, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces): the deputy to the military chief of staff. Under President Traoré, this person has also simultaneously served as COTN commander (see below) and BSIR commander.

CEMGAA (Chef d'Etat-Major Général Adjoint des Armées, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces): the deputy to the military chief of staff. Under President Traoré, this person has also simultaneously served as COTN commander (see below) and BSIR commander.

COTN (Commandement des Opérations du Théâtre National, National Theater Operations Command): a joint forces command center under the direct control of the CEMGA, tasked with designing, organizing, and supporting counterinsurgency operations.

COTN (Commandement des Opérations du Théâtre National, National Theater Operations Command): a joint forces command center under the direct control of the CEMGA, tasked with designing, organizing, and supporting counterinsurgency operations.

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States): a regional political and economic union of 12 countries of West Africa. Burkina Faso, alongside Mali and Niger, officially left the bloc in January 2025.

ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States): a regional political and economic union of 12 countries of West Africa. Burkina Faso, alongside Mali and Niger, officially left the bloc in January 2025.

FDS (Forces de défense et sécurité): Defense and Security Forces.

FDS (Forces de défense et sécurité): Defense and Security Forces.

G5 Sahel Joint Force: a multinational military force created by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in 2014 to address the Islamist insurgency in the Sahel. It disbanded in 2023.

G5 Sahel Joint Force: a multinational military force created by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in 2014 to address the Islamist insurgency in the Sahel. It disbanded in 2023.

ICC (International Criminal Court): Pursuant to its treaty, the Rome Statute, the Hague-based ICC has a mandate to try individuals alleged to have committed genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression that fall within its jurisdiction.

ICC (International Criminal Court): Pursuant to its treaty, the Rome Statute, the Hague-based ICC has a mandate to try individuals alleged to have committed genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression that fall within its jurisdiction.

IS Sahel (Islamic State in the Sahel Province): second most active Islamist armed group in Burkina Faso after JNIM, formerly called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

IS Sahel (Islamic State in the Sahel Province): second most active Islamist armed group in Burkina Faso after JNIM, formerly called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims): an Al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM is the most active armed group in the Sahel region.

JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims): an Al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM is the most active armed group in the Sahel region.

VDPs (Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland): civilians recruited, trained, armed, financed, and coordinated by the Burkinabè armed forces to serve as auxiliaries to the military.

VDPs (Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland): civilians recruited, trained, armed, financed, and coordinated by the Burkinabè armed forces to serve as auxiliaries to the military.

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