Why Russia Wants Into the Turkic States Organization

Crimean Tatar leaders have condemned Kazakhstan’s proposal to bring Russia into the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), challenging the very justification offered for Moscow’s possible inclusion: the millions of Turkic people living within Russian borders.

The proposal, advanced by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the organization’s Oct. 30 summit in Ankara, has raised a fundamental question the future of Turkic cooperation.

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Kremlin’s Alleged Plan to Infiltrate the Turkic Bloc

Refat Chubarov, chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, strongly condemned Kazakhstan’s proposal to bring Russia into the Organization of Turkic States, describing the initiative as a possible Kremlin operation aimed at expanding Moscow’s influence over the Turkic world.

In a statement , Chubarov pointed to Moscow’s immediate positive response to the proposal, suggesting that the alignment between Tokayev and the Kremlin may indicate coordinated action.

“I am convinced that Tokayev voiced exactly what Moscow is seeking,” Chubarov wrote.

He argued that Central Asian countries have spent years building closer relations within the OTS partly to reduce their dependence on Russia, the former imperial power that continues to exercise considerable influence across the region.

Allowing Moscow into the organization could undermine that objective, giving Russia another platform to influence countries seeking greater economic and political independence.

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Chubarov also warned that Tokayev’s initiative placed Turkey in a particularly difficult position.

According to the Mejlis chairman, Ankara would face a choice between supporting a proposal that he believes contradicts the organization’s fundamental purpose and risking a deterioration in relations with Moscow by rejecting it.

Chubarov urged OTS member states to reject Tokayev’s proposal, stressing the contradiction of welcoming Russia while Moscow continues its war against Ukraine and its occupation of Crimea, the ancestral homeland of the Crimean Tatars.

Tokayev offered a different justification.

At the Ankara summit, the Kazakh president proposed involving Russia through the OTS+ framework or granting it observer status, citing Moscow’s historical ties to the Turkic world and its millions of Turkic citizens, including Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash and Sakha.

But his reasoning raises a question: if Russia’s Turkic population justifies its inclusion, why did Tokayev not extend the same invitation to Ukraine, to Turkic peoples including Crimean Tatars, Karaites, Krymchaks and Gagauz?

Tokayev’s proposal also reflects Kazakhstan’s longstanding “multi-vector” foreign policy. Sharing a 7,600-kilometer border with Russia, Astana seeks to reassure Moscow while quietly expanding alternative trade routes and defense partnerships. Yet even if intended as a tactical concession, the move risks opening the door to greater Russian influence within the OTS.

Why Russia Wants Into Another Turkic Bloc

Russia hardly lacks institutional access to Central Asia.

Moscow already works alongside Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Russia also participates with Central Asian countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Why, then, seek a role in another regional organization?

The answer may lie in what makes the OTS different.

Unlike Russian-led institutions, the OTS was established around shared Turkic identity and the ambition to strengthen political, cultural and economic cooperation among Turkic-speaking countries.

The organization has evolved beyond its original cultural focus, including efforts to promote a common alphabet , into an increasingly influential platform for transport, energy, technology and security cooperation.

Russia has traditionally been wary of independent regional structures emerging near its borders. A stronger OTS could offer former Soviet republics additional security partnerships, transport routes and diplomatic options beyond Russian influence.

In other words, Moscow may be seeking to neutralize the OTS before it emerges as a serious geopolitical rival.

Rather than confronting the OTS from outside, participation could allow Russia to monitor its initiatives and influence the organization’s future priorities.

Checking Turkish and Western inroads

The OTS comprises Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan – countries whose combined economic potential, energy resources and strategic geography give the bloc growing regional importance.

Its expanding defense ties with Ankara and economic engagement with Western countries present a potential challenge to Moscow’s traditional dominance in Central Asia.

Turkey’s growing defense cooperation with Azerbaijan and Central Asian states is particularly significant.

Ankara has expanded its influence through military training, defense technology and arms partnerships, offering Turkic countries alternatives to their longstanding dependence on Russian military equipment and security structures.

Turkish Drones Challenge Russia’s Defense Dominance

Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become central to that expansion. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have all acquired Turkish drones, while Azerbaijan demonstrated their battlefield effectiveness during the 2020 war with Armenia.

Kyrgyzstan has purchased Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı and Aksungur combat drones, expanding its capabilities following border clashes with Tajikistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also operate Turkish UAVs.

In September 2026, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed defense agreements worth more than $500 million, covering Hürkuş-II trainer aircraft, smart loitering munitions, radar systems and coastal defense equipment supplied by Turkish companies including Baykar, Roketsan, Aselsan and Turkish Aerospace Industries.

But Ankara’s influence extends beyond arms exports.

In May 2026, Kazakhstan and Turkish Aerospace Industries agreed to establish a joint venture for the local production and maintenance of ANKA drones, expanding cooperation into defense manufacturing and technology transfer.

Azerbaijan has also entered Turkey’s advanced aerospace supply chain, producing a component for the KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet.

These partnerships are gradually building a Turkish-centered defense industry network across the Turkic world, offering countries historically dependent on Russian military equipment alternative suppliers, technologies and production capabilities.

As Turkey deepens its military-industrial presence in former Soviet republics, Russia risks losing not only arms contracts but also some of the long-term influence that comes with equipment maintenance, training and defense dependence.

For Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the OTS also supports his broader vision of a more influential Turkic world.

Competing Trade Corridors: Bypassing Russia or Connecting With It?

One of the OTS’s most strategic initiatives is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, known as the Middle Corridor, linking China to Europe through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Turkey while bypassing Russia.

The route offers Turkic states greater trade diversification and reduced dependence on Moscow.

Azerbaijan’s approach, however, offers a different perspective. In an Aug. 11 interview , President Ilham Aliyev the Zangezur Corridor, connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenia, while advocating its integration with the Russia-linked North-South Corridor.

This divergence gives Moscow an opportunity to court individual OTS members through overlapping trade routes, blurring the distinction between corridors designed to bypass Russia and those that preserve dependence on its infrastructure.

Russia Eyes Lucrative Opportunities in the Turkic Bloc

Full Russian membership in the OTS appears unlikely under the organization’s current structure, but limited cooperation or observer status remains possible.

Tokayev’s proposal has already attracted support from Russian diplomatic circles.

Andrei Baklanov, deputy chairman of the Association of Russian Diplomats and a professor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, told Vestnik Kavkaza that Russia could follow the precedent established in 2005, when Moscow became an observer in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with Saudi Arabia’s support.

Baklanov argued that a similar arrangement with the OTS would be logical, given Russia’s longstanding relationships with countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

He also suggested that the bloc’s increasing focus on transport and economic cooperation made Russian involvement particularly relevant.

But Baklanov did not identify specific transport projects that would require Moscow’s participation.

The Middle Corridor, among the organization’s most strategically important initiatives, is designed to bypass Russia altogether.

For Moscow, even limited participation could create opportunities to shape regional discussions without formally joining the bloc.

Could Moscow eventually reshape the organization from within, weakening its independence and redirecting its priorities toward Russian interests?

Turkey’s ruling party pushes back – but will Erdoğan follow?

Kazakhstan’s proposal has already encountered resistance within Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), raising questions whether Ankara would ultimately support Russia’s involvement.

AKP deputy chairman Kürşad Zorlu pointed out that OTS rules require countries seeking observer status to recognize a Turkic or related language as an official language throughout their territory, rather than only within individual regions.

Russia does not meet that requirement.

Although Turkic languages such as Tatar, Bashkir and Sakha have official status in their respective Russian republics, none has nationwide official status throughout the Russian Federation.

Zorlu also stressed that Russia’s possible participation through the more flexible OTS+ framework would require unanimous approval from member states.

His remarks, however, do not necessarily amount to a final position by President Erdoğan’s government.

It remains to be seen whether Ankara will back the AKP official’s objections or adopt a more accommodating approach toward Moscow, given Turkey’s extensive political, energy and economic relationships with Russia.

China’s interests in the Turkic world

Russia is not the only major power watching the OTS.

China maintains deep economic ties with Central Asia and closely monitors Turkic cooperation, particularly given its repression of the Uyghurs, a predominantly Turkic Muslim population in Xinjiang.

Russian participation could indirectly benefit Beijing by providing another channel to monitor the bloc’s activities.

Admitting Moscow would mean bending the OTS’s core linguistic rules. And if those rules can be bent for Russia, which occupies the Crimean Tatars’ homeland, why not for China, which rules over millions of Turkic Uyghurs in Xinjiang?

If the OTS aims to strengthen Turkic states’ independence, Russia’s admission could mark the beginning of its end, undermining the very purpose for which it was created.