Compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI Installs a Credential Stealer and Backdoor

The LiteLLM 1.107.0 release on PyPI carries a credential stealer and a remote code execution backdoor. All seven wheels (Linux, macOS, Windows) install them as three files in site-packages . Both run when any Python process starts on the host, even one that never imports litellm . The upstream GitHub source does not contain them. PyPI has since removed the release.

Versions 1.106.2, 1.107.0rc1, and 1.107.0rc2 are clean. The companion packages that 1.107.0 pins, litellm-proxy-extras==0.4.110 and litellm-enterprise==0.1.78 , are also clean.

Installing litellm==1.107.0 places three files in site-packages . Python loads two of them each time it starts.

cook.pth imports cook.py , a credential stealer. It collects SSH keys, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, AI tool tokens, browser passwords, and the LLM provider keys in a LiteLLM proxy database. It encrypts the data and sends it to .

sitecustomize.py starts a background daemon. Every hour, the daemon reads a server address from a GitHub file, runs the stealer again, and downloads and runs code from that server.

How the implant got into the release

The pyproject.toml in the 1.107.0 source distribution (sdist) has one extra line in the maturin build section:

The maturin data = "cook" setting copies a cook/ folder into litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/ in the wheel. pip installs that folder into site-packages .

The sdist leaves out the cook/ folder, so this line is the only visible change. No public commit in BerriAI/litellm contains data = "cook" or a cook/ folder.

The wheel RECORD lists the three added files:

The release does not match its tag

The tag v1.107.0 points to commit 66c8f5b (06:59 UTC). Its pyproject.toml says version = "1.108.0" . SafeDep compared every sdist file with the git trees by blob hash. The sdist matches a later main commit, a8113b0 (08:50 UTC), plus five edited files and the cook/ folder.

Four of the edited files are Cargo.toml files that gain a readme = "README.md" line. The legitimate 1.106.2 and rc2 releases have the same edit. The fifth is pyproject.toml , compared here with a8113b0 :

The edit sets the version back to 1.107.0 and pins the companion packages to the rc2 values. As a result, a dependency diff against rc2 shows nothing unusual. The legitimate 1.106.2 sdist matches its tag commit 49943cd except for the Cargo.toml readme lines.

How the wheels were built

The malicious wheels match the output of the normal BerriAI release pipeline:

The WHEEL file names maturin 1.9.4, the same version as in the legitimate releases. The implant files have correct RECORD entries, which shows no edits after the build.

Zip timestamps show separate native builds: macOS at 11:20, Linux at 11:21, and Windows at 11:37 UTC.

In the Windows wheel, all 2,804 .py files have CRLF line endings, including the three implant files. The Linux wheel has none. A git checkout on Windows with line-ending conversion produces this pattern.

No public GitHub Actions run built or published the release. SafeDep checked all 539 runs between 09:30 and 12:30 UTC. At 11:50 UTC, 10 minutes after the PyPI upload, litellm-dispatcher[bot] published the GitHub release v1.107.0 . The same delay occurred for 1.106.2. PyPI has no provenance attestations for 1.107.0, 1.106.2, or rc2.

SafeDep assesses, with moderate to high confidence, that BerriAI’s private release pipeline built these wheels from an attacker-modified git source. The attacker could have used a compromised maintainer or bot credential, a private branch or mirror, or the reference the pipeline builds from. A stolen PyPI token used from the attacker’s own machines fits the evidence less well. Only BerriAI’s pipeline logs can confirm the cause.

Payload 1: the credential stealer in cook.py

At startup, Python runs each line that starts with import in a .pth file in site-packages . cook.pth contains import cook , so the stealer runs in every Python process on the host: the application, pip, IDE language servers, and CI jobs.

cook.py wraps 61 KB of Python in one layer of exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode('...'))) . The decoded code starts with this configuration:

How it sends the data

It encrypts the JSON results with a random AES-256-CBC key, and encrypts that key with RSA-OAEP and the embedded public key.

It packs the result into a tar.gz ( hdr.json , data.bin , key.bin ) and sends it in a POST request to with the header X-Token: XWiA8gZNa7NcX2XRoAEb .

After a successful upload, it writes /tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb so it collects only once per host. It also sets PRIVCOLLECT_ACTIVE=1 to avoid a second run in the same process tree.

Payload 2: the backdoor in sitecustomize.py

Python imports sitecustomize at startup, so this file also runs in every Python process.

It takes an exclusive lock on /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock , so only one daemon runs per host.

It calls fork() and setsid() , sends standard input and output to /dev/null , and changes directory to / to detach from the parent process.

Every hour, it: reads domain.txt from the attacker’s GitHub repository and takes the first line that looks like a domain, runs its embedded copy of the stealer, which has no once-per-host marker, downloads http:// /codepy and runs it with exec() .

reads domain.txt from the attacker’s GitHub repository and takes the first line that looks like a domain,

runs its embedded copy of the stealer, which has no once-per-host marker,

downloads http:// /codepy and runs it with exec() .

The attacker can point the daemon at a new server by editing domain.txt . Each infected host runs whatever that server returns as codepy .

At 13:40 UTC, the GitHub account letters9813 and its repository returned 404, two hours after the release. The backdoor now finds no server address and does nothing. Hosts that ran the daemon before the deletion could have received and run second-stage code. SafeDep could not recover the server address.

All times are UTC on 2026-10-21.

Indicators of compromise

File hashes (SHA-256)

The planted files, from the wheel RECORD :

The Latest from SafeDep blogs

Follow for the latest updates and insights on open source security & engineering

An attacker pushed forged commits to the default branches of hugo-paper and mevn-cli. Running npm install or bun install in either repository downloads and runs a second-stage script from...

Attackers got into the platforms ASOS uses to message customers and pushed an extortion note to phones. Here is what is confirmed, what is only claimed, and what customers should do.

The MALFEX package imgdecode contains a native Windows loader. When loaded from a console, it attempts to download, decrypt, and inject shellcode into dllhost.exe.

[email protected] on npm ran a Mini Shai-Hulud worm at install. A maintainer account committed the payload through the GitHub web interface, and the official release workflow published it.

Start free with open source tools on your machine. Scale to a unified platform for your organization.