Skip to content
Exploit for Classic Buffer Overflow in Php

Exploit for Classic Buffer Overflow in Php

Sploitus • October 31, 2026

[![CI](

[![license: MIT](

[![platform: linux | macos | windows-git-bash](

**PHP2Shell & friends — detect, audit and fix PHP security posture on any host,

automatically.** Maintained by **ESS KS Life Tech**.

One command finds every PHP installation, version, SAPI, web server and PHP

project on a system, audits them against the critical PHP vulnerabilities

(**CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619, CVE-2026-115560, CVE-2024-4577,

CVE-2019-11043**) plus general hardening, and then **fixes everything it safely

can** — package upgrades, version-aware ini hardening, PHP-FPM pool lockdown,

nginx guards, worker recycling — with full backups and one-command rollback.

The `patches/` directory additionally contains **real, verified upstream source

patches** extracted from PHP's own release tarballs for anyone building PHP

./setup.sh # detect + audit + report (read-only)

sudo ./setup.sh --fix # apply every safe fix automatically

| CVE | Name | CVSS | Type | Fixed in | Status |

| **CVE-2026-109618** | PHP2Shell — RCE via OOM corruption | 9.2 (v4.0) | unauth RCE | **8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35** (2026-10-21) | **CISA KEV, exploited in the wild** |

| **CVE-2026-109619** | PHP2Shell — RCE via stale global state | 9.2 (v4.0) | unauth RCE | same as above | **CISA KEV, exploited in the wild** |

| **CVE-2026-115560** | session.serialize_handler switching (info) | — | unauth RCE (unconfirmed) | keep `session.upload_progress.enabled=0` until bugfix release | advisory pending |

| **CVE-2024-4577** | PHP-CGI argument injection (Windows) | 9.8 | unauth RCE | 8.3.8 / 8.2.20 / 8.1.29 (2024-06-06) | CISA KEV |

| **CVE-2019-11043** | PHP-FPM env_path_info underflow | 9.8 | unauth RCE | 7.3.11 / 7.2.24 / 7.1.33 (2019-10-24) | CISA KEV |

PHP2Shell affects **every PHP release from 5.4 onward** serving web requests —

PHP-FPM, Apache mod_php (highest risk: a single unauthenticated request can

trigger exploitation before application code runs), php-cgi, FrankenPHP and

What "no fix for you" actually means depends on which support channel is

missing — these are three different questions:

| Condition | 8.2 – 8.5 | 7.4 / 8.0 / 8.1 | ≤ 7.3, PHP 5 |

| Upstream-supported release | yes | **no** — branch EOL | **no** |

| Upstream source backport | n/a (fixed release) | **yes** — `patches/legacy/` | **no** |

| Vendor / LTS backport possible | n/a | yes — distro ESM/ELS/LTSS, vendor PHP builds | yes — ask the vendor; some distros backport into ESM (e.g. Ubuntu publishes fixed PHP 5 for Trusty ESM) |

So: an EOL branch is **not** automatically unfixable. The toolkit reports which

of the three channels applies for each detected runtime (`php2shell_support_note`

in `lib/cve_db.sh`) instead of declaring the host hopeless — and only says

"migrate" when upstream *and* your vendor have nothing.

Full technical write-up: [SECURITY-RESEARCH.md](SECURITY-RESEARCH.md).

git clone

./tests/run-tests.sh # sanity-check the checkout, no root needed

Nothing to compile, nothing to install, no package manager: plain bash plus

coreutils/awk/sed/grep. If you fetched a source archive instead of cloning, mark

the entry points executable first (`chmod +x setup.sh rollback.sh install.sh

hunt/hunt.sh tests/run-tests.sh patches/apply-source-patches.sh`); a git

Then pick a mode below. `sudo ./install.sh` is only needed if you want the

`php-secure-patch` / `php-secure-patch-hunt` wrappers on `PATH` for cron.

# 2. fix everything (as root; backs up every file it touches)

# 3. preview instead of changing anything

sudo ./rollback.sh # newest backup set

sudo ./rollback.sh --list # show sets

1. **Upgrade PHP packages** to fixed releases via the system package manager

(apt/dnf/yum/apk/pacman/zypper/brew). `--no-upgrade` to skip.

2. **Ini hardening** — writes a version-aware `99-pSP-hardening.ini` drop-in per

PHP install: `session.upload_progress.enabled=Off` (kills the confirmed

CVE-2026-109619 producer), conservative `post_max_size` /

`upload_max_filesize` / `max_multipart_body_parts` bounds, `fatal_error_backtraces=Off`

on PHP 8.5, plus baseline hardening (`allow_url_include`, `expose_php`,

`phar.readonly`, session cookies, …). `memory_limit` is **not** quietly

tightened on a vulnerable runtime — see [Memory](#memory-why--1-and-why-it-needs-a-cgroup-cap).

3. **PHP-FPM pool hardening** — same mitigations as `php_admin_value` so they

apply *before request parsing* and cannot be re-enabled per-directory,

plus `pm.max_requests` (250–500 = reduced exposure; `1` via `--lockdown` =

no worker serves a second request), `security.limit_extensions`,

4. **nginx CVE-2019-11043 guard** — inserts `if (!-f $document_root$fastcgi_script_name)

{ return 404; }` into `location ~ \.php` blocks that use

`fastcgi_split_path_info`, with `nginx -t` validation and auto-rollback.

5. **CVE-2024-4577 kit** — emits the `%AD` rewrite rules, `.htaccess` and a

Windows PowerShell mitigation script (`hardening/windows-cve-2024-4577.*`).

6. **Project assists** — drops PHP2Shell hunting notes into every detected

project and runs `composer audit` where available.

7. **Source patches** (optional `--source-dir DIR`) — applies `patches/` to a

8. **Restarts/recycles every PHP worker** — mandatory: PHP2Shell lives in

long-lived worker memory; patches only take effect after a restart.

Every touched file is copied to a timestamped backup set

(`/var/backups/php-secure-patch//` or `~/.php-secure-patch/backups/`) with a

`MANIFEST.txt`, so `./rollback.sh` restores everything exactly.

### Memory: why `-1`, and why it needs a cgroup cap

CVE-2026-109618 is steered through a *predictable* per-request memory ceiling:

the attacker aims PHP at a controlled out-of-memory during request setup. That

makes the advisory's interim mitigation counter-intuitive — it is not "set a

* **vulnerable runtime** → `memory_limit = -1` removes the lever, **plus** a cap

*outside* PHP (systemd `MemoryMax=`, cgroup v2 `memory.max`, container limit).

With no PHP ceiling, that external cap is the only thing stopping one request

* **patched runtime** → keep a finite `memory_limit`; the OOM-corruption path is

gone, so the bound is purely your availability guard.

* **never** `RLIMIT_AS` / `RLIMIT_DATA` (`ulimit -v`, `ulimit -d`) — they show up

as fatal allocation errors, which is the very bailout being exploited.

Because `-1` trades exploitability for availability, `--fix` does **not** write

it behind your back. The audit reports it as `H-001` and you opt in:

sudo ./setup.sh --fix --oom-mitigation # writes memory_limit = -1

sudo systemctl edit php8.3-fpm # [Service] MemoryMax=2G / MemoryHigh=1500M

Both settings are containment. Only upgrading PHP closes the vulnerability.

| `--fix` | apply fixes (default is audit-only) |

| `--dry-run` | print planned actions, change nothing |

| `--strict` | shared-hosting grade: `display_errors=Off`, `zend.assertions=-1`, `cookie_secure` |

| `--lockdown` | `pm.max_requests=1` — no worker serves a second request, which removes the cross-request requirement of CVE-2026-109619 (real performance cost; it does not close CVE-2026-109618) |

| `--oom-mitigation` | write `memory_limit=-1` for vulnerable runtimes (CVE-2026-109618 interim mitigation; pair it with an OS/container memory cap) |

| `--no-upgrade` | skip package upgrades |

| `--source-dir DIR` | also patch a php-src tree |

| `--scan-path DIR` | extra project root (repeatable) |

| `--json FILE` | machine-readable report |

| `--rollback [DIR]` | restore a backup set |

**Exit codes** (cron/CI friendly): `0` = clean (or fixed), `2` = vulnerable

exposure remains in audit mode, `1` = error.

Real unified diffs against official PHP trees — provenance and verification

details in [`patches/README.md`](patches/README.md):

| `upstream-php2shell-CVE-2026-109618-109619.patch` (5,385 lines) | both PHP2Shell CVEs | php-8.3.35 — 0 failed hunks |

| `CVE-2019-11043-env-path-info-underflow.patch` | CVE-2019-11043 | php-7.3.10 — clean |

| `CVE-2024-4577-php-cgi-argument-injection.patch` | CVE-2024-4577 | php-8.3.7 — clean |

| `legacy/php2shell-minimal-backport-7.4-8.1.patch` | PHP2Shell producer kill for EOL branches | php-7.4.33 / 8.0.30 / 8.1.29 / 8.3.35 |

./patches/apply-source-patches.sh /usr/src/php-src # auto-select + apply

./patches/apply-source-patches.sh /usr/src/php-src --rebuild # + build + install

**Priority of fixes:** (1) vendor/distro fixed packages → (2) official fixed

release → (3) distro/LTS backported packages → (4) source patches → (5) config

mitigations + migration plan. PHP states **no configuration change fully

mitigates PHP2Shell** — the config layer buys time, the version fix ends it.

* **OS**: Debian/Ubuntu/EL/Alpine/Arch/SUSE/macOS/Windows(Git-Bash)/WSL, with

* **PHP runtimes**: every interpreter on `PATH` and in standard prefixes

(`/usr/bin/php*`, Homebrew, XAMPP, LiteSpeed `lsphp`, `update-alternatives`),

probed for version, SAPI, `php --ini` location and 22 security-relevant ini

* **SAPIs / servers**: PHP-FPM (binary + every pool config), nginx (fastcgi

configs, `fastcgi_split_path_info`), Apache (`apachectl -M` module scan),

* **Projects** (bash + `scanner/project-scanner.php`): WordPress, Joomla,

Drupal, Moodle, MediaWiki, phpBB, Laravel, Symfony, Magento, Yii, CakePHP,

CodeIgniter, TYPO3, Shopware, PrestaShop, Nextcloud, phpMyAdmin, Craft,

SilverStripe, generic Composer trees — with framework versions (marker files

/ `composer.lock`) and the project's own `php` requirement.

Package upgrades keep you on the same PHP branch. To leave an EOL branch:

* **Debian/Ubuntu** — the distro ships a single branch per release. To move up,

add [deb.sury.org]( (Ondřej Surý's PHP repository):

`curl -sSLo /tmp/debsuryorg-archive-keyring.deb

then `apt install php8.4 php8.4-fpm` (adjust version), and re-run

* **RHEL/CentOS/Alma/Rocky** — use the **remi** repository

(`dnf module reset php && dnf module enable php:remi-8.4`).

* **Alpine** — `apk add php84 php84-fpm` (parallel packages per branch).

* **macOS** — `brew install [email protected] && brew link --overwrite --force [email protected]`.

* **From source** — build the fixed release, or apply `patches/` to your tree

(`./patches/apply-source-patches.sh /usr/src/php-src --rebuild`).

After any upgrade: **restart every PHP worker** — `systemctl restart php*-fpm`,

`apachectl graceful`, etc. Re-run `./setup.sh` until the report is clean.

# nightly audit, non-zero exit when exposure remains (exit code 2)

15 3 * * * root /usr/local/bin/php-secure-patch --json /var/log/php-secure-patch.json \

|| mail -s "PHP exposure on $(hostname)" [email protected]

# CI gate on container images / build agents

php-secure-patch --json report.json --no-upgrade

# exit 0 = clean, 2 = vulnerable PHP or unmitigated CVE findings

# weekly compromise hunt (after patching)

0 6 * * 1 root /usr/local/bin/php-secure-patch-hunt --fail-on-findings

`sudo ./install.sh` installs `php-secure-patch`, `php-secure-patch-rollback`

and `php-secure-patch-hunt` into `/usr/local/bin` (from `/opt/php-secure-patch`);

`sudo ./install.sh --uninstall` removes them.

CISA/NCSC guidance — both CVEs are triggered by errors inside a request:

* unusually large or **deeply nested multipart/form-data** requests in access logs

* PHP workers **killed by the kernel OOM killer**, crashing, or hitting

`memory_limit` (on hosts that still set one) around attack timestamps

* **unexplained files in web roots** (webshells) with recent mtimes

* **outbound connections** from `php-fpm`/`httpd` children you cannot explain

* `Allowed memory size exhausted` spikes immediately followed by odd requests

Automated: `./hunt/hunt.sh` scans access logs, PHP error logs and web roots for

exactly these indicators (large POSTs, `upload_progress` probes, `%ad`/`-d`

cgi-arg probes, OOM bursts, fresh/hidden/double-extension PHP droppings).

`hunt/sigma_php2shell.yml` is a SIGMA rule for your SIEM.

setup.sh main entry (detect → audit → fix → report)

rollback.sh restore any backup set

install.sh install/uninstall system-wide wrappers

lib/common.sh logging, backups, version math, service control

lib/detect.sh OS / PHP / SAPI / webserver / project detection

lib/cve_db.sh CVE knowledge base + verdict engine + hardening checks

lib/fix.sh remediation engine (all changes backed up)

lib/report.sh human + JSON reporting

patches/ verified upstream source patches + applier

hardening/ ini / FPM / nginx / Apache / Windows templates

hunt/hunt.sh post-patch compromise hunting (log + webroot scan)

hunt/sigma_php2shell.yml SIEM detection rule

scanner/project-scanner.php deep composer-aware project detection

tests/run-tests.sh self-test suite (no root needed)

SECURITY-RESEARCH.md full technical research on the CVEs

CONTRIBUTING.md ground rules, test expectations, PR checklist

SECURITY.md coordinated disclosure for bugs in the toolkit itself

.github/workflows/ci.yml CI: bash -n, self-tests, shellcheck, php -l

bash 3.2+ (macOS included), coreutils, awk/sed/grep. Root only for `--fix` on

This toolkit applies well-understood, documented mitigations and takes backups

of everything it changes — but test `--fix` in a staging environment first, and

read the report it prints. `--strict`/`--lockdown` trade compatibility for

containment: review before production use.

Run it only on hosts you own or are authorized to administer. It upgrades

packages, rewrites ini files and FPM pools, edits nginx/Apache configuration and

Contributions are welcome — read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) first. The

toolkit stays dependency-free, bash 3.2 compatible, and every `--fix` action

stays reversible through `rollback.sh`. Behaviour changes need a case in

Found a way to make this toolkit do something harmful — a detected path reaching

a command, an unsafe temp file, a rollback that drops a file? Report it privately

through the process in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md), never in a public issue. This

toolkit runs as root, so its own bugs are treated as vulnerabilities.

Bugs in **PHP** itself belong with the PHP project or your distribution.

Built and maintained by **ESS KS Life Tech**.

Canonical repository: ** —

issues, releases and private security advisories live there. If you received

this as a tarball or a vendor copy, clone the repository to get fixes.