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Whatever the ICJ Rules, the Arakan Army Is Beyond Its Reach

Whatever the ICJ Rules, the Arakan Army Is Beyond Its Reach

Thediplomat •Ashley S. Kinseth • November 10, 2026

On November 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will rule in The Gambia v. Myanmar . The much-anticipated judgment comes nearly a decade after the military’s 2016-17 clearance operations drove more than 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. Should the court find that those operations amounted to genocide, it will be the first such ruling against any state.

Yet whatever the judgment, it will bind only Myanmar – a state whose government no longer controls the territory in question. What, then, could it realistically mean for the Rohingya? Among The Gambia’s requested remedies is full and equal citizenship for the Rohingya – one of the few that Myanmar could still offer in the now-fractured state, at least in theory. It is also among the least likely to be ordered, as the court has historically proven reluctant to dictate changes to a state’s laws, and its record on genocide redress is thin.

The Gambia has further asked the court to order Myanmar to provide for the Rohingya’s safe return, restore their property, and guarantee their freedom of movement. But each of those orders would be impossible in present-day northern Rakhine, which is now controlled by the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group that wrested power from the junta in 2024 and has since imposed an elaborate system of controls on the Rohingya who remain. For Rohingya still in Rakhine, these new rulers – who have adopted many of the military’s methods, yet lie beyond the judgment’s reach – pose the more immediate threat.

Investigators from the United Nations and Human Rights Watch say that the AA has imposed forced labor quotas , paid permits to visit neighboring villages, and an array of targeted taxes, which a London-based Rohingya advocacy group reports cover everything from homes, shops, and rice paddies to boats, cattle, and fishing nets . The AA has also reportedly seized an estimated 2,000 acres of land from Rohingya, and satellite analysis attributes to the AA roughly 8,500 burned structures across some 50 Rohingya villages in Buthidaung township in 2024. Further satellite imagery confirms the destruction: in the village of Hnget Thay, the rice paddies on which Rohingya livelihoods once depended have been replaced by a grid of 120 gray buildings – an AA detention camp for displaced Rohingya, which no one can enter or leave without the AA’s permission. Non-Rohingya settlers have also been installed in 11 former Rohingya villages, including villages emptied in 2017, with Rohingya laborers forced to build the settlers’ new homes as well as their own camps and AA buildings.

Whether or not this conduct clears the standard for genocide, which turns on proving intent to destroy a group, it already amounts to crimes against humanity . The crimes in question are deportation and persecution – the same crimes as in the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor’s warrant application against Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, now Myanmar’s president. For instance, all residents of AA-held areas need a string of recommendation letters to leave Rakhine State, but only Rohingya must obtain a paid permit just to visit their neighboring village. Meanwhile, deportation need not happen at gunpoint; the AA creates the requisite “ coercive environment ” when its officials tell Rohingya at village meetings that “any family unable to pay taxes or meet recruitment quotas must leave Rakhine State.”

These conditions have contributed to a continuing outflow of Rohingya refugees, with over 155,000 having crossed into Bangladesh since 2024, many of them driven out by the AA . One villager, Salamat Khan, told The Guardian that after attacking his village, AA fighters delivered the order in person: “Go to Bangladesh,” they said. “Your homes are gone, go to the [refugee] camps.”

Because Bangladesh is an ICC member, the ICC can investigate those deportations now. When it authorized the investigation in November 2019, its judges explicitly declined to limit the investigation to the 2016-17 operations or to the people named in the prosecutor’s request. Rather, their authorization covers any crime, “ including any future crime ,” committed at least partly in Bangladesh and “sufficiently linked to the situation.”

But with the ICC under U.S. sanctions , no new prosecutor is expected until late 2027 , and its Bangladesh/Myanmar investigation nearing completion , bringing the AA into it will take pressure and support from its member states, starting with the 11 that backed The Gambia’s case at the ICJ.

With the ICC’s warrant application against Min Aung Hlaing already pending for nearly two years, some might ask why the ICC should turn its scarce attention to the AA. But including the AA need not dramatically expand the scope of the investigation: to do so would address the same crimes on the same jurisdictional basis, and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, which shares evidence on crimes against the Rohingya with the ICC, is already investigating the AA.

The AA casts its conduct as a matter of war and security, arguing that “Rakhine State is witnessing war and emergency measures are necessary.” It insists it has “strictly adhered to the international laws of war,” and says it arrested Rohingya who worked with the junta to “ ensure regional security .” It is true that the junta conscripted thousands of Rohingya to fight the AA, and that some Rohingya armed groups sided with the military. But whatever role individual Rohingya played in the war, the AA’s controls fall on Rohingya as a group, the vast majority of whom never took up arms. Furthermore, much of the land was seized after the AA took control and fighting there had largely subsided , and arbitrary taxation and permitting schemes have nothing to do with the battlefield.

The ICC confronted a similar defense in September. When it convicted Mahamat Said , a commander in the Seleka rebel coalition that had seized power in the Central African Republic, it acquitted him of war crimes because the fighting had ended – but convicted him of crimes against humanity committed in the territory the Seleka then controlled.

Still, the AA is the force that broke the junta’s hold on Rakhine, and pressing it may look like helping the military or, at the very least, treating the two as equivalent. In 2017, the military drove more than half a million Rohingya out in a matter of weeks, and the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission has called its estimate of up to 10,000 deaths “conservative.” The AA’s abuses, by comparison, have not approached that scale. If anything, its methods more closely echo the controls the military imposed on Rohingya for decades before 2017. Even its burning of Buthidaung’s Rohingya villages destroyed less than a quarter as many structures as the military did across northern Rakhine in 2017, while its best-documented massacre, at Hoyyar Siri , left a casualty toll in the hundreds.

Yet holding both to the same law does not make their crimes equal, and the ICC has applied it to both sides of a war before. In the Central African Republic, it has convicted commanders of both the Seleka rebels and the anti-Balaka militias that fought them of persecution, among other crimes. Nor does any of this require weakening the AA’s fight against the junta. The changes at stake – lifting Rohingya-only taxing and travel permitting schemes, ending forced labor and halting the transfer of Rohingya land – concern only the AA’s treatment of civilians under its rule and would cost it no lawful advantage on the battlefield.

The AA’s eager courting of recognition and aid also presents a rare opportunity for leverage. Its spokesman said in 2022 that it was “ still trying to become an internationally recognized government,” and in February its leader, Twan Mrat Naing, wrote to Bangladesh’s new foreign minister proposing “a new course of friendship between Bangladesh and Arakan.” Bangladesh, which is working to facilitate talks between the AA and the junta, has particular sway. States, donors, and U.N. agencies are all well positioned to condition their support on the AA taking measures to materially improve conditions for Rohingya on the ground. This is leverage that outsiders have rarely had over the junta, and largely squandered with Myanmar’s government during its opening after 2011.

But conditioning support is not enough on its own: the states with the most influence, like China and India, deal with the AA on the basis of their own interests . The ICC route, by contrast, does not rely on those politics, and an investigation would raise the cost of dealing with the AA without conditions. The ICC prosecutor’s office should thus act before the investigation closes. Member states will have their own opportunity in early December, when the Assembly of States Parties meets in The Hague to approve a 2027 budget that plans for that closure; the 11 states that intervened in The Gambia’s case should ensure the investigation can extend to the AA instead.

Until the AA lifts its Rohingya-only controls, no one should be promoting returns to AA-held areas, least of all on the strength of the court’s ruling on 2016-17. For many Rohingya who have fled since, the AA has already handed down a verdict of its own: their homes are gone – and as long as that verdict stands, any prospect of “safe return” is illusory.