CSWP 36G, False Base Station: Applying 5G Cybersecurity and Privacy Capabilities

Date Published: September 30, 2026 Due: October 30, 2026 Email to: [email protected]

Michael Bartock (NIST) , Jeffrey Cichonski (NIST) , Parisa Grayeli (MITRE) , Sanjeev Sharma (MITRE)

This initial public draft details how the availability of inexpensive, off-the-shelf hardware and software tools allows attackers to mimic legitimate carrier equipment to intercept and disrupt cellular communications. The paper evaluates how 5G devices respond to six simulated false base station scenarios and examines protections available to mitigate risks.

This white paper is part of the NCCoE’s work to accelerate the adoption of 5G security features by demonstrating their implementation on NCCoE’s operational 5G security testbed and providing actionable implementation guidelines to help network operators and other stakeholders enhance the cybersecurity and privacy of 5G systems and supporting infrastructures.

the White Paper

This white paper evaluates six FBS scenarios (simulated in the NCCoE’s 5G Security lab) to assess how the tested 5G devices respond to FBS attacks and identify areas for improvement in standards and available device-configurable protections.

NIST is particularly interested in your feedback on the following questions:

How do you envision using this paper? What changes would you like to see to improve that use?

What additional information would you like this paper to provide?

What other 5G cybersecurity and privacy capabilities are you most interested in learning more ?

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This white paper is part of a series called Applying 5G Cybersecurity and Privacy Capabilities, which covers 5G cybersecurity- and privacy-supporting capabilities that were implemented as part of the 5G Cybersecurity testbed at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE). This white paper provides details regarding security risks posed by False Base Stations (FBS) in 5G networks. It details how the availability of inexpensive, off-the-shelf hardware and software tools allows attackers to simulate legitimate cells and exploit pre-authentication vulnerabilities. Incremental standards improvements over several generations have addressed many of the risks posed by FBS, limiting privacy breaches and location tracking for users and making FBS less effective against 5G devices. This white paper evaluates multiple FBS scenarios using the NCCoE 5G Cybersecurity testbed to assess how the tested 5G devices respond to FBS attacks, including when they are still vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. It identifies areas for improvement in standards and available device-configurable protections.

This white paper is part of a series called Applying 5G Cybersecurity and Privacy Capabilities, which covers 5G cybersecurity- and privacy-supporting capabilities that were implemented as part of the 5G Cybersecurity testbed at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE). This white paper provides details regarding security risks posed by False Base Stations (FBS) in 5G networks. It details how the availability of inexpensive, off-the-shelf hardware and software tools allows attackers to simulate legitimate cells and exploit pre-authentication vulnerabilities. Incremental standards improvements over several generations have addressed many of the risks posed by FBS, limiting privacy breaches and location tracking for users and making FBS less effective against 5G devices. This white paper evaluates multiple FBS scenarios using the NCCoE 5G Cybersecurity testbed to assess how the tested 5G devices respond to FBS attacks, including when they are still vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. It identifies areas for improvement in standards and available device-configurable protections.

Publication: Download URL

Supplemental Material: Project homepage

Document History: 09/30/26: CSWP 36G (Draft)

general security & privacy

communications & wireless