The construct_uri() function in OpenSIPS concatenates multiple URI components (protocol, username, domain, port, params) into a fixed 1024-byte global buffer without any bounds checking. When the combined length of URI components exceeds 1024 bytes, the function overflows the static BSS buffer, corrupting adjacent global data.
OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the construct_uri() function concatenates multiple URI components (protocol, username, domain, port, params) into a fixed 1024-byte global BSS buffer without any bounds checking. When a routing script calls construct_uri() with an attacker-controlled username, a combined component length exceeding 1024 bytes overflows the buffer, corrupting adjacent global data with attacker-controlled content. The overflow reaches disable_503_translation, a global flag controlling SIP 503 response handling, allowing an attacker to deterministically set the flag via the URI username and alter the server's routing behavior for subsequent messages. Because the same buffer is shared with contact_builder(), the overflow also corrupts that function's data, and without a memory sanitizer the adjacent globals are silently overwritten on every request containing a long username. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1.
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