Back Redpacketsecurity CVE Alert: CVE-2026-94044 – 03-lovepreetSingh
A vulnerability was identified in 03-lovepreetSingh MCP up to f95d035c5317fad81af9828286631053ccb23546. This issue affects the function create_file of the file app/api/mcp/route.ts. Such manipulation of the argument filePath/content leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
**Risk verdict:** High operational risk requiring prompt remediation; public exploitability is reported, but KEV status, SSVC exploitation state and EPSS probability are not provided, so active exploitation cannot be confirmed.
**Why this matters:** An unauthenticated remote caller may be able to write files outside the intended workspace, enabling unauthorised content modification, service disruption or preparation for follow-on compromise. Impact depends on the application account’s filesystem permissions and whether written files are later executed, served, imported or trusted by other systems.
**Most likely attack path:** An attacker sends crafted path and content values to the exposed API, with no authentication, user interaction or complex prerequisite apparent from the supplied attack metrics. The scope is assessed as confined to the vulnerable service, but files accessible to that service could affect adjacent application data, secrets or operational workflows.
**Who is most exposed:** Internet-facing deployments of this repository, particularly development tools, self-hosted MCP integrations and services that expose the route without an API gateway, authentication or filesystem sandboxing. Containers or hosts granting broad write permissions face greater consequence.
Alert on traversal sequences, encoded separators and unexpected absolute paths in requests.
Review API access logs for unauthorised calls to the file-creation route.
Monitor file creation or modification outside the designated workspace.
Hunt for newly written scripts, configuration files and credential-like content.
Mitigation and prioritisation:
Treat as urgent remediation; obtain a maintainer fix or remove the route until a verified fix exists.
Enforce canonical-path, allowlist and workspace-boundary checks server-side.
Require authentication, rate limiting and network restriction at the gateway.
Run the service with a least-privilege account and read-only or isolated storage where feasible.
Test containment in staging before deployment; preserve logs and review recent writes retrospectively.
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