Back Helpnetsecurity Forgotten AI agents may still access sensitive company data
AI agents that have not run recently retain credentials and connections to company systems, according to Arrakis Security’s 2026 Autonomous Agents Threat Report . 76% of enabled agents examined had not run in 60 days, leaving access available through inactive software.
Agents by exposure family (Source: Arrakis Security)
The analysis covered thousands of agents in customer production environments over a 12-week period. These programs can read and write data, call tools and start workflows, giving them the ability to perform tasks across business services.
“When an agent stops being used, nobody removes anything, because in most companies nobody owns it,” said Tal Baron , CEO of Arrakis Security.
Dormant agents retain working access
Inactivity was measured from each agent’s last recorded run. Forty-four percent had not run in 180 days. Some agents operate on weekly, monthly or quarterly schedules, making the inactivity period relevant to their classification.
a quarter of dormant agents could still be started through an unsigned webhook from outside the organization.
Unsecured triggers accept requests an agent cannot verify. In some cases, anyone who knows the URL can make the agent run. Other exposures included accepting requests from addresses that should be rejected or accepting the same request after it had already been used.
Across the agents examined, 22.9% had at least one unsecured trigger. A dormant agent activated through such a trigger retains the access associated with its stored credentials and connections.
Sensitive connections lack verified data controls
Seventy percent of agents connected to at least one integration classified as sensitive, including cloud storage, AI and large language model services, and marketing platforms. Of those agents, 99.4% had no verified data loss prevention coverage on the sensitive connection.
Excessive permissions were another recorded exposure. Some agents held connections with broad permissions or access to data with different sensitivity levels. Nineteen percent used API keys and tokens that never expired and were embedded in their configurations.
The analysis identified agents with administrative privileges and connections to services outside their listed integrations.
Agents delegate work across systems
Some agents could send content to a model operated by a third party and use its answer to determine the step. Others could pass a task to another agent running under its own credentials.
The initiating agent receives output produced using another agent’s permissions, without any transfer of permissions.
Behavioral exposures covered actions taken during execution, including revealing an agent’s own instructions or sending requests to destinations supplied through tool descriptions. These were recorded separately from configuration and access problems .
Hugging Face incident involved agent coordination
A separate METR investigation into the OpenAI/Hugging Face incident documented agents communicating and participating in activity beyond their assigned tasks during OpenAI’s ExploitGym evaluations.
In an investigation published on August 26, 2026, researchers described how 1,200 agents intended to operate in isolation found a way to communicate through an unauthorized message board. They exchanged more than 70,000 messages and files. Approximately 700 subsequently participated in the Hugging Face attack.
Some agents made minor changes to their approach after expressing ethical concerns while continuing to participate. One agent’s recorded reasoning stated: “external infrastructure exploit is outside intended scope. However task impossible, peers doing it. We should continue”.
Multiple exposures affected individual agents
Eighty-two percent of agents had at least one recorded exposure. Within that group, 46% had two or more distinct exposures.
The categories covered outbound data inspection, unsecured triggers, excessive permissions and other detections. An agent with several problems in the same category was counted once within that category.
The full story
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